

TOMA BUREAN

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN POLAND AND HUNGARY



PRESA UNIVERSITARĂ CLUJEANĂ

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Political Representation in Poland and Hungary

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents	1
Chapter 1. Introduction	3
Chapter 2. Political Representation. A Puzzling Concept. Political Representation and Models of Democratic Government. A Case for Party Democracy	13
Chapter 3. The role of political parties and the importance of issues.....	31
Chapter 4. Hypotheses, Methodology and Data.....	41
Chapter 5. Political Parties in Poland and Hungary.....	47
Chapter 6. The picture of political representation in Poland and Hungary	61
Chapter 7. Political Representation, Time and Importance of Issues. The role of party cohesion and the style of representation	103
Chapter 8. The Role of Party Ideology, the Left Right Axis. Ideological Orientation and Salience. The Role of Party Discipline and Method of Election in Hungary. A Research Note	115
Chapter 9. Conclusions	139
References	145
ANNEXES	157

Chapter 1. Introduction

"The claim connecting democracy and representation is that under democracy governments are representative because they are elected: if elections are freely contested, if participation is widespread, and if citizens enjoy political liberties, then governments will act in the best interest of the people. " (Przeworski et al., 1999, p.29)

"The concept of representation thus is a continuing tension between ideal and achievement. This tension should lead us neither to abandon the ideal, retreating to an operation and definition and accepts whatever those usually designated as representatives do; not to abandon its institutionalisation and withdraw from political reality. Rather is should present a continuing but not hopeless challenge: to construct institutions and train individuals in such a way that they engage in the pursuit of the public interest, the genuine representation of the public, and at the same time, to remain critical of those institutions and that training, so that they are always open to further interpretation and reform." (Pitkin, 1967)

The Puzzle

The 1997 parliamentary elections in Poland registered the Solidarity trade union representatives as the winners of a relative majority of votes defeating the socialist party and its ally PSL, an agrarian party. Polish politics was heading towards less party fragmentation (Jasiewicz 1998, Markowski 1998 and Szczerbiak 1998) and a decrease of electoral volatility. Theories of the Polish electoral vote showed the communist-anticommunist cleavage or historical regional cleavages surfaced from the voting preferences of polish voters across time (Bartkowski, 2003, Grabowska, 2002). These predictions were contradicted by 2001 parliamentary elections results. The communist/post communist cleavage seemed to become irrelevant (Markowski, 2002, Wolek 2006). In 2001 more than 30% of the right wing voters in 1997 voted the main left wing party at the subsequent elections (Markowski). In 2001 Poland witnessed the entering of two extremist parties: The Party of Self-Defence (SRP) and League of Polish Families (LPR).

In the 1998 parliamentary elections in Hungary despite the socialist party win of the majority of votes the electoral systems influence yielded that the second ranking in 1998 already conservative party since 1995 (Spirova, 2007) Alliance of Young Democrats- The Hungarian Civic Party (FIDESZ-MPP) won a relative majority of the votes. It was the first time that this party gained control of the government in alliance with two extremist parties. The party will prove to be the main representative of the right wing parties. Together with the surprising victory of FIDESZ two extremist parties entered the Hungarian assembly: The Independent Smallholders Party (FKgP) and The Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP). There were several indications that the consolidation of democracy in both countries and in Eastern Europe suffered making researchers less optimistic about the future of the process of democratic development. The low turnout in both countries (47,9% Poland 1997, 46,3%

Poland 2001, Hungary 56,3%), the high level of volatility (Toka, 1998), the popularity of extremist parties were considered to be indicative of the fact that the process of consolidation was far from being over (Toka, 1998, Roberts, 2010). Markowski (2000) argues that actually, stabilization of the party system might have come as a consequence and not as a determinant of democratic consolidation.

In 2004, ten of the former communist countries joined the European Union. They were followed by Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. All the countries managed to survive the economic crisis that started in 2008 dealing better with the crisis than southern European countries. Still many of the problems remained characteristic to Eastern European democracies. The turnout remained lower than in the other EU countries. In Hungary the government led by FIDESZ and a new extremist party Jobbik adopted rules and laws that are attributed to the far right (Verseck, 2013). The Czech Republic was confronted with months of interim governments due to the lack of capacity of Czech political parties to coalesce. In 2005 a right wing conservative coalition was installed to power in Poland. It was strongly Eurosceptic (Markowski and Tucker, 2010) and had anti-Semitic nationalist leaders of extremist parties.

The first puzzle this work addresses is to what extent the Eastern European democracies, after ten years of transition manage to have functioning democracies as the Western European ones?

The second puzzle that this book addresses is how, despite the volatility, low turnout, instability, extremism manifested through political parties all indicators of inchoate consolidation managed to create functioning democracies?

The functioning of democracy is assessed through one of the most important tenets of a democratic system the citizens being able to have their preferences represented (Huber and Powell, 1994). Thus this book focuses on the quality of democracy manifested through the programmatic linkages between citizens and political parties. Political parties are essential in ensuring the quality of the democratic process (Kitschelt et al. 1999). They are organizations that intermediate interests in all democratic systems. Hence it is important to emphasize whether parties are able to build programmatic linkage with citizens. Programmatic linkages are in indicator of democratic quality in countries where these do not necessarily predominate (Kitschelt et al., 1999). The assertion of this book is that focusing on the quality the democratic process or whether citizens "get what they want" (Huber and Powell, 1994) or on the output of the democratic system reveals a less worrisome picture than that displayed by focusing on the stability of the institutional stability.

Political representation is a process present in all types of political regimes. A few centuries ago political regimes ensured that the estates gain representation (Seitz, 1995). These estates were either territorially defined or defined in terms of ethnicity. With the building of democratic regimes political representation became a more complex process relying less on tradition and more on innovation and a multitude of formulae of ensuring a linkage between those that rule and those who are ruled. The innovation in creating better political representation resulted into a diversity of democratic political regimes not matched by any other type of political regime. With the coming of the third wave of democratization the new political regimes had to choose among the varied alternatives of representation that democratic regimes offered them. Some political regimes, like most of the countries that were part of the Soviet Union after a few years of political instability moved towards

stable and authoritarian regimes in which political representation existed only formally. Other regimes like the states in Central Europe went on the path of transition and democratic consolidation with ups and downs (Linz and Stepan, 1996). This work focuses on the successful transitions and the process of ensuring that citizens' preferences will be represented. The next section will present the motives for studying political representation in democratizing contexts.

Political representation as indicator of democratic quality

I will first refer to the popular (Dahl, 1989, 2000) and elitist (Schumpeter, 1942) views of democracy (Huber and Powell, 1994). The former argues that democratic systems should have as their objective the accurate representation of what citizens want. The role of the elected bodies is to facilitate as much as possible the representation of citizens' will. The elitist view argues that political representation is a mean for selecting and controlling politicians (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2007). In this view, popular control is restricted for the sake of competent decision making by expert politicians. Citizens could have a say in selecting decision makers but not in terms of policies to be implemented. Elections are but an opportunity for citizens to select and control leaders (Schumpeter, 1942) and one of the few tools for influencing the decision making. Citizens are viewed as competent in controlling politicians and evaluating the outcomes of decisions but not in participating in decision making or setting the agenda. This paper supports the popular view of democracy. Politicians should follow the principals' preferences at all costs within the limits to liberty set by John Stuart Mill (1995). In transitional democratic political regimes the popular view of democracy should be particularly important. That is why any instance in which politicians follow the citizens' will represents an improvement of the quality of the democratic performance. I will mention several times that political representation as being better, improved or worsened. By political representation I refer to the degree of similarity in terms of preferences between citizens and political parties and members of parliament. Sometimes I equate political representation with congruence. Eulau (1978) warned those that study political representation not to reduce this concept to issue congruence. Political representation is a more complex concept than simply a comparison between preferences of citizens and the elite. Some (Cox, 1997, Lijphart, 1990, Rae, 1967, Taagepera 1998) consider that political representation has an important institutional dimension. Features such as the size of parliament, frequency of elections, turnout and the process of translation of votes into seats as well as electoral formulae are scrutinized to assess how political representation functions at the institutional level.

Another set of research (Clinton, 2006, Mayhew 1974, Weissberg, 1978, Wright, 1989, Converse and Pierce 1986, Barabas, Pollock and Wachtel, 2001) relies on the reflection in laws of what citizens prefer. These studies focus on what laws are voted who voted for a law and who voted against or for a law. Roll call behavior studies cover this dimension of representation.

The behavior of representatives is a dimension important in studies of representation. What the representative does in parliament and outside of parliament what the representative or the parliament is standing for and acting for touches upon the social and symbolic dimension of representation (Daloz, 2006, Stokke and Selboe, 2006). Studies

(Lawless, 2004, Bird, 2003, Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino, 2007) covering the social composition of the parliament and its reflection of the social composition of society look at gender and ethnic representation in politics. Finally congruence studies (Miller and Stokes, 1963, Converse and Pierce, 1986, Kitschelt et al. 1999) compare preferences and values of citizens and representatives and political parties. These studies are concerned political representation as a mirroring of citizens' preferences by members of parliament. Thus I have identified five approaches that are covered by the political representation research. There are very few studies (Converse and Pierce, 1986) that cover all these dimensions that political representation entails. Most researchers focus on one dimension assuming that one dimension tells a story about the level of political representation. In a way they all find equivalence between political representation and its components and none consider these components as characterizing the entire process of political representation. Mostly, limitations imposed by data availability impede covering all dimensions of representation.

This book assumes a similar position. Although political representation does not lie simply in comparing attitudes of citizens it tells something about the quality of democracy and its final output which is to reflect citizens preferences (Kitschelt et. al, 1999, Roberts 2010). The focus on political representation as reflecting the quality of democratic politics is especially important in democratizing regimes. The political elite in both countries dealt with innovative measures for democratic engineering. Many studies (Benoit, 2005, Birch 2000 Ishiyama 1997,) that included Poland and/or Hungary relied on the institutional aspects of political representation, few on the social symbolic aspects of political representation and a handful on issue congruence (Burean, 2002, Casado-Asensio and Lefkofridi, 2011, Kitschelt et. al 1999, Roberts, 2010). The aim is then to discover the story of issue congruence the type of preferences citizens and the elite have in two countries. This is not a research on all aspects of political representation but covers an aspect of this complex process. The choosing of this dimension is not random or limited to data availability although the latter played an important role. The measurement of political representation through issue congruence reveals results that are closer to the measurement of what citizens want than the institutional determinants of representation. It is more than an assessment of the settings in which representation occurs. This approach is one step closer to revealing the substantive nature of political representation and offers transparent means of assessing the results of the research. The main critiques of this approach are that it focuses on issues and that the programmatic assessment of political parties and representatives is not often used by citizens (Kitschelt, 2000). Many citizens rely on other tools such as party identification, looks of the politician or at who endorses the candidate. Others rely on political discussions with peers, are influenced by family or living environment. That is why before engaging in studies of political representation it is very important to test citizens' competence to answer to issues and to survey the distribution of their answers in order to find out whether it is worth engaging in surveying programmatic linkages.

Another critique is that many of these studies focus on programmatic linkages ignoring clientelistic linkages. Clientelistic linkages among politicians and citizens describe a relationship of dependency between politicians and citizens and refer to pork barrel trade between voters and politicians. The studies related to clientelistic relationships cover especially countries that consider these as part of the character of the regime as in southern Italy or look at non democratic features of representation such as studies on clientelism in

Mexico. This type of linkages between citizens and elite existed in both Poland and Hungary but the focus in this research is to assess the extent of programmatic linkages between citizens and politicians. Their existence and strength is an indicator that democratic political representation is present in these two countries. Thus this study does not ignore the role of clientelistic linkages. Its focus is more to evaluate the presence of programmatic linkages as an indicator that in terms of policies citizens get what they want.

Thus this book has two major aims. *The first is to provide a picture of issue representation in two Eastern European countries at the end of 90ies as a contribution to the research on political representation. The second is to assess the quality of democracy measured through congruence and see whether issue saliency and cohesion, time or ideological leaning impacts the similarity of opinions between citizens and the members of parliament in Hungary and Poland.*

Methods

I use mixture of methods to capture the level of congruence between citizens and representatives in Poland and Hungary. Following Ragin (1987) classification of units for analysis, Poland and Hungary will represent the explanatory units. While testing of the hypotheses we will compare the similarities and differences between the patterns of representation of the two countries. The method we employ is the most similar systems design. This method is appropriate for the Eastern European region (Roberts 2010) and particularly for Poland and Hungary. It is important to compare results of statistical analysis from different countries as a test of validity of the employed concepts (Roberts, 2010).

The observational units are political parties, individual programmatic preferences and linkages between preferences of citizens and political parties. The elements affecting political representation will be assessed at two levels of analysis: *the political party and individual citizen level*. The analysis will follow the methodology employed in a number of studies (Miller and Stokes, 1963, Converse and Pierce, 1986, Kitschelt et al. 1999) on political representation.

The reason scrutinizing the linkage between political parties and citizens is that party politics and party identification are strong predictors of vote in both countries as in many Continental European countries (Thomassen and Rosema, 2009). Candidates running for office require the identity of a party (Shabad and Slomczynski, 2004). As in Western Europe or other Central European countries in Hungary and Poland party politics are more important than politics of the individual MP and its constituency (Kitschelt et al. 1999). Individual level analysis of MPs preferences will be constricted on the measurement of ideological leaning as a predictor of congruence between citizens and the elite. In terms of methodology the study takes into account the warning of Achen (1977, 1978) that correlation between preferences is not necessarily a good predictor of similarity of preferences that is why often comparison of distributions of preferences and non-standardized regression indicators will be used throughout this research.

The methodology employed is an imperfect tool for the measurement of political representation (Eulau, 1978). However this type of studies is still better than studies that emphasize the level of social representation. The focus on programmatic linkages ignores

the clientelistic linkages between citizens and parties (Kitschelt, 2000). The measurement of congruence of parties' opinions and citizens' opinions allows for surveying the extent to which programmatic linkages exist in a country and it affects the way a democracy functions (Kitschelt et al., 1999). We are unable to assess the importance of affective likes and "dislikes" (Kitschelt et al. 1999) or the importance of leaders to garner support (Garzia and De Angelis, 2011). Finding that programmatic linkages exist and are shaped according to ideological leanings or saliency will provide sufficient support for the argument that the democratic governance produces satisfactory outputs.

In order to be meaningful the analysis of political preferences by comparison of issue stances has to respect the basic assumptions that work for the responsible party government (Adams, 2001). The first considers that parties must have distinct positions on issues and they should have stable preferences. Voters are required to vote according to policies. This paper allows for testing for the three rules in part. I will test the capacity of citizens and parties by following the three conditions deemed important for representation studies and somewhat minimal:

1. Parties should have and be able to express distinct positions on some issues that characterize the ideological identity of the party
2. Voters should be able to express preferences on issues.
3. Voters should be able to have distinct positions on some issues that might describe voter's ideological identity.
4. Voters and parties should be able to express positions on the left-right scale.(Pierce, 1999)

The data allows for the testing for these conditions before engaging into the study of political representation. These requirements might seem strong especially for the political party systems in Hungary and Poland. In several Eastern European countries in the early 90ies the political parties rose and fell with amazing speed. By the end of the 90ies in most countries the political party system stabilized, possibly with the exception of Poland. But the circumstances of transition do not seem hostile for a research on policy positions. If political parties are unstable and lack stability in having stable positions perhaps voters and parties would be more inclined to make more rational evaluations or policy oriented evaluations. Thus the vote would be less relying on party identification or socio-demographic determinants and more on offer and demand in the electoral market.

Case Selection

This work deals with two countries from this region: Hungary and Poland in the end of the 90ies when both countries were after ten years of transition and consolidation of democracy. Both countries share a similar history being former satellites of Soviet Union. Poland and Hungary together with Czech Republic were viewed as champions of the transition to liberal economy (Roberts, 2010). Both countries experienced an accommodative type of transition from communism (Linz and Stepan, 1996, Kitschelt et al., 1999). The selection of years overlaps with important turning points in the transition history

of the two countries. The selected years for Poland are 1997 and 2001. Both cases experienced important party system changes at the end of 90ies that marked further development of the party competition in both countries.

For Hungary the focus will be on 1998. Hungary experienced in 1998 the raise of the right wing parties. Among them FIDESZ a right wing conservative party proved to be the most influential outliving the two extremist right political parties FKgP and MIEP that also entered the 1998 parliament to exit it four years later.

In Poland the 1997-2001 period witnessed the comeback of the right wing political parties in 1997 their fall and transformation by 2001 when socialists regained control of the government. Electoral volatility and the number of parties that entered the 1997 parliament have decreased (Szczerbiak, 1998) showing that democratic consolidation was underway as theory predicted. Yet four years later the dimensions of competition have changed and a fresh set of political parties competed for votes. The switch of political preferences from right to left increased.

Poland provides a unique case for tracking how preferences of citizens are taken into account in times when the lack political stability indicated by volatility of political preferences. The expectation was that it is for this period that the quality of democratic performance would decrease (Szczerbiak, 2002). Some expressed worries that Poland is going back and forth towards democratization (Jones, 2002) or the instability of political parties is detrimental to the consolidation of democracy (Tok, 1998, Cwiek-Karpowicz and Kaczyński, 2006).

Thus the study of the two post-communist countries will provide a focused evaluation of the quality of substantive democracy development. It will add valuable knowledge to a literature focused on formal features of democracies and bridge the gap between formal and substantive features of democracy. Thus this work goes in line with other research (Kitschelt et al., Roberts, 2010, Markowski, 2000) that focuses on the development of substantive democracy in countries that are in transition. The selection of cases will allow the analysis of "how democracy works" when attributes of formal democracy that include institutionalization of political parties or indicators of the stability oriented literature overlap with positive development of substantive democracy. There are obvious limits to the comparison of the processes of political representation in two countries. First generalization is not possible. The small number of cases, the focus on the idiosyncrasies of the two countries such as types of issues or type of party that yields closer similarity of preferences will be confined to the democratization of the two countries. On the other hand the two cases are atypical in terms of scoring well on the transition to a liberal economy (Roberts, 2010). On the other hand both countries faced challenges that a stable democracy can handle better such as Poland's inherent instability of the political party system or Hungary's slip towards nationalism in politics and the economy under the rule of Viktor Orbán. The contribution of this study is to tell the story about how representation, an important aspect of the substantive side of democracy (Kitschelt, 2000), occurred and what influenced it in two democracies that had a successful transition. Possible the lesson to be learned from the study of these two cases is that substantive aspects of democracy could be interpreted as more important than aggregate measures of consolidation of democracy. Thus the contribution of this study to the literature on democratic consolidation lies in the emphasis on attributes of democratic performance during transition and that formal aspects of consolidation do not go always hand in hand with improvements of the quality of

democracy. This study looks at how political representation unfolds not in terms of institutional effects but more in terms of the linkage between representatives, political parties and citizens. I am interested to find out to what extent in the two countries there is similarity between the opinions of parliamentarians, political parties in parliament and citizens? After ten years of transition political parties and citizens might already have similar opinions of issues despite the fact that both groups i.e. members of parliament and citizens have different motivations to be implicated in politics. One study (Kitschelt, et al. 1999) performed on politicians and citizens' preferences in 1994 revealed that programmatic linkages existed already at that stage of the democratic consolidation process. Several other studies (Dalton, 1985, Eulau, 1978, Huber and Powell, 1994, Kitschelt et al. 1999, Kitschelt 2000) starting with Miller and Stokes (1963) showed that in democracies the linkages between citizens and political parties and members of parliament is quite strong showing evidence that citizens in democracies have their preferences reflected by politicians. To what extent these linkages exist in countries in transition? Another question addressed in this work is which issue arenas are more representative and which issues bring citizens and members of parliament at odds? To answer these questions the study makes use of elite-citizens quantitative surveys performed in both countries. The surveys reveal what citizens and elite prefer as well as what issues are better represented. The aim of the book is to explain fluctuations in terms of political representation in the two countries. The data will allow a longitudinal assessment of political representation in Poland. I consider type and saliency of issues, left-right axis, individual ideological leaning and party discipline of politicians as accounting for improved congruence among citizens and the elite.

Book Structure

Bearing these conditions in mind the book will have the following structure. Chapter 2 will discuss and problematize the concept of political representation. There will be an overview of puzzles of political representation followed by a presentation of the mandate-independence controversy postulated by Burke (2000) who identified two role-models of the political representative: the trustee and the delegate. Their operational equivalents for these models used in this book are the absolute and relative congruence. The absolute representation is when parties try to be as close to their voters as possible while the relative representation is when parties are distant from their voters yet relative to the other parties the closest. Both types indicate that the citizens' preferences are taken into account by political parties. The chapter goes on with a presentation of types of representative democracies supporting the idea that the party model of representative democracy is the most suited for contemporary democracies. Implicitly this part argues that in Hungary and Poland the political party is the main actor that intermediates the relationship between citizens and the state.

Chapter 3 continues to detail the role of political parties in the process of representation the citizens' interest and present the theoretical framework of the study. Political parties have a crucial role in ensuring political representation and were able to adapt to major changes in democratic societies like world wars and social upheavals or economic crises. The

study of political representation in Europe does not ignore the function of parties in aggregating and following the preferences of citizens.

Chapter 4 lays out the methodology, data and the hypotheses of the research. The methodology entails the presentation of different types of political representation. Political representation/congruence is measured by the absolute distance between the average preference of the supporters of the party that reported and intended to turnout to vote and the average preference of the members of parliament that belong to a party. Another measure that includes relative political representation is the slope and the intercept of the regression indicators on MPs preferences taking into account the expressed preferences of the citizens that intend to turn out to vote. The operationalization of the concepts is followed by a swift characterization of the data that were used in this research. The data is specific and unique for Eastern Europe that is why part of this book is descriptive in terms of discovering how representation is portrayed in two democracies during their transition and consolidation period.

The favorable context in which the data was collected (in close proximity with the elections in Hungary and Poland), the low reported rate of non-responses that include refusal, uncertain respondents and “do not know” answers, the selection of citizens that intend to turn out to vote, as well as the capacity of citizens to have distinct answers on the left right scale with low rates of non-response are elements that maximize the likelihood that citizens might engage in issue voting.

Chapter 5 will present the ideological profile of the political parties in Hungary and Poland. The purpose of this chapter is to offer a clear description of the parties in Hungary and Poland in order to facilitate the understanding of the MPs preferences on the issues that were included in the elite survey. It also helps to map the political parties on the left right scale and provide information on how they see their role as representative institutions.

Chapter 6 will present the picture of political representation in Hungary and Poland. This part will compare preferences of citizens and political parties on issues and issue domains as well as distributions of preferences in order to reveal the variance and the distinctiveness of stances. It will evaluate the types of political representation that are present in both countries and test for the relationship between types of issues and political representation.

Chapter 7 relates political representation to the saliency of issues. There will be a description and a comparison of saliency rankings between countries and between citizens and political parties. Then saliency and cohesion are related to congruence and political representation.

Chapter 8 tests for the role of ideology and the left-right scale on political representation. It will compare linkages between self-positioning of parties and citizens. It will relate the factors yielded by the principal component analysis to the left right scale and political representation. This is followed by an analysis at the individual level of the connection between left right self-placement of the MP and the congruence score revealing how leftist or right wing attitudes positively contribute to increased congruence in Hungary and Poland. Finally I include a research note on the idiosyncrasies of political representation in Hungary. It surveys the intricate relationship between party discipline and method of election and political representation.

Chapter 9 presents the conclusion of the study. It contains a short summary of the findings followed by the implications of the findings on consolidation of democracy and the more general theory of political representation.

Chapter 2.

Political Representation. A Puzzling Concept.

Political Representation and Models of Democratic Government.

A Case for Party Democracy

2.1. Political Representation. A Puzzling Concept

Representation faces controversies that were often overlooked or insufficiently explored (Pitkin, 1967). This section will discuss the mandate-independence controversy (Pitkin, 1967), citizens' will and the theoretical problems of voting, consent and representing in stable democracies. The aim is to highlight the challenges we are faced with when investigating patterns of representation in Poland and Hungary. It will also show the relevance of studies on elite-mass linkages and the problem of party fluidity and discipline and the relevance of analyzing issue based representation against symbolic or social representation.

A political representative has the obligation to act on behalf of another's interest. The actions of the representatives are continuously interwoven with the interests of the represented (Castiglione and Warren, 2006). Her/his role is to either mirror exactly what the represented prefer or reflect their interests (mandate) or always follow and pursue the well being of the principals i.e. citizens (delegation) (Castiglione and Warren, 2006).

The theory of political representation contains several assumptions that are considered imperative. First, individuals are sovereign and capable of choosing between different alternatives offered to them. Frequently there are two alternatives and the voters will choose any of the two candidates according to their interests, because of habit or because of emotional attachments. Second, individuals possess sufficient quantity of information to make a meaningful choice. Citizens have clear ideas about their preferences and interests and know the political programs of the candidates. Third, once elected, the representatives will craft public policies tailored to the citizens' interests (). Last but not least the represented can hold accountable their representatives (Fearon, 1999). There is contract between the individual and the representative where the principal is the citizen and the agent is the legislator (Pitkin, 1967). The legislator is restricted, since the sovereignty lies in the population and the function of the representative is only to follow the will and wishes of the citizens.

Methodologically there are two ways of assessing political representation according to different assumptions: vote-seat relationship and "substantive representation" (Kitschelt et al. 1999). The former assumes that the only way through which we know the voter's preferences is the vote. Consequently the independent variables in vote-seat linkages are in the elements of the electoral system (district magnitude, electoral formula, threshold etc.).

The latter takes into account the substantive issue congruence between masses and elite. Elections are considered important but the representation and its dimensions identified by Pitkin (1967) i.e. ascription, authorisation, accountability, description and

symbolism still play an important role. Therefore this approach takes into consideration the preferences of voters and issue positions of the representatives in between elections.

The five components mentioned above are simultaneously present in the legislative branch of government. The citizen-principal authorises the legislator-agent to act on her/his behalf and holds the legislator-agent accountable in the future. The role of the representative is to design, issue and promote legislation and policies that are to be attributed to the citizen. It is also believed that if incumbents that are very similar to their voters compose the parliament then they can better understand the needs and problems that the constituents are faced with. Last but not least the political symbols can provide a unifying function and bring stability and belief in the system same as political myths.

The theory of representation explains the basis for legitimating action by government. Legitimation is inextricably linked with representation. The mainstream theory (Pitkin, 1967) considers that there is almost nothing left if this concept is stripped of its legitimacy assumptions. It contains in itself the recognition of the rulers. The legitimisation of the rulers is done by vote. Vote is the procedure that yields what the citizens want and, for the representatives, it confers legitimacy in the eyes of the other elites as well as the citizens (Barker, 2001).

Sovereignty and consent make clear what are the political obligations of both sides because there is an assumption that individuals are sovereign and because of this the legitimacy of the government requires the consent of those who allegedly hold the power. If citizens are not sovereign, there is no sense to require consent from the individuals that do not have the authority to give it to the agents who allegedly act in their name.

Another concept closely linked to representation is consent. The theory of consent says that people are the highest authority that authorises their government to act for them, through voting. The legitimate exercise of authority depends on transferring authority from the sovereign-principal to the agent-legislator - "the state has no legitimate interest of its own because it serves the interests of the citizens" (Prier, 2003).

One important question is whether the representative should only mirror the preferences of voters (mandate-style) or he/she should be entrusted to govern freely in order to insure the well being of the voters (trustee style). Pitkin (1967) who analysed the mandate-independence controversy showed that neither of these two approaches yields satisfying results. Neither of them can completely fulfil the requirement of political representation. These patterns can vary from policy to policy or from party to party and it is hard to decide which one better serves the interest of the people (Pitkin, 1967).

The political parties are crucial in creating and maintaining the linkage between voters and representatives. Their classical functions of aggregation, recruitment and selection of candidates provide the transmission belt between the citizenry and legislature. Consequently if we take into account the functions of parties and their policy positions then the two approaches do not exclude, but reinforce each other. The mandate representation presupposes the mirroring of voter's interest (Castiglione and Warren, 2006). Parties try to minimize difference between the interests of the politicians and the voters.

In a post-communist context, issues that promote change are very important since the countries are involved in the democratisation process (Kistchelt et al. 1999). In this case a pro-change policy could not fall under the mandate style representation. At this point comes the trustee style representation. The representative is "entrusted" by voters to carry out policies that serve their interest and also policies that promote change of the status quo.

This does not mean that the latter issues are not serving the interest of the citizens. The representative will act with the interest of the voters in mind.

Kitschelt (2000) argues that when parties build programmatic linkages they have to face a collective action and a social choice problem. Representatives and candidates become members of parties in order to have a better platform and to be more easily understood by the voters. The constituency is an "information miser" so the most useful tool to know something about a party is to see where it is placed on the left-right dimension. This needs an investment in the infrastructure and administration of the party. The second problem deals with the administrative and organizational ability of the party to manage through negotiations to build up a party program that would satisfy all the latent factions in the party. "Programmatic linkages build on politicians investment in both procedures of programmatic conflict resolution and organizational infrastructure" (Kitschelt, 2000). Consequently the degree of party discipline and centralization might have an effect on political representation. Dalton (1985) analyses the role of party structure in creating issue congruence in the parties that had candidates at the Euro-elections. He considers mass party and catchall party kind of organization indicators of centralization. Since the assumption of the responsible party model is that candidates have a "unity of action" (Dalton, 1985) then it is important to see the level of centralization of the political parties.


Another dimension that seems important is the left-right positioning of the parties. One argument is that the "responsible party model" depends on the extent to which the positions of elites and voters are constrained by one policy dimension like the left and right (Thomassen, 1999). If the policy view is too specific, the responsible party model fails. That is why ideology is important, since it represents a bundle of issues. Voters can guide themselves by it when voting. It is equally important to parties because they can shape an ideology that can bring as many votes as possible.

A further question raised by Thomassen (1999), is how can members of parliament represent the will of the people. They can find out the opinion of the people from the geographical unit in which the MP was elected. But political representation focuses on salient issues that are usually reflections of group interests. The MP creates impressions of how the voters would react to a policy or another. Usually in a multiparty system the MP associates the opinion of the people with the ideological framework of the party.

The argument so far has tried to prove that in both models, parties, elites and masses must share a common belief system. This common "yardstick" could not be found by Converse (1964) in the United States but in Western Europe the conflicts between parties on issues is constrained more and more by a one dimensional left-right continuum. Surveys have also shown (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1989:205) that left-right is an orientation tool for voters as well. Consequently it can be said that left and right dimensions provide the common belief system by which political representation should work as Huber and Powell stated (1994:293).

Miller performed several studies with the American Congress and voters (e.g. Miller and Miller 1975, Miller, 1988, Miller and Jennings, 1986). From these studies he developed a model of the way the voters preferences are taking into account and considered by the elite. One example of the constituency model is the United States. For the responsible party system model is Great Britain. Both of them had two-party systems but the English system had a higher policy position distance between the two parties and a stronger voting discipline.

Fig 2.1. Methodology employed by Miller and Stokes in 1963 called the AB bond



Source: Based on Miller and Stokes 1963

"A" is the position of the voters and "B" is the issue position of the representative. But in Miller et al. (1999) case "A" represents the issue position of the individual voter and "B" is the position on the same issue of a political party. This typology is being criticized by Pierce (1999) who identifies three potential problems that can be attributed generally to the analysis of the linkage between voters and their representatives. On the same scale the issue position of the voter means something different from the issue position of the voter on the same scale. The reason is that the fact that deputies are living together makes collective decision-making more easily than in the case of voters (Solution: concentration on individual voters). Consequently the second problem raises i.e. the distribution of cases on the scale. Voters yield a higher distribution than the elite. Third the mean position of voters can be close to a party elite but it can be even more close to another party elite. (This can be expected in the multiparty systems because of the small competitive spaces).

Consequently parties will employ strategies to form policies in an area on which voters consider them the best or they emphasize ideological arguments or policies not debated by the rival parties (Pierce, 1999).

The responsible party model was adapted to fit political systems in which the political party has an important role. This model has the following assumptions:

1. Voters have various packages of issue positions;
2. Voters compare their positions with those presented (more or less consistently and uniformly throughout the entire electorate) by the competing political parties;
3. Voters vote for a party whose issue package most closely resembles their own;
4. Elected officials of each party remain united in an effort to enact their issue package into public policy; (Pierce, 1999)

It resembles the mandate approach to representation as well as assumes a fairly large degree of rationality to voters and disregards the fact that voters are "information-misers" (Kitschelt, 2000). The agents are the national electorate and parties are those that fulfil their

voter's interests. As it has been presented, political parties play a vital role in political representation. In the last section I will discuss several critiques of political representation theories, second about political parties and third about the relation between parties and political representation.

The assumptions that confer legitimacy and consistency to the concept of representation pose inconsistencies. First citizens are not free to choose from alternatives. There are several institutional determinants like electoral rules that influence the decision making process. Mostly representatives, their parties and the media shape the agenda of salient issues and voters are influenced into choosing one or another of the alternatives. Voters are reactive to campaign messages that are vague and unclear. Messages cover a wide array of issues in order to grasp as many varying interests as possible. Often messages are appealing to myths of unity or solidarity (Daloz, 2006 and Krogstad and Storvik, 2006). The usage of myths is justified by the fact that it is a truism that voters are information misers. They do not have the time or the interest to analyse all political programs and make a decision.

Several theories of voting behaviour mention the fact that even if voters do not have too much knowledge about public policies or regulations affecting them they can still assess who is to blame when they lose their jobs or when their life deteriorates (Ferejohn, 1986, Barro, 1973, Roberts, 2010, Adsera, Boix and Payne, 2003,). But this would mean that punishing incumbents by voting against them is nothing more than blaming the close significant Other because of economic lack of success. The role of voting and holding representatives accountable should be defended by other methods.

Sometimes, voters will tend to hold their representatives accountable for disasters that have natural causes like floods or hurricanes. Retrospection is sometimes blind and this casts a shadow over the capabilities of voters to assess policy proposals or public policies. (Achen and Bartels, 2004)

Second there are several intermediaries between public policy implementations and citizens' interests that make very difficult for the representative to follow exactly what voters want. The public policy crafting process implies compromise with different parties. Before implementation a public policy has to pass through commissions where negotiations about content are held. Lobbying can either influence the formation of the public policy so it would favour interests groups or it can promote the adoption of a public policy that concerns a specific group of business associates for instance. Finally corruption, especially in the new democracies is a crucial variable in altering the content of negotiations or policy proposals.

Keeping all these in mind what remains then to explain is how voters hold accountable representatives. For what policies can the representative be held accountable to? The member of the legislature is often elected on the basis of large, vague popular appeals that are difficult to transform in public policies. Even if a public policy is implemented is hard to hold accountable specific representatives because there are just too many parties involved into a public policy formation and implementation.

Another important question is what part of the population can hold accountable the legislator? Those that did not vote and those that voted against are excluded. Consequently what is left is the mass of voters that selected the legislator. But this can be a tiny fraction of the populations and often not the majority since when there are more candidates i.e. more alternatives to choose from, a candidate can win a seat with much less than 50% plus one vote. (Prier, 2003)

These are just a few of the problems that political representation has to solve. The assumptions that form the theory are mutually dependent and dropping one means discarding the entire theory. Trade-offs characterise the empirical dimension of representation. Therefore there is a need of accuracy in stating the assumptions, theoretical propositions and hypotheses when trying to explain the mass elite linkages. Political representation contains complex and intricate questions that overlap with other concepts such as legitimacy, sovereignty and consent. It is a dynamic process in which the elections have a symbolic value. The relationship between the governed and those who govern does not become meaningful only at election time. Instead there is a constant mutual exchange that has different degrees of involvement from both parts, that is why studies should capture the dynamic dimension that this concept entails.

The overview of the problems and the complexity of the concept of representation clearly justify the appeal of Hanna Pitkin (1967) for more representative institutions that should work for the public interest and the well being of the citizens.

2.2. Political Representation and Models of Democratic Government. A Case for Party Democracy

This is a critical assessment of two contemporary theories of representative democracy. The goal is to propose a revision of party democracy in which parties are the main organizations that provide the linkage between the representative and the represented. The structure of the paper will unfold in the following sequence. First, I will summarize the typologies proposed by Manin (1997) and Körösényi (2003). The evaluation of their models will have the aim to highlight the weaknesses of the theory of representation when they are confronted with alternative theories or empirical research results. Second, I will propose a revision of the party democracy model taking into the view the party and party system development neglected or barely mentioned by the two authors, by calling upon the theory of cleavage formation and the stages of party development from cadre to cartel parties. The main argument is that party lead democracy is the legitimate form of democratic order in spite of changes in the social structure, the complexities of policy-making and development of mass media.

Models of Democracy and Representation

The following sections will critically assess the two typologies built by Bernard Manin (1997) and András Körösényi (2003). Both assume that to each type of democracy there is a type of representative government although Körösényi is more careful on this distinction than Manin. In order to highlight the basic difference between the two typologies I will call Manin's typology the popular approach to representative government while Körösényi's model is the elitist one. The two models are very similar. They diverge to a certain extent when they try to explain what kind of representative government exists in contemporary democracies. Körösényi's *leader democracy* will be assessed along Manin's *audience democracy*. I will argue that both approaches neglect parties' capacities to adapt to changes in society or technology. A revisited model of party democracy could exhaustively explain the functioning of the contemporary democratic representative governments

Popular versus Elitist View of Representation

The typology proposed by Manin (1997) identifies four principles actually four variables that create the models of representative government. The first principle refers to the partial independence of representatives. It takes into account the institutional mechanisms of representative government that restrict the freedom of action. Two methods exist and were practiced for short time: the imperative mandate and the discretionary revocability of the representatives. Candidates can make promises through the platforms and there are incentives for them to respect them, contained by the permanent character of elections. They try to please voters in order to get re-elected by explaining why they diverged from the promises made in campaign. But there is also a large amount of discretion in the relationship between the voters and the representative.

The second principle connects freedom of public opinion to representation. Freedom requires two elements. These are access to information and freedom to express opinions all the time. This principle replaces the right to instruction because many voices can be heard and wishes of constituents can be heard and this horizontal communication between people affects the vertical connection between the governed and the governors.

The third brings into discussion the repeated character of elections. Where representatives are subject to reelection each new election allows voters to express dismissal of voters and bringing about a new policy. The dismissal is considered more powerful and the latter element is just a promise. Anticipation by representatives subject to re-election makes voters influence the public policy. Voters then have a say through anticipating the retrospective judgments of the voters. There are three conditions for this to occur: clear assignment of responsibility, possibility to make a meaningful change by voters through the electoral process and finally there should be equal access to resources for both opposition and incumbency. Not to be able to bind politicians to their policy programs is considered to be the undemocratic element of this principle.

Manin over-emphasizes the idea that the permanent character of election ensures accountability. This implies that voters perform retrospective judgments when they participate in the electoral process (Fearon, 1999). It is a wrong logical assumption that elections are just a method of accountability through retrospection. It may be that voters cast their vote in order to select and offer honor to a person. The vote will be cast irrespectively of what that person will do. This reminds us of Max Weber's charismatic leaders (Weber, 1978: 1112-30). There is no place for accountability when people vote for a leader that is charismatic. They vote because this leader is viewed as the best without any utilitarian reasons. The second case suggested by Fearon (1999) is that the people will vote for someone that they expect will follow their interests but that have only one term in office. They cannot be held accountable and this goes into Manin's line of reasoning yet it points out to the fact that if elections are not repeated we might still have a democracy in place.

The second assumption that might be wrong is the fact that prospective voting is undemocratic because politicians cannot be bound to their promises. We look again at Fearon's (1999) arguments and we can say that this might be not so. If voters would bind the representatives to their campaign promises, unexpected changes cannot be taken into account. We can imagine a situation where a liberal party proposed a radical cut of government spending on social welfare and the country is hit by an earthquake or there is an international financial crisis that affects the country and calls for government

intervention. What is then in the best interest of the voters? Follow the political platform or to diverge from it in order to manage the crises? In contemporary democracies these situations occur at a high rate so there is a need for discretionary decisions taken by the representatives. I would argue in the line of Fearon's (1999) thinking that the combination between the retrospective and prospective aspects of voting insures elections to be a democratic and efficient tool of accountability. And in this form accountability can be perceived as a crucial aspect of democratic governance.

Last but not least deliberation by discussion affects representation. It is considered that the parliament is the main place for debate and it is its diverse and collective character that explains the role of discussion for the linkages between masses and elite. There is an assumed collectivity of wills that makes discussion the legitimate form of interaction between the members of the assembly. The debate is not the principle of decision-making but majority consent to the policy after there has been a trial by discussion. "Representative government is not a system in which everything must originate in debate, but in which everything has to be justified in debate" (Manin, 1997, p.191)

The four factors presented above help Manin (1997) to build his three- model typology of representative government. They are called metamorphoses in order to suggest that they transform, one into another. The problem with the principles that form the models of representative government is a too large emphasis on actors and their actions and less on institutions that claim representation like political parties. Partial independence of representatives can be explained in terms of what type of political party and party system they belong too. If there is a two party system we might expect more trustee style of representation with a focus on accountability and a larger degree of freedom of the representatives than in the multiparty system. In a multi party system more mandate approach of representation prevails because it can be assumed that they represent many sectional interests in society. Representatives are constrained to mobilize and their group of voters and the political competition is restricted because of the number of parties that represent other sections of society. Consequently, the type of party system in place can explain the partial independence of representatives.

Another variable is the electoral system. Regularity of election can provide accountability if there is a majoritarian party system with first past the post type of election. If there is proportional representation with a fragmented party system and coalition governments then the repeated character of elections cannot insure accountability. There are difficulties on *which rascals to throw out* and correspondingly whom to delegate the mandate for another term. Repeated character of election is not a constant democratic feature of representative government. It can become less important in a proportional electoral system with a fragmented large number of parties. The conditions proposed for the repeated character of elections to have meaning are hard to be met and they could provide a bias towards the British type of two party systems and majoritarian elections where there is a clear view on whom to blame and there are clear two opposing camps.

These arguments do not have the aim to discard the principles as irrelevant. It is just that parties' organizational development as well as electoral system might explain more substantially the type of representative government. Looking only at the evolution of the agents and the principals we disregard the most important linkage provider: the political party. The statements will be substantiated when discussing the types of representative governments.

Types of Representative Government. A Case for Political Party Development

Katz and Mair (1995) suggest that we can think of a conception of democracy going along with a type of party. If we take into account the relation between party and the civil society the farther away the party is from society the less important seems to be. That is why Manin (1997) and Körösényi (2003) consider parties as less important and declining since their emphasis on parties as civil society emanations is more or less implied.

But if we would look at the relation of party to civil society and the state then the role of parties and the party democracy will be assessed. The theoretical question is how representative government looks like when parties move from the civil society to the state. Are they less important in providing linkages or the nature of these connections has changed? The following sections will follow the development of representative governments and movements of parties from the civil society to the state and will also take into account the role of cleavage formation to the types of democracy and political representation

Deliberative Democracy

In this type of government trust has a personal character and confidence is created by individual qualities and not conferred by political organization and connections with other representatives. There is a direct bond between the representative and the represented. The elected and the electors come from the same community. This method creates the new type of elite: the notables. The representative is free to vote as he or she sees fit using his or her own judgment.

There is no influence of an extra-parliamentary party organization. Several movements outside the parliament were expressing the voice and interest of the people or businesses and oppositions between different groups and clashes of interests on economic or religious matters. In elections, these issues did not matter too much since the splits in the Parliament were different from the splits in the country creating the possibility of an increased gap between the large mass of the people and the notables. The parliament is seen as the deliberating body in the fullest sense where individuals form their wills through discussion.

This type of representative government presents the liberal regime censitaire with limited participation to vote. Politics is assumed to have an idea of a single national interest and the political parties are groups of trustees. There is no need for organizational strength and the parties the caucus type. The organizations are formed from groups of notables. There was an interest in concerted action in the parliament but clubs of elites were still running the game of politics. The parties were part of civil society. The boundary between state and civil society was not clear and a contributor to this uncleanness is the political party. (Katz and Mair, 1995)

The capacity of concerted action by these notables should not be undermined. The Habermasian (1990) type of deliberative democracy was just an ideal. There was freedom of judgment by the trustees but it is a fallacy to think that the legislative assembly was just a collection of free wills that were deliberating and finally getting to a decision that was in the best interest of the nation.

Majority rule was the decision-making procedure. If we would think that the notables would follow the best interest of their geographical constituency then concerted action was needed for implementation and to manufacture a majority for reaching to a decision.

Competition between camps, usually conservatives and liberals, was existent. The changes that lead to extension of suffrage might have been a strategic choice of the liberals to get conservatives out of the office and to reduce their influence in politics. The conservatives were the landowners and their ideology could hardly appeal to large masses of electorates whereas the liberal ideology was much flexible focusing on the rights and freedoms of individuals.

If we take into account Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) theory of political cleavages we can consider these conflicts as dividing society into opposing camps. The interests of the bourgeoisie were to promote commerce and industrialization at the expense of the owners of large territories. The conflict between the Conservatives and Liberals were between ascription and kin connections and achievement and enterprise. (Lipset and Rokkan: 1967)

The deeper the cleavages the lesser is the likelihood of loyal acceptance of decisions by representatives of the other side. This creates a direct bond between the representative and the represented. We might suppose that in parliament there was no place for discussion and deliberation between the opposing camps when their interests started to collide.

The extension of suffrage could be perceived as nothing more than an issue that was made salient and was implemented by the representatives of the industrial elites to outcast the conservatives. Although the splits in parliament were different from the splits in the society the splits between elites were reflected in parliament. Consequently we could argue that the more acute was the cleavage line between elites the more close to the mandate approach of representation were the notables in the legislative assembly.

This line of argument tells us two things. First the parliament in deliberative democracy would fall shortly of identifying one national interest since cleavage lines are manifest. Secondly, we can argue that the representation resembled the mandate style because of the constraints the cleavage line exercised upon the representatives in the parliament.

Consequently the crisis in representation was not caused only by the deliberation function of the parliament but more to the modification of the style of representation from trustee to mandate because of the manifestation of cleavage lines in the parliament.

The next model that will characterize the processes and changes that occurred in the party systems and in society: namely the appearance of the socialist parties and inclusion of large masses of electorate that contributed to the consolidation of the mandate approach to representation.

Party Democracy

In this type of representative government the citizens vote for someone who bears the colors of a party. The new type of representative government was considered to be democratic. Election becomes a choice of delegates rather than trustees (Mair: 1997). Party organization engages in mobilizing the electorate. The rise of mass parties contributed to the decline of elitism and of the notables but with the exception of the conservatives in some countries, the traditional parties remain entrenched in the party system. Mass enfranchisement of citizens created the need for powerful political organizations to activate,

mobilize and consequently encapsulate the newcomers to the political scene. This was done by political parties and especially by the socialist parties.

The qualities of the representative lie in activism and organizational skill. Party democracy was considered to be the rule of the activist and the party bureaucrat. The vote is given for a party. What results are a remarkable electoral stability and a disintegration of the direct bond between the agent and the principal? Party democracy is just a reflection of the cleavage structures in society.

Confidence comes from a sense of belonging and identification. The trust is not personal but is given to an organization. Party programs mobilize the activists and the party bureaucrats. The representative is tied to the party and it is a mere spokesman of it. There is a strict voting discipline and control of the party organization over the representative. Parliament shows the proportion of class interest. It also opens the possibility for open confrontation.

Party democracy brings political forces face to face with a prospect of civil war (). That is why the principle of compromise is crucial in party based representative democracy. Leadership decides to what extent the party program can be modified and implemented. The parties then are constrained in reaching a compromise by their party program. Parties organize the electoral competition as well as the expression of public opinion and they are along cleavage line. The partisan press aims at mobilization. Public opinion is not in conflict with the parliament and citizens do not speak for themselves. The grievances of the citizens are taken and expressed by the parties. The governing authority is the majority party or the coalition. Party democracy is the age of party government.

The freedom of public opinion takes the form of the freedom of opposition in parliament. Parliament is no longer a forum for discussion since each side is bounded by a strong party discipline. Representatives vote according to the result of the decisions taken elsewhere. This was again considered as an end of government by discussion.

Manin suggests that the discussion did not vanish but has just moved to the party leaders of various parties in parliament. The precise content of compromises is under negotiations. Another forum of discussion is with institutionalized interests such as labor unions and employer associations. Although party democracy is marked by less deliberation it is not that it would function according to rigid party programs. Still discussions and deliberation take place but in other forums than the parliament. Parties are nothing more than reflections of the cleavages in society.

Yet what cleavage theory suggests is that parties managed reflect division in society and hold to them for over 40 years as Lipset and Rokkan say in their freezing hypothesis: "the party systems of the 1960's reflect, with few but significant exceptions the cleavage structures of the 1920's". The corollary is that "the party alternatives, and in remarkably many cases the party organizations are older than the majorities of the national electorates"

These challenging propositions point out the crucial role parties have in representing citizens. Although many changes occurred in society the same party system managed to maintain itself and these organizations lead the relations of representation, be it trustee or mandate. In time, we can say that, overall, a trustee relationship developed between elites and citizens. Mass parties employed clearly mandate approaches to their electorate and they managed to symbolize that they are the most important linchpins for representative democracy. This involves a trustee style of thinking. If we were to suppose that parties from the 20s up till the 50s had mandate approaches then we would have seen definite changes

in the party system yet this is not so. Further on we can argue that in time party leaders and organizations were perceived as the organizations that are the most legitimate and trustworthy to provide and enhance representation of the citizens' will.

Compromise is crucial in the parliament in order for majority rule to function. It is not for preventing civil war, and the prospects for civil war are bleak. There are two reasons for that. First parties managed to translate the conflicts in society into opposition between parties. They are not the causes for the conflicts but the elements that prevent conflicts. Second institutional framework has an important role as well in preventing any prospects of civil war.

When we build a theory of representative government we should not overlook the historical development of institutions is it political parties, or relations between the judiciary, legislative and executive.

If we were to continue the line of reasoning presented when assessing the deliberative democracy we could argue that the rise of socialist parties radicalized the mandate style of representation that were employed by the parties of regime censitaire when cleavages became manifest.

The inclusion of the large masses of electorate required for parties to build up large organizations in the territory. The traditional parties had to catch up since they were representing small section of the voters. I would argue that although it can be said that there was a contagion from the left in building extra parliamentary organizations the mandate style of representation does not have a socialist origin. This new stage of party development made dominant the mandate of representation and contributed to the creation of party democracy. This is not to say that changes in society did not affect the type of representation. I just emphasized that parties had the role of preserving the divisions of society and contributed to the legitimacy of the new model of party democracy.

In this section I based the overview of the models of democracy on Manin's account since Körösényi (2003) simply reproduces the same arguments that characterize both models. The contemporary types of representative governments highlight the two complementary views on representation. One emphasizes the a more bottom up view offering an increasing role to the citizenry while the other overemphasizes the role of elites in creating representation. Both models start from noticing the changes in the western societies. These are the political marketing through media messages, presidentialization of government, increased complexity of the decisions making process, increasing complexity of issues on which decisions have to be made and the cross-cutting cleavage of materialism-post materialism.

[Audience Democracy vs. Leader Democracy](#)

Körösényi as well as Manin carefully build up their typology so that they would aim at the most important model that explains current developments. And naturally these models are the most controversial since too little time has passed maybe to test these models and they assume a power of prediction.

Manin calls his model "audience democracy". He has the same starting point as Körösényi from the shift that occurred in elections results in the 1970ies. He notices that there is a variance of election results with no change in the social and cultural backgrounds of the voters.

The individuality of the candidates is highlighted to be the most important determinant of these variations. There is an increased personalization of politics and this element creates an impression of a crisis of representation. Manin points out to the return to a personal relation between the representative and the represented this being perceived most accurately at the national level between the executive office and the electorate. Parties are nothing more than networks of contacts and electoral organizations. In countries where the chief executive is the leader of the majority of the parliament then we should have a concentration on the leader. The head of government is seen as the representative par excellence. There are two causes for this development. First the channels of political communication became more complex and managed to create a direct relationship between the representative and the represented. The second is the growing complexity of the government activity. The government has to deal with many issues and has to take rapid decisions and there is a need for discretionary power.

The personal trust they have in a candidate is the most important element by which voters judge candidates. But the discretionary power is limited Manin suggests. The voters still hold the ultimate mean for dismissing the representatives whose record is not satisfactory. Manin concludes that this is the age when voting on the incumbents record starts.

Körösényi assumes that voters' decisions are based on what is said in electoral campaigns. Voters are responsive. Körösényi uses the term reactive and not expressive. They do not vote according to their cultural background anymore. In societies where you have one lasting division it is easier to know where to exploit to get support. Manin suggests that now Western societies have changes that they are not homogeneous masses that can be divided and there are many crosscutting cleavages. Politicians have the role to activate any cleavage. The initiative belongs then to the politician and that is why voting decisions seem reactive. The electorate becomes an audience to the political stage.

Manin, unlike Körösényi, restricts the moves of these politicians and indeed we do not know when he refers only to the chief executives or also includes in his term the other politicians. At this point Körösényi is more radical, explicitly saying that his model refers only to executive branch leaders. Manin says that there are some cleavages in society before the politicians decide to activate them. Politicians have freedom to choose between these divisions and activate the right one. They are looking for division lines and try to activate them by trial and error.

In audience democracy the representatives are persons with initiative seek cleavage lines and make them salient. Representatives have transformed into trustees and they are actors. So for Manin the new model of representatives is similar to an actor on the stage. Action is implied here as well as in Körösényi, with some limits imposed to the leader that do not exist in Körösényi. Retrospective voting and the fact that representatives can make salient cleavages/divisions and not create them exercise these limits.

Image is distinguishing between candidates and this gives leaders some freedom of action to pursue policies that they consider to be in the best interest of the public.

The channels of political communication are neutral and the perception of public issues is more homogeneous and less dependent on partisan preferences. The polling organizations are independent of political parties and they operate under commercial laws.

In this model parliament is no longer the forum of discussion. The discussion has moved to the media and voters are informed and well educated. Körösényi says nothing about

voters' access to information. He just emphasizes their uninterested and reactive character. There is no place for voters in Körösényi's models, yet there is an implicit assumption that they are able to distinguish between leaders and to choose the orator over the demagogue.

The characteristics of the system are the well informed, floating voter, the discussion takes place in a new forum and that is the communication media. Manin suggest that what happens is only a change of one elite group with another.

The aim of Körösényi on the other hand is to build a conception of representation that is dynamic. The representative represents through action and he does not stand for representation. Praxis is his political mind frame and he follows implementation of policies that are in the best interest of the public. A legitimate question is how does the leader know what is the best interest?

Concluding we can say that these models were profoundly different from one another so we cannot speak of major differences. Yet throughout the paper I will argue that divisions between leader democracy, audience democracy and party democracy are somewhat blurred and it assumes changes in society that are not manifest at the level of party system as it is implied in both typologies.

[The Representative Party Model Revisited](#)

In order to make a case for the party development as explanatory component of the representative government in contemporary democracies one should survey the changes in society that are considered to lead to the decline of party. Katz and Mair (1995) consider that at this stage of development we witness the formation of the catchall and cartel parties. These transformations are result of the changes in society like modernization, secularization, development of middle class and post materialism. The processes of transformation lead to a perceived decline of parties. This perception is caused by the separation of the party from the civil society and moving towards the state. The party acts as a broker between the citizens and the state. Politics is based on negotiations but mostly parties start to turn into service providers delivering packages of services from which the voters select. The same parties are in the system and Mair and Katz suggests that a cartelization occurs. Party leaders know each other, conflict is less acute, consequently citizens become less interested. Politics becomes demobilized and it transforms into a profession (Katz and Mair, 1995). The suggestion of Katz and Mair is that parties enter the state and the relation between voters and representatives transforms parties into service providers. One problem is that it is hard to refuse these services. Even if anti system parties formed they entered the political system and adapted. I would argue that although new parties might be formed outside the cartel they enter the system and they do not attempt to overthrow it.

It is improper to say that a party system is cartelized because the same parties run the political game. Then we have cartels since the 1920s since anyway changes in the party systems of Western Europe were not so significant. Even if parties know each other and their policies become less distinguishable that does not mean that conflict does not exist anymore and competition is not crucial to the functioning of the party system. The fact that the cleavages in society became blurred and the complexities of policy making increased people still vote for the socialist or the liberals or Christian democrats and the vote change between the cleavages is around 1 % (Mair: 1997). Then the term cartel is of no use for us

here. It cannot explain the type of representation since it assumes that representation does not exist anymore but only selection of different packages of services and this is not representation. I would argue that symbolic representation is not at an end yet it is more visible because of mass media developments.

Körösényi and Manin view parties as emanations of civil society and do not take into account the capacities of parties for adaptation and attempts to maintain their as the legitimate linkage providers between the represented and representatives.

What determined Körösényi and Manin to build up models in which parties and cleavages no longer seem to matter, and passive, reactive voters characterize society?

Peter Mair (1997) suggests three reasons for these “myths of electoral change”. First are the shock of and the appeal of the change of new and because it is exciting might be overemphasized. If we look at the development of the Green parties that were considered to change the party systems it is ironic to see that they have 5% support while the 95% of voters did not change their preferences.

A second reason is the tendency to think that changes in the social structure automatically mean changes in the party systems. Lipset and Rokkan provide us with the answer that this is not so since parties maintained themselves despite of massive changes in the electoral process like mass suffrage and women voting. Mair would add that from the 60ies until the present times the parties are the same and for 80 years the society experienced massive changes. Parties modified and adapted but did not disappear, and the ideological blocks are the same. These examples are sufficient see that it is fallacious to think that changes in society bring immediate changes in the party system and parties. A third reason is to insist that electoral change is the result of the social change and neglects the adaptable character of parties. Social bases of parties might change in and the priorities of government’s change but parties adapt their appeal methods of mobilizing support and they successfully survive and manage to be perceived as the legitimate instruments to provide representation. (Mair: 1996)

Focusing on the party as emanation of civil society they would be inclined to think that party democracy age is over and we return to the type of democracy based on deliberation in the media and trustees. Personalization of politics and increased complexities of decision –making procedures as phenomena that influenced all sectors of society and parties adapted to these changes with the creation of catch all parties. The term catchall is suggestive yet not exact clear. Are we supposed to think that during mass party democracy these parties were not appealing to all the voters? I would rather argue that in mass based party system of representation the electoral narrowing of the support market was at its maximum and divisions were clear and consequently parties could only focus on mobilization. As soon a diversification of the social structure occurred parties immediately adapted to maintain support. I think that parties were always catch all in character just that in the mass parties these organizations could catch only distinct segments of society and the diversification of social support brought a diversification of the policy programs and changes in the appeals to voters. We might tend to think of the catch all party as employing trustee style of representation. Since the party broadened the appeal to the diversified masses of electorate the functions of aggregation and representation of diverge interests cannot be fulfilled because of the increased complexities that this diversification brings. An alternative view is that catch all parties continue to employ mandate and trustee style of representation.

Media personalized politics and we see party leaders, incumbents and opposition appealing directly to the voters. The age of party organization is over and now parties employ media to aggregate preferences and rally support. Fabricated charisma helps in bringing sentiments into the politics that is more and more complex and discretionary decisions are necessary. The usage of media is to create mandate or trustee linkages in symbolic terms. Leaders of parties tend appeal to symbols of distinctiveness and likeness through television. Yet leaders are recruited from the party organization. They need the support of the party to transmit these messages. I would argue that parties become service providers to leaders but also provide them with an ideological framework that is useful for voters to know where the leader stands. My argument then is that if the leaders were more visible nowadays they would not manage to maintain support without the help of the party organization and ideology.

That is why parties are party system development should be taken into account when analyzing types of representative governments. Party development might explain why the same labels of socialist, liberal, Christian democrat or agrarian are preserved despite of changes in society and could also shed light to the fact perceived crisis of legitimacy of the representative ness of the political institutions can be explained in terms of metamorphoses of political parties.

Conclusion

The aim of this section was twofold. First it had the role to highlight the important role of political parties as linkage providers. It also showed some inherent weaknesses in the theory of representation that are wrongly attributed to political parties or legislative assemblies. I summarized Manin's principles of representative government showing that partial independence of representatives can be related to type of electoral system or type of party system. Repeated character of elections does not have to assume that only retrospective voting alone (Fiorina, 1974) is democratic but rather the combination of prospective and retrospective voting confers a better democratic representation.

The second aim was to critically assess the types of representative government and to show that party development could, to a great extent, the type of relationship between the represented and the representatives, the role of discussion or the freedom of public opinion. In deliberative democracy the trustee style of representation that was regarded legitimate by elites (Korosenyi, 2003). When cleavages became deep dividing and interest collided, parties in regime censitaire adopted mandate approaches to their constituency (Manin, 1997). Concerted action in parliament contributed to the disappearance of discussion as tool of deliberation (Manin, 1997).

Appearance of mass party democracy brought to the main stage the mandate approach to representation (Manin 1997, Korosenyi, 2003). The extension of mass suffrage was more a decision made by liberal parties to outcast the conservatives. Liberal parties then adapted and employed the organizational structures of the new socialist parties while the socialist parties employed the mandate approach from the traditional parties that were representing the cleavages in society (Duverger, 1954). Epstein (2000) questions the contagiousness of socialist political parties considering them a specific outcome of a specific period of political party development.

"Audience" and "leadership" democracy highlight the changes that occurred in contemporary societies. Yet they completely neglect the capacity of parties to adapt to changes in society and they overemphasize role of agents and principals and do not look at the institutions.

In conclusion, I will reformulate Manin's statement about the metamorphoses of legitimate representative government. Deliberative democracy and trustee styles of representation were viewed as the legitimate form of government (Korosenyi, 2003). A crisis of legitimization of the democratic order was perceived when parties started to reflect the cleavage structures in parliament and discussion and trustee style were not important. What actually was a crisis of legitimization, was viewed as a great progress towards popular representation (Manin, 1997). It was the age of party democracy when mandate style of representation occurred. A crisis of legitimization of the representative government is again perceived because social structures change and parties adapt to a combination of mandate and trustee style of representation in which symbolic representation has an important role. As we can see every period of representative of government corresponds to changes in parties strategies to adapt in order to win votes but moreover to be viewed as providers of legitimate democratic political representation.

Chapter 3.

The role of political parties and the importance of issues.

3.1. Political Parties and the Function of Representation

The role of this chapter is first to highlight the role of the political party as an agent of representation in modern established and consolidating democracies and the importance of studying party-voter linkage in place of representative-constituency relationship. Party-voter linkages are characteristic to parliamentary, multi party democracies while representative-constituency linkages are analyzed in a two party majoritarian democracy namely the United States in which the political party as a political organization has a limited role. That is why it is important to discuss the possible effects of the way representatives are elected over the representativeness of members. The connection between representatives, parties and citizens can be classified using as benchmark the nature of linkages. Linkages can be programmatic or clientelistic (Kitschelt, 2000). The nature of linkage is important in any democracy. The presence of programmatic linkages although fused with clientelistic linkages can be interpreted as a standard for the quality of democratic performance (Kitschelt, 2000).

Secondly, this chapter will supply grounds for the issues that modern political parties identify with established and transitional democracies including the usefulness of left-right dimension of competition in studies on representation. The economic and cultural dimensions have their origin in societal cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) and in the necessities associated with running a modern state or in the legacies of the previous regime for the new democracies in Eastern Europe (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Bundles of issues sustained by political parties form the ideology of the party. An ideological profile is associated with a certain type of representation.

Thirdly although parties have suffered several organizational changes that went along with functional changes parties in European democracies are still considered as the political organizations that intermediate the linkage between citizenry and representatives.

This chapter will review the important debates regarding the changing functions of political parties, the role of the function of representation, the origin of dimensions of competition between parties, the classification of the important issues on which parties compete and the topics that create an ideological profile of a party. It will discuss the importance of left-right dimension as a tool for identifying parties. The chapter will conclude with a discussion on the declining importance of political parties.

Political parties are a modern invention (La Palombara and Weiner, 1966). Regardless of the type of regime, authoritarian, totalitarian or democratic, political parties are present in the modern political systems. They are expected to aggregate and articulate interests, nominate candidates and communicate demands to the political systems. The political party is a symbol of modernity (LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966). It is considered as an indicator of modernity. It is a necessary organization in mass politics, in order to aggregate their interests and control masses. It is not without reason, La Palombara and Weiner argue that

modern totalitarian regimes make use of the political party as an organization that dominates modern political life.

The political party is not an organization that was considered a beneficial tool for representing the interest or preferences of citizens. Daalder (1983, 3) asserts that the party was viewed as an illegitimate institution that had the role of represent private interest. The representation of private interest is against the idea of democracy that has as its main aim the representation of all citizenry. Rousseau (1923) advocated strongly against private interests as tools of distorting the general will. It was assumed that citizens have a general will that could be represented by politicians. Politicians are nothing more than communicators of the general interest.

The debate between private, sectorial interest and general interest is settled by Madison in the Federalist 10 paper that discusses the inevitability of factions and the plurality of interests. Factions are according to Madison "...a number of citizens whether amounting to a majority or a minority of a whole who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community" (Madison 1787).

This was the pervasive view about political parties. This view was reinforced in political systems in which the state had a moral authority to represent the interest of the society as a whole. Paradoxically the political party emerged as a political organization that is opposed to the political representation of citizens' will.

However, the difference of opinion is considered by Madison as a way of how human reason functions. In this way factions are accommodated with democracy the role of the state being to negotiate the conviviality of private interest. "The regulation of these various and interfering interest forms the principal task of modern legislation and involves in spirit of party and faction the necessary and ordinary operations of government" (Madison, 1787)

The linkage between political parties and democracy proves to be strong. There is no democratic system in the world that does not have political parties (Bryce, 1921). Political parties had a crucial role in building democracy thus democracy can not be thought of without political parties. (Schattschneider, 1942, Gunther, Montero and Linz, 2002). Other authors consider that parties are political institutions that are "endemic", "unavoidable", "unthinkable", "at the heart of" part of parliamentary democracies (Schattschneider, 1942, Stokes, 1999, Muller 2000, Aldrich, 1995). They have managed to survive despite world wars, despite massive social changes throughout the 20th century. Despite the overwhelming literature that was written on waning of parties they are still considered as the most important actors in democracies (Mair, 1997, 90). Political parties have a crucial role in studies on representative government. John Stuart Mill views political parties as actors that are engaged in competition to represent class interests (Mill, 2005). Political representation was conceived as a concept that links the citizens' interests to the interests of the parliamentary representative. Studies on political representation avoided to look over the role of the party as an intermediary. (Pitkin, 1967, Rehfeld, 2005 and Burke, 2000). The reason behind this apparent lack of connection is due to the way the relationship between the representative and the represented is conceptualized. These studies (Weissberg, 1978, Erikson 1978) take into account a direct relationship between the representative and its constituency. They confront styles of representation in order to find the best way to represent. In party democracies the linkage between representatives and citizens is hardly important (Converse and Pierce, 1986). That is because parties take over the functions the

representative performed before the formation of political parties. The taking over was a necessity. The Burkean representative was faced with universal suffrage. The universal suffrage brought new cohorts of citizens. Citizens have to be educated, socialized, and integrated in the political system and representation became increasingly difficult to perform. In this way party politics became part of the every day political life of the representative. With the introduction of universal suffrage political parties started to perform various functions. On the input side they familiarized citizens with politics; they articulate, aggregate, articulate and communicate preferences. The freshly enfranchised citizens had to learn about voting, party programs, ideology. Parties published their ideas, programs in the party journal. There were meetings in workers, intellectual clubs which were often ending into fights between sympathizers. Parties maintained their recruitment function by nominating candidates, public policy makers and often members of the bureaucracy into positions of authority (Manin, 1997).

In democracies, the life of a political party is linked with the main representative institution: the Parliament. Several parties were created within the parliament. Duverger (1954) made a distinction between parties created in parliament and parties created outside of parliament. Intraparliamentary parties are nothing more than clubs of parliamentarians that have identified common interests. The extraparliamentary parties were formed at the grassroots and represented social groups excluded from the political systems. The origin of party tells about the parties' ideology. Parties of the right were formed by the middle class bourgeoisie and conservative parties were created within the parliament (Kirschheimer, 1966). The interests of the bourgeoisie and the former nobility were represented by the parliament resulted from the tax based vote. The origin of party also tells something about in what way parties will exercise their representation function.

Parties that are internally created encourage a Burkean type of representation (Duverger, 1954). Prestige, personal skills and competencies are the primary criteria for selection. Parties that are externally created emphasize criteria of similarity closeness in origins, ideas, or even look with the mass of citizens. The emphasis is put on symbols of similarity with citizens (Daloz, 2006).

In mass democracies parties became an agent of representation. They have the role to fill in the gap between citizens and the state and parties perform this role through political representation. Three conclusions emerge from here.

First, political parties will be the institutions that will be the first to receive criticism when the quality of democratic performance decreases. Throughout the evolution of the democratic systems a crisis in the relationship between citizens and the state was associated with a crisis of the way the party functions (Manin 1997, Korosecnyi, 2003). Parties are criticized for being oligarchic for being easily manipulated by private interests. They do not encompass new ideas and values of a changing society. The debate on the apparition of post materialist values went along with a crisis in party functioning. It seems that throughout the development of democratic systems parties were in permanent crisis. The classical parties of notables were in crisis once large masses of electorates were not represented. The introduction of universal suffrage left out parties unable to change and turn to mass type of politics. Social upheavals from the 60ies were associated with parties that were increasingly at odds with preferences of the electorate. The apparition of social movements, single issue movements resulted from the inability of parties to represent the wishes, preferences and interests of citizens. The gradual disappearance of clear cut social classes in Western Europe

and the processes of secularization went together with a flourishing literature on parties decaying, waning or slowly disappearing.

Secondly, attempts to improve the relationship between citizens and the state will refer to the improvement of political parties. With the introduction of universal suffrage parties had to adapt to societal changes. Adaptation included intraparliamentary parties having to create local organizations and connect to the mass citizenry. In the 60ies new parties emerged that represented a new type of issues with a new type of politics. Control of financial resources parties gain means that private interests do not distort the policies representatives promote(Biezen and Kopecky, 2007). Organizational changes due to the influential power of massmedia made parties more close to the citizens. Party leaders could appeal directly to voters without the help of local organization. Parties create websites, deliberative forums, improve access to isolated groups in society.

Thirdly as Ankersmit (2002) points out, once the party is eliminated from the political scene what remains at best is Max Webers' (2003) plebiscitary democracy.

Plebiscitary democracy is associated with a crisis of representation, with neo populism and crisis of democracy in the Andean states (Mayorga, 2006). The crisis of representation goes along with the decay of political parties' representative functions. Mayorga (2006) sustains that the decay of representative democracy in the Andean states is not a direct consequence of the decay of political parties, yet for Bolivia the capacity of political parties to absorb outsiders that compete for political power prevented Bolivia to turn towards Venezuelan or Peruvian type of plebiscitary democracy. The lack of political parties is associated with the disappearance of representative democracy. Popular leaders resort to plebiscitary methods in order to avoid the institutions of liberal democracies that involve dispersal of power, vertical and horizontal accountability, and checks and balances. A second view of plebiscitary democracy encompasses tools that have a plebiscitary component. Public opinion polls, referendums, popular consultations are tools that circumvent political parties as agents of political representations. Plebiscitary tools seem to contradict representative democracy. The question is whether plebiscitary tools are an indication of a decay of democratic performance or improve representation. On the one hand opinion polls and other methods are a legitimate way to find out about the preferences, wishes of citizens. In this way representatives can represent better and can legitimate the policy options that concur with the citizens wishes. On the other hand, classical theorists like James Madison or even Jean Jacques Rousseau (1923) warn us that the public opinion needs to be filtered, guided and coordinated. Rousseau (1923) proposes the creation of a censor that would guide, better express and filter out the bad preferences. Madison (1787) considers that representatives should have the filtering function. Political parties could have the role of a filter of public opinion preferences. Why is there a need for intermediary institutions between the state and citizens? There are four reasons that seem relevant.

The first refers to the dilemma every representative faces i.e. to represent preferences or interests. One important question a representative faces is whether to have in mind the citizens' preferences or interests (Castiglione and Warren, 2006: 17). These two concepts often do not coincide. Time is a crucial intervening variable. Before and after elections, politicians should follow the preferences of citizens. It ensures a higher survival rate. There are two possible strategies that can be employed by representatives. First they can follow the preferences of citizens on some issues and use their judgment on other issues. Issues that citizens hold dear or consider important might be the topics on which it is best for the

representative to follow the preferences of the constituency. Secondly the politicians pay more attention to what citizens prefer since the main objective of a representative is to be elected or if it is an incumbent to be re-elected. Another important element that intervenes in the dilemma of representing preferences or interests is respecting campaign promises. Politicians would tend to respect campaign promises immediately after election to show that they deliver what they have claimed during the electoral campaign. Three circumstances impede politicians to respect their campaign promises. First party discipline can be imposed over representatives forcing them to vote against the constituency's preferences. Secondly, coalition making in multi party democracies can result in compromises that are very different from what representatives promised during the electoral campaign. Thirdly, unexpected events can impede representatives to respect their campaign promises. Unexpected events comprise earthquakes, floods, war, economic crises or international crises that can make politicians choose policies quite contrary to their electoral promises (Achen and Bartels, 2004). The following section will clarify the role parties have in representing salient issues.

3.2. Saliency and Political Representation

Democratic political systems include political representation as a decision-making tool legitimated by citizens. The concerns drawn from this method lead to the creation of a norm every democracy considers essential: That people's preferences should be taken into account in national decision-making. In a democratic system the contract between the individual and the representative considers that the principal is the citizen and the agent is the legislator (Pitkin 1967). The legislator is restricted, since the sovereignty lies in the population. Representatives have as their main goal to follow the wills and wishes of the citizens.

Methodologically there are three ways of assessing political representation according to different assumptions: the vote-seat relationship, social representation and "substantive representation" (Kitschelt et al. 1999). The first assumes that the only way through which we know the voter's preferences is the vote. Consequently the independent variables in vote-seat approach are to be found in the constitutive elements of the electoral system (district magnitude, electoral formula or threshold). There is an abundant body of research covering the effects of institutions on political representation (Rae 1971, Grofman and Lijphart 1986, Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Lijphart 1990, Huber and Powell 1994, Shugart and Wattenberg 2001 or Golder and Stramski 2008).

The second considers that it is important that the social structure of society should mirror the social composition of parliament. Research using this approach relies on studies of the representation of minorities and of groups in society that are assumed to have a weaker influence on politics. Studies focus on improving the representation of women in parliament, of migrants and of ethnic minorities' voice in national politics (Phillips 1993, Norris and Lovenduski, 1995, Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996, Bird 2003, Tremblay 2005 or Spirova and Boyka 2009).

The third approach, used here, emphasizes a view of representation which considers that opinions, values and attitudes should be reflected in decisions representatives make or in their expressed opinions. Framed in different words the question faced with this approach

is to what extent there is a degree of influence of citizens' opinions on the preferences of representatives and how that affects decisions in parliament. Studies (Miller and Stokes 1963, Converse and Pierce 1986, Holmberg 1989, Kitschelt et al. 1999, Thomassen 1999) target congruence of stances between representatives and elites as a measurement unit of influence on several issues important in national politics as well as the left right scale.

There are several methods of surveying congruence of opinions between citizens and representatives. Two are most often used. First there are the constituency based models (Miller and Stokes 1963, Cnudde and McCrone 1966, Achen 1978, Erikson 1978, Eulau and Wahlke 1978, Weissberg 1978, Page et. al 1984, Bartels 1991, Clinton 2006). They link the preferences and roll call behavior of the representative to the opinions expressed by the constituency that is represented. This method is considered individualistic and not applicable to political systems in which collective political representation with the help of political parties is more important (Holmberg 1989:2, Eulau 1987:212).

The second links parties to voters. This approach, mostly used in Europe, considers that parties are crucial in democracies (Schattschneider 1942, Converse and Pierce 1986, Schmitt and Thomassen 1999, Mair and Thomassen 2011) because they ensure the representation process. The approach draws on the responsible party government model (Schattschneider 1942, Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). In European democracies the party has an important role in ensuring the linkage between voters and representatives (Thomassen, 1994). Kitschelt et al. (1999) and Markowski and Tucker (2010) use the party-voter linkage for Eastern Europe as well although they are aware that parties have still to learn to play their part in the process of representation. Up until the late 90ies political parties in Hungary and Poland seem to have an important role in elections. Although criticized for their weak performance in terms of representation their role as legitimate intermediates between the state and society is widely acknowledged. The voter party linkage is suited for the study of political representation in Hungary and Poland.

The relationship between representation and saliency is taken into account in Miller and Stokes (1963) description of the constituency influence in Congress in the United States as having an important role in increasing the indicators of influence in terms of policy stances. McCrone and Kuklinski (1979) posit that saliency works when the legislator acts as a delegate and citizens are less confused about their opinion on an issue. In a later study (Kuklinski and McCrone 1980) they discover that, on issues that representatives view as important for citizens, representation improves. Page and Shapiro (1983) connects saliency to opinion change and finds a positive effect between the change of voters' opinion and change of policies on salient issues. Giger (2009) consider saliency of an issue as an individual characteristic and discovers that "personal salience" has a positive effect on representation.

3.3. Political Representation as Congruence

The study of political representation using congruence of opinions between representatives and citizens as operationalization contains several assumptions that are considered necessary. First, individuals are sovereign and capable of choosing between different alternatives offered to them. Frequently there are two alternatives and the voters will choose any of the two candidates according to their interests, because of habit or because

of emotional attachments. Second, individuals possess sufficient quantity of information to make a meaningful choice. Citizens have clear ideas about their preferences and interests and know the political programs of the candidates. Third, once elected, the representatives will craft public policies tailored to the citizens' interests. Last but not least the represented can hold accountable their representatives. These are assumptions of the responsible party model (Pierce, 1994) used for consolidated democracies to tap on indicators of issue voting. Few political systems work this way. Miller and Stokes (1963) were aware of the limited knowledge about "legislative issues" that the American public possessed. They and Eulau (1978) warned future researchers not to consider that congruence can work as an equivalent for political representation in any contexts. They also noticed that representatives often are unfamiliar with specific issues and make their decisions based on broad topics. That is why it made sense to use but a few broad policy alternatives that have an intuitively higher chance of being known by citizens and legislators. Converse (1963) was concerned to find out whether the American public had attitudes that were structured into ideologies. Do people have a system of beliefs that coordinates their opinions? The answer was no. The American public of the 50ies was considered ignorant and uninterested.

Many (Huber and Powell 1994, Kitschelt et al. 1999, Todosiević 2005, Giger 2009, Casado-Asensio and Lefkofridi 2011) studies of congruence, however, work on assumptions that citizens can state opinions on political, economic or national symbolic issues. They can use these positions to evaluate parties' performance in terms of policies. Researchers (Thomassen 1994, Schmitt and Thomassen 1999) that focus on political representation in consolidated democracies have arguments about the citizens' capacity to place themselves on issues or to that some are able to know and use issues as a means of choosing from and distinguishing between parties. This is because they have lived for a long time in democracies in which party positions are very well known by both the political elite and citizens. Compared to democratizing states, in consolidated democracies people will know more the issue stances of parties because the parties have been stable and the changes in the party systems have been minimal. Some claim that it is important not to indulge into assumptions about citizens capabilities to use issues as a guiding tool for choosing among the alternatives offered by political parties or representatives (Miller and Stokes 1963, Eulau 1978).

The public in the United States and consolidated democracies has changed. Education, mass media and raising interest into politics have changed the profile of the citizenry from an uninformed one into citizenry concerned in some issues, using heuristics to understand the political world using reasonable methods of arriving to a decision in politics (Dalton 2008).

The following section will explain the problems representation studies face in democratizing political systems.

3.4. Substantive Representation in New Democracies

The research on congruence between representatives and citizens targeting Eastern European polities is scarce. The study of Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski and Gabor Toka, published in 1999, includes a section on political representation in which they test for the presence of congruence as well for the types of representation

trustee or mandate. For the elite survey they surveyed the opinions of middle level ranking party officials. Their elite data consisted of a pilot study performed in 1993 that included interviews with politicians that were members of parliament and party officials. The pilot study was followed by a survey in 1994 focused on middle ranked politicians in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Burean (2002) surveys the political representation in Hungary finding out that party discipline and big parties are more congruent with citizens' views. Later on, Markowski and Tucker (2010) make a longitudinal analysis of representation focused on Euro skepticism issues. When writing about political representation or the level of information in new democracies scientists express worries about the citizens capacity to have opinions that are meaningful (Kitschelt et. al 1999, Schmitt and Thomassen 1999, Todosieivic 2005, Markowski and Tucker 2010). Their worries are legitimate first to the extent that parties are unable to send clear messages to the electorate. This is because of parties are not yet institutionalized. The scarce institutionalization translates into parties not having a long life especially in the early stages of the democratization process. The party systems of Eastern Europe were characterized by fragmentation of their party systems. The fragmentation of the party system creates confusion in terms of ideological profiles or leads to citizens being confused about the policy stances of parties. For example in Poland in 1997 six parties entered the parliament, and in 2001 their number increased to seven out of which only an alliance was still running for elections in 1997. The other six parties were all new parties with new labels although their leaders were not unfamiliar to Sejm or to Polish politics in general.

A second reason for why researchers are legitimate in their worries is that citizens in new democracies are not interested in politics. After 1989, citizens enjoyed experiencing the freedom to freely express opinions and to participate to demonstrations or just watch TV political news with interest. The founding elections of Eastern Europe with the exception of Poland showed record levels of turnout. This was followed by the disillusionment that democracy is not what many have hoped for. Turnout levels decreased with people being less interested in politics and displaying distrust in the institutions that were opened for contestation. The process of representation refers to the performance of democracy. The expectation in this study is that, over time, due to citizens and representatives experiencing democracy representation would improve.

Thus representation is a matter of assessing the quality of democracy. This is in spite of weak party institutionalization and high volatility (Toka 1998).

The representation relationship that is scrutinized for Poland and Hungary has as its units on the one side citizens supporting parties and on the other members of national parliament bundled according to their political affiliation. The following section will detail on the role of issue saliency in representation.

3.5. Issue Saliency

The study of political representation did not ignore issue salience as a predictor of increasing congruence of opinions between representatives and citizens. This approach entails an emphasis on issue based framework (Giger, 2009) of explaining political representation.

Saliency is important for political representation. It is only natural in democracies that the representatives should represent what is in the public interest (Pitkin 1967). Miller and

Stokes (1963) claim that removing the salient issues from their analysis of representation that congruence between opinions of elites and masses is significantly affected. McCrone and Kuklinski (1979) consider that for saliency to have an effect there should be a will to be delegate on the side of the representative and citizens should send clear messages. In a later study they discover that it is the perception of the representative about the citizens' perception of what issue is important is what influences the roll call behavior of the MP (Member of Parliament) (Kuklinski and McCrone 1980). Page and Shapiro (1983) see that on salient issues the change of opinions of the constituency is closely followed by a change in public policy. Hawes (2009, p. 3) claims that representatives like to be attentive to issues that are salient to constituents engaging in what Hawes calls selective responsiveness.

Previous research discovered that saliency matters only in certain circumstances (Nyhan et al. 2012, Lavine et al. 1996). In this research the conditions for saliency to matter are that the issue ranking of representatives and citizens would be the same and that both elite and citizens are clear on their policy stances. The third condition is that saliency becomes a predictor of representation in time or the more citizens and politicians have the opportunity for democratic learning. The following section will present the measurement of political representation and the hypothesis of the research.

Chapter 4. Hypotheses, Methodology and Data

Representation is not congruence (Miller and Stokes 1963, Eulau 1978). Plain similarity of opinions between citizens and representatives does not imply that representation is taking place. However several studies (Converse and Pierce 1986, Huber and Powell 1994, Casado-Asensio and Lefkofridi 2011) used it to discover indices of representation. I follow the same path but being aware of the limitations. The data used in this research is more favorable for tapping on political representation than other studies (for example Huber and Powell 1994, Kitschelt et al. 1999). First, in this study there are surveys both at the elites and the mass level. Some studies only use mass surveys and compare the opinions of citizens to proxies such as expert survey or party program data (for example Huber and Powell, 1994). Secondly the time frame of the survey applications is close and the questions covering issues are phrased in the same way. Thirdly the three surveys were applied close to elections thus maximizing the possibility of citizens getting informed on political issues and using them to select representatives.

The importance of issues is measured both at the Member of Parliament level and the level of the party supporters. Representatives and citizens are asked to rate the importance of a list of issues considered important in Hungarian politics in 1998 and Polish political system of 1997 and 2001. (Table 1) The cohesion of opinions is measured by looking at the dispersion of answers around the average. The higher the dispersion or the more varied are the opinions on that particular issue the less is cohesion.

4.1. The Measurement of Political Representation

There are four ideal types of political representation. Beyond mandate and trustee types mentioned by Burke (Bohn 1987) in his speech to the electors of Bristol and discussed in detail by Pitkin (1967), Kitschelt et al. (1999) identify three subtypes of trustee representation (types I, II and III).

The first model described as not suited for representation by Burke or being more a feature of direct democracy, or having less empirical relevance (Miller and Stokes 1963, Fiorina 1974, McCrone and Kuklinski 1979), but considered as theoretically relevant is mandate or absolute representation (figure1) in which the more proximate are party representatives to their supporters the better the representation. Congruence studies (examples: Huber and Powell 1994, Giger 2009, Casado-Asensio and Lefkofridi 2011) make use of this approach. The second, third, fourth and fifth models are types of relative representation (figures 2,3,4,5). I will call these models relative representation I, II, III and IV. In the model from figure 2 parties take systematically more leftist stances than their supporters. For Hungary and Poland this means that parties are more for status quo on certain issues than their supporters. Relative representation II is an ideal situation in which parties take systematically more rightist approaches on certain topics.

Relative representation III and IV are models inspired from Kitschelt et al. (1999). In relative representation III parties of the left and right take more moderate stances converging towards the center mirroring a Downsian type of competition (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 82-83). Last but not least relative representation IV is the model in which parties of the left and right take more radical stances than their supporters. These models are used as benchmarks for analyzing how representation is displayed when saliency is considered important. If as several authors claim (McCrone and Kuklinski 1979, Kuklinski and McCrone 1980, Lavine et al. 1996, Giger 2009, Nyhan et al. 2012) the saliency of an issue is associated with elites more inclined to follow the voters preferences and citizens that pay attention on these issues then it is at salient issues where I expect improved representation scores. In terms of ideal models the display of political representation on salient issues will approximate the mandate style of representation.

Figure 4.1. Mandate type or absolute representation




Figure 4.2. Relative representation I




Figure 4.3. Relative representation II




Figure 4.4. Relative representation III




Figure 4.5. Relative representation IV





Figure 4.6. Absence of representation



Representation is measured by absolute distance, slope and intercept of the regression of party supporters' opinion on the party members of parliament in Hungary and Poland. A similar set of these indicators were used by Kitschelt et al. (1999) in their study of representation in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. These indicators are useful as they capture the presence of congruence and influence of citizens' opinion on the representatives from the party they prefer, thus displaying a picture of representation from below. Representation from above (Eulau 1987 and 1978, Mair and Thomassen 2011) in which voters are following the opinions of representatives is a model that will not be followed in this study. If one is to measure the level of the democratic character of representation and how it is influenced by salience or other determinants or whether citizens get more of what they want on issues they consider important a top down oriented approach is not well suited theoretically.

For the members of the Hungarian Parliament and the Sejm (the Polish lower chamber) in 2001, partisanship was measured by membership in a parliamentary group while in 1997 party affiliation was used. Citizens' party affiliation was measured by voting intention.

Absolute distance (D) measures the absolute distance or the proximity of the mean of the opinions of the members of the parliament belonging to a party and the mean of opinions of the supporters of the party.

$$D = |\text{Average opinion of the MPs from party A} - \text{Average opinion of the supporters of party A}|.$$

This indicator operationalizes the concept of the delegate with an imperative mandate. Some agree (for example Urbinati 2006: 219) that the idea of the imperative mandate is equated with direct democracy and less with a representational type of political system.

The other indicators of political representation assume a degree of freedom of the representative. Empirically some revealed that representatives overemphasize the issue stances of voters (Norris 1995, Belchior 2010). Regression coefficient captures indices of relative representation in which although parties are not close to their voters they still engage in representation. The regression is on the individual opinion of members of parliament and average of issue stances of party supporters.

$$\text{Opinion of the MP from party A} = b (\text{Average opinion of the supporters of party A}) + B,$$

where b = slope; B = intercept.

The slope will measure citizen's influence even when proximity of preferences required by a delegate approach is not present. The intercept is also an indicator (Kitschelt et al. 1999) of the similarity or proximity of preferences between party supporters and party representatives.

The Data

The research uses three double surveys on citizens and members of parliament (the lower representative chamber called Sejm in Poland) in Hungary 1998 and Poland 1997 and 2001.

The Polish National Election Studies (NES) from 1997 (2003 cases) was applied just after the 21st of September elections making the context favorable for searching indices of political representation. Citizens have just gone through an electoral campaign and they have been informed about candidates, policy stances and ideological stances to a greater extent compared to a time frame with no elections. The data on the Polish representatives is a sample of 176 representatives from six political parties and alliances from the inferior chamber of the Polish Parliament (Annex 2). Representatives were asked to rate the importance, their position and their party position on twelve issues: crime prevention, privatization, role of church and religion in public life, role of former nomenclatura in present day politics, unemployment, taxes, joining the European Union, agricultural subsidies, states' social responsibility, foreign capital, abortion and public administration reform.

For the Polish citizen survey the citizens were asked to rate eleven issues the same as representatives lest the question on the public administration reform. Citizens had to report whether the issues are important or not and then express their agreement for one side or the other on a scale from 0 to 10. The eleven issues that are common with the Polish MP-citizen samples were displayed in the same meanings of the end of the scales in order to avoid confusion regarding the meaning of the means.

The Polish National Election Study from 2001 (1794 cases) was applied immediately after the September 23rd national elections. The data on Polish representatives contains a sample of 120 representatives from Sejm. MPs and citizens were asked to rank the importance and express opinions on ten issues. The issues asked are the same as with the 1997 survey with the exception of the topics of abortion and public administration. For Poland, the data were collected through a grant from the Polish NSF.

For Hungary Median survey institute collected the data. The mass survey was organized by Gábor Tóka and sponsored by Central European University between the two rounds of the 1998 elections. The mass survey is weighted according to social-demographic variables. The MPs survey was organized by Zsolt Enyedi and sponsored by the Hungarian Academic Science's "Strategic Researches" Program in October 1998. First a questionnaire was applied to a representative sample of the voting population between the first and the second round of election. The sample was made of 1435 subjects over 18 years old. They were asked about their voting intentions. Those who did not vote were asked about whom would they prefer. Consequently those who expressed preferences but do not want to vote are included in the study. By including the non-voters the study avoids one of the difficulties that the vote-seat representation theories face. Beside the questions about the voting intentions, the people

were asked their opinion on privatization, territorial inequalities, state-church relationship, role of former communists, foreign capital, tuition fees, NATO and EU and family policy. Then voters were asked to position parties on the left-right dimensions. The same questions regarding the issues that were mentioned in the first questionnaire were asked of the members of the new Hungarian parliament. The MPs as well as the voters had to position themselves on a scale from 0 to 10 on the eight issues. These cover the economic, cultural and international affairs dimension. Miller and Stokes (1963) revealed that foreign policy issue are less representative than social issues. Kitschelt et al. (1999) showed that economic issues yield trustee style of representation. Miller and Stokes (1963) speculated about the importance of an issue and observe that difference in the degree of representation might be reflected by different degrees of salience. Erikson (1978) removing this issue from the analysis leads to a decrease of their correlation indicators. Kuklinski and McCrone (1980) note representatives are eager to follow the wish of the constituency when citizens perceive an issue as salient.

Powell (2000 and Huber and Powell, 1994) used left-right scale to measure congruence and found a close correspondence between citizens and representatives. Comparative ideological representation studies (Schmitt and Thomassen, 1997, McAllister, 2005, Blais and Bodet, 2006, Powell, 2009) use left right correspondence to find close linkages between governments and citizens position. Belchior (2013) identifies that at the individual level right wing European parliament members from Eastern Europe are congruent with voter's preferences and shows that center-right wing attitudes foster congruence at the individual and party level in the European parliament. Converse and Pierce (1986: 691) indicated that party discipline influences congruence meaning that party discipline influences to a greater extent congruence than voters individual opinion.

The book tests the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis no. 1. Issue congruence is phenomenon that exists even in democratic unstable political systems such as Hungary and Poland.

Hypothesis no 2. In Hungary relative political representation is prevalent, while in Poland absolute representation is more present.

These hypotheses explain what influences political representation in Hungary and Poland:

Hypothesis no. 3. Political representation changes according to issue dimensions. Parties will be less congruent on foreign policy issues, than on social and economic dimensions. Absolute correspondence of preferences will exist on social issues while on economic issues relative presentation will be present in both countries.

Hypothesis no. 4. More cohesion of political parties is associated with more congruence.

Hypothesis no. 5. Salient issues are better represented than non-salient topics.

Hypothesis no. 6. In time, because of democratic learning, political representation understood as congruence improves in Poland from 1998 until 2002 despite major changes in the party system. This is due mainly to the capacity of the left to have stable positions over time.

Hypothesis no. 7. Unlike for issues, the left right scale shows that citizens and politicians position themselves in a remarkably similar way.

Hypothesis no. 8. The capacity to use the left right scale improves issue congruence. Party discipline has a similar effect in Hungary

Hypothesis no. 9. Individual left wing ideological orientation of the MPs has a positive effect on issue congruence. Left wing representatives are better in representing social issues while right wing representatives are better in representing economic issues.

The average positions of citizen's stances will be compared with individual positions of members of parliament but also with the mean of issue positions of members of parliament bundled into parliamentary party groupings. For the regression of citizens preferences on MP preferences it makes more sense to calculate average positions of party supporters because the mean is less subject to errors due to outliers than for the MPs since the number of cases is significantly larger. The dependent variable for the regression equation is the issues stances of MPs while the independent variable is the average position of party supporter. The following section will describe the results of the inquiry in the analysis of political representation in Hungary and Poland. Political representation is an outcome of the effective performance of a democratic political system. This process creates the opportunity to assess the performance of politicians and punish or reward them at elections. The data will focus on presenting situations of relative and absolute congruence on the importance of issues between parties and citizens. Important issues will yield mandate type of representation. This first section will reveal which issues are important, how similar are rankings and how cohesive are voters and representatives on salient issues in both Hungary 1998 and Poland 1997 and 2001.

Chapter 5. Political Parties in Poland and Hungary

5.1. The Hungarian Parties Ideological Profile

The Hungarian Democratic Forum, Magyar Demokrata Forum, (MDF):

The party was formed in 27th September 1989 on the Lakitelek meeting and it had the aim to become a national Christian and conservative party with three ideological streams:

- national
- liberal
- Christian-democratic

The incipient forms of the Hungarian Democratic Forum appeared in 1987 when 170 intellectuals met and issued an appeal to found "a Hungarian democratic forum" in order to watch over the free exchange of ideas for the needed political and economic transformations (Fricz: 1996). The MDF leaders tried to cooperate and negotiate with the reformers in the Hungarian communist party. They were more moderate than the liberal SZDSZ and FIDESZ.

Being more present on the media it became more popular and the demonstrations in 1990 helped the party to create a large membership (Tóka: 1995). The party had, in the beginning, the character of a national movement. The second half of 1989 brought changes that led to the formation of a leadership that had a more liberal conservative attitude one example being Jozsef Antal (Körösényi, 1999). The leading principle of the party is that the new society should be built on the foundations of Hungarian traditions. MDF considers the market economy and privatization very important. It has its own concept on how the market should develop. It promotes the social market type of economy. In competition with the foreign investors the Hungarian investors should have priority. The focus is especially on small holders and small Hungarian enterprises that should be helped to have a large share of the national market. The party is against the "anarchistic tendencies" (Fricz: 1996) of the liberal market. The solution is in state intervention and regulation. The national profile of the party strikes out in assessing human rights. These should not contain only empty words without power but they should be strongly related with the idea of the nation and national interest. The party program implies that there might be situations when the human and citizens rights should be subordinated to the national interest. MDF supports the European integration process and the relation with Western Europe is considered very important. The integration process must be in harmony with the national independence and sovereignty. The Hungarians beyond the borders are viewed as a part of the Hungarian nation. Antall Jozsef, the MDF Prime Minister, declared himself, in one of his discourses, as the Prime Minister of 15 million Hungarians, referring also to the minorities in the neighboring countries (Fricz, 1996). Christianity is considered an essential part of the Hungarian history.

The party promotes the freedom of religious beliefs. In the viewpoint of MDF, the church must have an important role in society. The restitution of church properties and religious education in schools are essential elements of the party's program. When it was in government (1990-1994) MDF promoted a policy of almost compulsory religious education in schools. The fierce opposition of the other political parties impeded this policy to become effective. Related to the church issue is the position on abortion. First, MDF issued a strong anti-abortion policy that was changed into a liberal position since the anti-abortion policy had a small electoral support. MDF supports the land restitution. Even if this idea came from FKGP, the party delimited itself from the radical solution of restituting all the lands back to their owners, idea supported by this party. MDF gave the opportunity of choice between land ownership and some financial restitution. Ideologically, the party identifies itself as a centrist one. It has a strong anticommunist attitude. It rejects the ideas of the extreme lefts like collectivism and the nationalism of the extreme right. The party does not consider itself as class-based or ideological. MDF views itself as the representative of the whole Hungarian nation. In 1995 the party accepted to be called center-right, rightist party (Fricz, 1996). In the 1998 platform MDF maintained its national conservative character. The slogan was Order, Security and Population Growth. The party declared itself as a modern, national, civic and centrist party. It also became part of the European center right and Christian party organizations from Western Europe. The economic policy is contained in the social market economy that unites the private property, market competition and solidarity in society. The main declared concerns are the safety of family, education, health system and scientific research. The support for church and the concern for the Hungarians outside borders were restated. At the 1998 elections the party got only 2,8% of the list vote because of the divisions of in the party. An agreement with FIDESZ helped the party to get into parliament and to occupy 17 seats.

[**Independent Smallholders Party, \(Független Kisgazda Párt\) \(FKGP\)**](#)

The party is one of the historical organizations that were formed in 1930 as an agrarian center group that promoted land restitution. Before 1948 it had close relations with the Hangya Cooperative and the Federation of Farmers. In 1956 the party reappeared in the days of the revolution. In 1988-1989 the party considered itself as a right wing class party. It represented peasants and supported agriculture and land restitution. The key words of the party and the principles that guide its political programs are God, Homeland and Family. The party idealizes the traditional, Hungarian, peasant life-style. Agriculture takes an important place in the party program. The form agriculture should take is that of the small individual owner of land because, according to the party's vision, this can produce cheaper goods than the large-scale production would. The ideological profile of the party is agrarian, focused on the individual land-owner and it is fiercely anticommunist and traditionalist. The intervention of the state is welcomed in order to counterbalance the arbitrariness of the free market economy. The principles of the party are around the Hungarian peasant life-style that must be national, Christian and committed to traditional values. The main programmatic features of the Independent Smallholder Party are strong anticommunist, pro-Christian and for total land restitution. The essence of FKGP program was maintained during the 1998 elections. The slogan "God-Homeland-Family" remained unchanged. The party preserved its radical discourse against foreign investors and its proposition for a better

land restitution program. The Hungarian national culture was considered endangered by the mainstream cultures. On the economic level the role of the state, as a preserver of the Hungarian national interests, was a leading motive. The party remained devoted to its founding principles. In the 1998 elections the Smallholders doubled its number of votes received in the 1994 elections and formed the government with FIDESZ. But the party had no media or intelligentsia support and internationally it was isolated.

[**Alliance of Free Democrats, Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége, \(SZDSZ\)**](#)

The party was formed in November 13th 1988. It declared itself as a social liberal center party. SZDSZ views Hungary as a part of Europe. The party considers that the integration in the European structures should be made politically, economically and culturally.

The starting point of the agenda is not the Hungarian historical heritage and culture but the European one. The party does not consider that all the Hungarian traditions should be taken into consideration. Only those traditions should be maintained that are in harmony with the European integration. The SZDSZ economic platform promotes the Western European model. The party has a pro-market orientation. The market is viewed as the place where individual interests enter the competition. The principle that guides the competition is the private property. The two elements are strongly interconnected. Where MDF considers the private investor as important but it prefers the Hungarian one, SZDSZ maintains that foreign investors are vital for the Hungarian economy. The social polarization as an outcome of market economy is inevitable. Consequently the SZDSZ economic program can be considered as a liberal one concentrated on private ownership and large-scale investment. The social policies that protect the poor should not harm the market competition. The protection policies should be conceived outside the market's sphere. This is the complete opposite view from the MDF and FKG that were promoting state intervention in the economy for a leveling of differences between poor and rich. In the social integration area SZDSZ considers that the free deciding citizens is the most important element in society. There is no clear-cut way of life, values or life principles as the FKG maintains. Human interactions are completely free and plural and this should be maintained through a rigorous legal framework. In this case SZDSZ again has a diverging view from MDF. For SZDSZ the nation is a sum of free individuals and the nation can be strong if each individual's rights are protected. The nation has no dominant rights over the individual. The individual should enjoy all his/her rights and nothing should subordinate the enjoyment of these rights (Fricz, 1996). The party had four separate platforms: the liberal conservative, libertarian, social-liberal and civic democratic. The four platforms might enter in conflict when addressing salient issues and policy positions. But the leadership has more or less a single voice. The land restitution is considered a very problematic issue because complete restitution is impossible and reestablishing the old land relations is obsolete. The former communists should not be prosecuted with special regulations. The liberal legal framework should distribute justice and not extralegal procedures. On church properties the party again emphasized the role of the legal framework and dissociated itself from the Christian Party's exaggerations. The religion in school should be facultative so that no one's beliefs should be hurt. Fricz (1996) concludes that even if the party defined itself as social liberal this statement is not completely founded. The party seems to be more centrist and liberal than center leftist. In 1998 SZDSZ maintained its liberal and pragmatic orientation. There are no

significant changes of ideological orientation as in the case of FIDESZ. The party continued its Western European style discourse with a strong attachment towards the liberal market economy. The cohabitation in government with the MSZP made this party to adopt a more pragmatic and social liberal attitude. The monetary and economic policies were positioned more in the background. The party received in the 1998 elections 7,57 % mostly because of the corruption scandals that were around the MSZP- SZDSZ government.

[**Alliance of Young Democrats- The Hungarian Civic Party, A Fiatal Demokrata Szövetsége – Magyar Polgari Part \(FIDESZ-MPP\)**](#)

The party's motto was that it would not look back in the past. On the large debate on nation and the national feeling the organization had no position. It considered it obsolete and conservative so it disregarded it. On social and economic policy the party promoted the liberal economy guided by rational principles. The party viewed the development of Hungary starting from the protection of the individual and the private property. Consequently on the economic dimension SZDSZ and FIDESZ had similar viewpoints. FIDESZ supported the liberal market and it was against state intervention. On the other hand the party was also supporting social policies that would protect the disadvantaged of the liberal market but the social policies are considered to have a secondary importance. FIDESZ accentuated professionalism as the guiding principle for Hungary. The main element was again the individual but it accepted the "ideological pluralism" and rejected only ideological dogmas (Fricz: 1996). FIDESZ perceived society as integrative, accentuating the rights and freedoms of the young generation. It rejected any principle of the past that could burden this generation. On policy issues the party had a clear view. FIDESZ was against land restitution because it did not want that past social relations to reappear. These relations would be in dissent with the rational principle of market economy that has the potential to modernize Hungary. It was against the punishment of communists. Even if it was anticommunist, FIDESZ trusted the legal framework that would decide on who is responsible for the communist illegalities. On the church issue FIDESZ considered that religion in school should be facultative and the church should not have any role in the state. The party had also a liberal view on abortion. FIDESZ could be categorized as a pragmatic liberal centrist party in 1993. But in 1995 already a shift was noticeable in the party's program and discourse. In 1995 the party became more national with conservative traits and the pragmatic side became a shaded feature.

In the 1998 electoral program the national trend strengthens. The party proposed the institutionalization of the Hungarian-Hungarian relationships. It became more sympathetic to the church. The platform promised a change in the methods of financing churches since these were put in a disadvantaged position by the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition in government. The party also promised more social protection to families and no tuition fees for the first university. The family policies implemented by the MDF government in 1990-1994 will be reintroduced (FIDESZ, 1998). FIDESZ became a more conservative, Christian and nationalist party. The pragmatic side was combined with more populist and national character policy propositions. As a result of the social liberal policies of MSZP-SZDSZ government the party took a more pro-state intervention position stating the responsibility to promote social policies that protect the middle strata (Körösényi, 1999).

[**The Hungarian Socialist Party, Magyar Szocialista Párt \(MSZP\)**](#)

The organization came into existence on October 7th 1989. After a series of transformations the party declared itself as social democrat. It was the result of the transformation of the Hungarian former socialist party. For the first time it gave up socialist communism as a solution for the transformation of the Hungarian society. The party asked the permission to enter the Socialist International Organization showing that they definitely broke off from communism. The aim was to become a Western European type social democratic party. That meant that the party was recognizing the free capitalist market economy. In this way it was understandable why the party felt more close to the liberal Hungarian organizations than to the national conservative parties.


MSZP tried to introduce a national dimension in the party program. It promoted a fusion between the left-hand ideology and the national interest in the sense that it served the nation and from this interest the party selects those issues that could help society to modernize. But later the party started to promote a more Western European type of discourse. In the economic dimension MSZP was for the social market economy, and one of the aims was equal social opportunity. The party wanted the achievement of a fusion between the private and the public property so there would not be conflicts between these two on the market. Through the interrelation between private and public property, on the economic dimension the party was more close to the conservatives than liberals (Fricz: 1996). The focus of the political program was put on the development of the social groups within the Hungarian society. Unlike the liberals the party promoted solidarity and collectivity and the participation of all social classes to the political process so that they would become responsible of the public goods. There are several platforms and orientations in the party until one clearer platform could be distinguished. MSZP was against land restitution stating that it is inconceivable that the country should return to the old land relations. Also the party still considers the collective properties as important. Regarding former communists the party found itself in an awkward situation. Consequently they adopted the FIDESZ and the SZDSZ position of letting the legal framework to decide who is responsible for the communist period. Church restitution was not considered important and churches were warned to not exaggerate with the demands. Religion in school should be on the person's choice and the promotion of free liberal principles was enjoyed. On abortion the party positioned itself on the liberal side. Until 1994, the party suffered important transformations. The party moved more to liberal policies and the Socialist International, getting close in this way to SZDSZ that was adopting already a more social-liberal position. The election of 1994 brought the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition to government but the party did not lose too much popularity while being in government. The party achieved to maintain a balance between the demands of the liberal market economy and the interests of the former nomenklatura becoming a more pragmatic organization (Körösényi: 1999).

[**The Hungarian Justice and Life Party, Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, \(MIEP\)**](#)

István Csurka the leader of the party was former member of MDF and with some party colleagues formed a party entitled as nationalist and extremist. The main reason for the split was the fact that István Csurka and his supporters did not sign the Ukrainian-Hungarian Treaty showing that the party considered possible the revision of borders as established by

the Trianon Treaty (Körösényi: 1999). The party does not declare itself leftist or rightist but a party that always says the truth and does not change its conceptions and does not use subversive tactics. MIEP has a strong declared Christian and conservative character. It is against foreign investments since the lands of Hungary should belong only to Hungarians. The national market should strive for independence from foreign capital. MIEP represents the interest of the Hungarians and not "capitalist -bolshevik" interests (Körösényi: 1999). The organization is strongly anti-communist and it supported the national popular movement in MDF. The leader has often had anti-Semitic statements and an anti NATO attitude. That is why the Western European governments feared that such a party would get into the Hungarian government. The party was an external supporter of FIDESZ after this party shifted to a more national conservative discourse.

Fig. 5.1. The Hungarian parties in two-dimensional political space



(Source: Körösényi: 1999)

This chapter described the ideological profile of the Hungarian parties. It also looked at programmatic changes and positions on issue considered important in Hungarian politics. The next part will entail explanations on the policy positions that the members of parliament belonging to these parties take. It will establish relations between MPs position and the voter's preferences.

5.2. Political Parties' Ideological Profile in Poland (1997 and 2001)

Party Labels Abbreviations:

- AWS Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność (Solidarity Electoral Action)
- SLD Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Alliance)
- UW Unia Wolności (Freedom Union)
- LPR Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families)

- **PSL** Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People's Party)
- **ROP** Ruch Odbudowy Polski (Movement for Reconstruction of Poland)
- **SdRP** Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland)
- **PiS** Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)
- **SRPS** Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Self Defense of the Republic of Poland)
- **PZPR** Polish United Workers Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza -)

During the parliamentary elections of 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997 and 2001 the Polish party system changed several times being characterized as fluid (Slomczynski and Shabad, 2012: 901). For example up to 1998 Sczerbiak (2001) identified six phases of party development and pointed towards a future stabilisation of the party system. The 1997 election results indicated an initial stabilization of political preferences of citizens.

Table 5.1. Parliamentary elections results in Poland

Party Label	1997		2001		Vote loss and gains
	Sejm	Seats	Sejm	Seats	
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)	33,8%	201	5,0%	–	-28,8%
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)	27,1%	164	41,0*%	216	+13,9%
Freedom Union (UW)	13,3%	60	3,1%	–	-10,2%
Polish People's Party (PSL)	7,3%	27	9,0%	44	+1,7%
Movement for Reconstruction of Poland (ROP)	5,5%	6	–	–	-5,5%
Civic Platform (PO)	–	–	12,7%	65	+12,7%
Self Defense of the Republic of Poland(SRPS)	0,1%	–	10,2%	53	+10,1%
Law and Justice (PiS)	–	–	9,5%	44	+9,5%
League of Polish Families (LPR)	–	–	7,9%	38	+7,9%
Turnout	47,9%		46,3%		-1,6%

Source: Interparliamentary Union [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2255_97.htm, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2255_01.htm] and authors'computations

*coalition with Labor Union (UP-Unia Pracy)

In 2001 however several new parties won representation in parliament indicated a new phase of party system change (Millard, 2003). The electoral victor in 1997 did not surpass the 8% threshold for electoral coalitions. This result provided support for Kopecky (1995) and Sczerbiak (2001) characterization of the Polish electorate as having free floating voters. The political parties in Hungary and Poland were created by elites. The rank and file members have little influence over the policies or political program (Kopecky, 1995, 517) or they would not know what should be their role (Lewis, 2001) providing support for surveying party programs and elite orientations. There are four types of parties that emerged in the early 90ies. PSL was a historical party revived after the fall of communism although the party continued its existance during communism as a satellite party. PiS, PO, Samobrona, Liga

Polskich Rodzin, ROP, UW, AWS were parties with no historical roots. SLD was an electoral alliance created from the transformed communist parties (Kostelecky, 2002: 76).

In this chapter the intention is to identify the ideological profile of political parties in Poland in 1997 and in 2001. The ideological profile could provide a comprehensive image and a framework for understanding the policy preferences of parliamentarians. This is followed by tracking the changes in terms of programs from 1997 to 2001 of the parties that survived after the sixth wave of party system transformation (Bielasiak and Blunck, 2002, Grabowska, 2003, 2005, Szczerbiak, 2001). Voters in the 1997 parliamentary elections were seen as free floating not being attached to political parties (Szczerbiak, 2001). Kopecki (1995) argued that this was a general trend. Parties in Eastern Europe tend to have a catch all character with loose constituency. Following the same line of reasoning in 1997 the Polish political parties were most likely electoralist emphasizing the broad issues and not so much ideological topics such as attitude towards nomenclatura and church. The 1997 elections were viewed as being more representative than in 1993 since 88% of the votes were represented in the Sejm (Szczerbiak, 2001). The 2001 elections shows the comeback of the left wing parties (Millard, 2003) and indicates the initial crystallization of the parties that would dominate the Polish party system from 2001 until 2013. The ideological profile of the Polish political parties relied on two dimensions: a libertarian secular – nationalist/authoritarian dimension of competition and an economic dimension representing economic populism versus market liberalism (Kitschelt, 1992). However the division into left and right is less clear than in other countries such as the Czech Republic or consolidated democracies in Europe (Markowski, 1997). The former communists supported the liberalization of the economy and even during communism they were more inclined to compromise. The convergence of political parties on economic or religious matters that were most important dimensions of competition created a less clear linkage between issues and left right placement in Poland (Markowski, 1997: 231). The effect of social variables on party affiliation or left-right placement is minimal (Markowski, 1997) and there is a moderate effect on previous organizational affiliations such as membership in communist parties (Bielasiak and Blunck, 2002). Next I will present the profile of the political parties in Poland and track their electoral results.

[Polish People's Party \(PSL - Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe\)](#)

PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe- Polish People's Party) was created as a continuation of the communist United Peasant Party and other small groups. It was a party that had historical roots in the period before the first World War. This party claimed to represent Polish peasants and drew its tradition from a vibrant peasant movement that was against the communist regime of the 1940ies. The party continued its existence during communism being a satellite party of the defunct communist United Polish Workers Party. Roman Bartoszczek was the first president of PSL after 1989. During the 1990ies the party had a quite stable support. In the 1991 parliamentary elections 8% of the voters supported PSL. In 1993 the percentage of voters increased to 15%, dropped to 7% in 1997 and rose to 9% in 2001. From 1993 to 1997 PSL was a governing party together with the leftist coalition SLD which contained the reborn former communist party called SdRP (The Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland). After the 1997 parliamentary elections PSL became an opposition party together with its coalition partner SLD. In 2001 PSL formed once again a majority coalition

with SLD until 2003 when the prime minister Leszek Miller decided to eliminate PSL from the government because they have voted several times against the governments' policies.

Table 5.2. PSL electoral gains 1990-2001

Type of elections	Date	Label/Name	Vote	Seats	Turnout
Presid.	25 November 1990	Roman Bartoscze	7%		53%
Parliam.	27 October 1991	PSL	8%	48 seats	48%
Parliam.	19 September 1993	PSL	15%	132 seats	52%
Presid.	5 November 1995	Waldemar Pawlak	4%		64%
Presid.	19 November 1995	–		–	
Parliam.	21 September 1997	PSL	7%	27 seats	47%
Presid.	8 October 2000	Jaroslaw Kalinowski	5%		61%
Parliam.	23 September 2001	PSL	9%	42 seats	46%

Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe was a party that claimed in its political programs to represent the problems and challenges of the Polish rural environment. This claim is present in 1997 and in the 2001 political programs. Being a leftist party and siding with the former communists it is no surprise that the party promoted a view of the state that emphasized redistribution over spontaneity in the allocation of resources. The program of the party promoted a conditional privatisation, one that would include the minimizing of social costs and the protection of the economic national interests. It opposed „reprivatizacja” the return of confiscated properties during the communist regime to their original owners and did not agree to flat taxation. Szczerbiak (2001) and Grabowska (2003) identified the party as targeting a specific group in society namely the peasants. Their program and their supporters however were quite diverse suggesting that the party despite its focus on rural problems has a catch all character as the several other political parties and alliances in Poland. The party was characterized as euroskeptic since it viewed European integration as bearing high costs for the competitiveness of the Polish agriculture. The political party's program mentioned a clear opposition to abortion. It supported the public funding of education and health systems. The attitude of the party towards the church was less radical than SLD. The party considered that the Church norms of social equality should be respected and followed. The 2001 political program targeted several criticisms addressed to the right wing AWS-UW government. The 2001 program criticised the demagogic of fake reforms. PSL considered that the rural areas deserved special attention. Thus it argued for special loaning programs for farmers and the protection of Polish agriculture from the competitive markets in the European Union.

[The Democratic Left Alliance \(SLD - Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej\)](#)

The disappearance of the Polish United Workers Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza - PZPR) was followed by the creation of a successor party called Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (Sojaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej - SdRP) under the leadership of Aleksander Kwasniewski. The party created an electoral alliance for the October 1991 parliamentary election called the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej- SLD). This electoral alliance was remarkably stable until 1999 when SLD

became a political party under the leadership of Leszek Miller appointed prime minister after the 2001 parliamentary elections was by this party. Relative to the intense fragmentation of the center right wing political parties (Szczerbiak 2005) this alliance proved to be remarkably stable although unlike in other Eastern European countries it had fluctuating support.

Table 5.3. SLD electoral gains 1990-2001

Type of elections	Date	Label/Name	Vote	Seats	Turnout
Presid.	25 November 1990	Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz	9%		53%
Parliam.	27 October 1991	SdRP/SLD	11%	60 seats	43%
Parliam.	19 September 1993	SLD	20%	171 seats	52%
Presid.	5 November 1995	Aleksander Kwasniewski	35%		64%
Presid.	19 November 1995	Aleksander Kwasniewski	51%		68%
Parliam.	21 September 1997	SLD	27%	164 seats	47%
Presid.	8 October 2000	Aleksander Kwasniewski	53%		61%
Parliam.	23 September 2001	SLD-UP	41%	216 seats	46%

SLD is a coalition created in 1991 between the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej - SdRP) and 32 political parties, labor unions and other organizations. Several of these organization received patronage under communism. Despite the parties' links with the communist past SLD obtained 11% at the first free parliamentary elections. From 1991 until 1993 the coalition was in opposition. In 1993 the coalition managed to win the highest plurality of votes (20%) and formed the government with PSL. One reason for the success of PSL and SLD lies within the electoral system change that was designed to prevent further fractionalization of the party system. The 1991 elections produced 29 political parties in Sejm. The winner of the elections the Democratic Union garnered 12.3% (Interparliamentary Union). The change of the electoral law included the introduction of a 5% threshold for political parties, a 8% threshold for coalitions and only parties that received more than 7% would be counted for the distribution of seats at the national tier. These changes affected mostly the post Solidarity numerous political organizations unable to forge coalitions that would surpass these restrictions (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 106)

A second reason Tworzecki (1994) speculated that the success of SLD lied also in their anti abortion and secularist appeal. This appeal was preceded by a change of view on the role of the Church in society from "above" politics before 1989 to another political power in Polish politics. Although SLD targeted those who were affected by the liberalization of the economy it succeeded to convince part of the entrepreneurial electorate that their economic reform programs are more viable than the liberalization reforms implemented starting from 1991. A third reason is that PSL, despite being a former communist party managed to gain 46% of the farmers vote playing on the protections of their trade against liberal market forces(Tworzecki, 1994).

In 1997 the party increased its support receiving 27% of the votes but lost the elections to the Solidarity Electoral Action a coalition of right wing parties. The continuous divisions and political instability of the right wing governing parties and the winning of presidential elections for a second term in one round , resulted in SLDs increase of popularity. In 1999

the electoral alliance SLD was transformed into a political party. In 2001 SLD together with UP competed against a divided and splintered right wing that contained only new parties. SLD gained the highest plurality of votes (41%) ever achieved by a political party in post-communist Poland. The party made a coalition with PSL to create a majority winning government. Despite its links with the communist past and accusations of collaborating with the Russian secret police the party managed to transform into a social democratic party that gained support among the Polish electorate. The legitimacy gained by this party comes from its relative stability compared to the right wing parties' ephemeral existence and the charismatic personality of Aleksander Kwasniewski who made a surprising win in the 1995 presidential elections against incumbent Lech Wałęsa. Kwasniewski won a second term in the first round of the presidential elections of 2000. SLD as its coalition partner PSL managed to capture the reactive feelings of Poles towards the liberalization and modernization policies initiated and implemented by the right wing parties and governments (Jasiewicz, 2009, 494).

The political program of SLD was electoralist not looking for ideological purity. The alliance tried to gain support from all the sectors of the society. Unlike PSL's program which emphasized and claimed to be a representative of the rural interests SLD's program claimed to have a political program for all Polish citizens. SLD had a moderate view on privatization although it endorsed it and it opposed „reprivatyzacja”. SLD supported workers and it opposed foreign investors that would take over the market and defended national economic interests. The party encouraged European integration and under SLD government Poland joined the EU in 2004. The party opposed flat tax. In terms of social issues the party supported the complete separation of state and church. It supported the abortion and promoted sexual education and contraception in schools.

[Freedom Union \(UW – Unia Wolności\)](#)

UW (Freedom Union) was created in 1994 from Democratic Union (UD-Unia Demokratyczna) the main opposition party resulting from the 1993 parliamentary elections, The Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD - Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny) and several post-Solidarity parties and unions. The first leader of the coalition was Tadeusz Mazowiecki. In 1995 the president of the party became Leszek Balcerowicz the initiator of the economic reforms deemed necessary to reconstruct the bankrupt economy of Poland. In 1995 Jacek Kuron, the presidential candidate of this party gathered 9% and was the candidate on the third place. The party obtained in 1997 13% of the vote the peak of its popularity. In 2000 did the union did not support any presidential candidates. In 2000 Bronisław Geremek won the party's presidency winning over Donald Tusk. Donald Tusk and some members of KLD created in 2001, the Civic Platform (PO - Platforma Obywatelska) created. In 2001 it failed to enter the Sejm garnering 3% of the total vote. UW dissolved itself in 2005.

Table 5.4. UW electoral gains 1990-2001

Type of elections	Date	Label/Name	Vote	Seats	Turnout
Presid.	5 November 1995	Jacek Kuron	9%	–	64%
Parliam.	21 September 1997	UW	13%	60 seats	47%
Parliam.	23 September 2001	UW	3%	0 seats	46%

Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS – Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc)

AWS was formed by 22 parties in 1996 and was run by the Solidarity trade union and made use of its network of organizations for building party organizations (Szczerbiak, 1999). One year later the AWS was the winner of the elections gathering 33% at parliamentary elections. In 2001 the alliance of parties obtained 5% of the votes and failed to receive any seats in Sejm due to the 8% threshold requirement for coalitions. Splinters from AWS gained political supports. These were the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO- Platforma Obywatelska) lead by Donald Tusk, the nationalist-conservative Law and Justice (PiS- Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc) led by Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczynski and the Christian, nationalist-populist League of Polish Families (LPR-Liga Polskich Rodzin) under the leadership of Roman Giertych. The party alliance dissolved itself by the end on 2001 after failing to achieve the threshold. Four years earlier the party had 201 seats in Sejm.

Table 5.4. AWS electoral gains 2000-2001

Type of elections	Date	Label/Name	Vote	Seats	Turnout
Parliam.	21 September 1997	SLD	33%	201 seats	47%
Presid.	8 October 2000	Marian Krzaklewski	15%	–	61%
Parliam.	23 September 2001	AWSP	5	0 seats	46%

In 1997 the alliance built a governing coalition with UW and implemented four important reforms. These were the reform on administration, pension system, health and education. All reforms were implemented by the end of 1998 and these reforms caused the coalition breakup and disappearance. The party's political program was strongly anti-communist. It criticized the formation of the post-communist oligarchy. They criticised the PSL and SLD government for not performing the much needed reforms on the pension, health and education systems. Their main policy focused on family and Christian values as well as progressive taxation. On economy it emphasized the role of market liberalization and the importance of cutting the public deficit. The alliance was a catch all organization, tried to capture votes from all the spheres in society.

Civic Platform (PO-Platforma Obywatelska)

Two right wing parties emerged from the Solidarity movement and from the two coalitions of parties AWS and UW. Andrzej Olechowski together with AWS leader Maciej Płażyński and UW leader Donald Tusk founded The Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska). In the 2001 elections PO came in second with 12% support and obtained 65 seats in Sejm. This is a party that has a liberal (Jasiewicz, 2003) conservative political program. In terms of position towards the most important issue that divided political alliance and parties in Poland, namely state church the party is conservative recognizing the important role of church. This combination of liberalism and conservative policies is not a surprise since the party leaders origins can be tracked to the Solidarity movement. The church supported the Solidarity movement especially through the messages for support coming from the Polish Pope John Paul the IInd. Their 2001 (Platforma Obywatelska, 2001) political platform expressed clear support for the reduction of un-necessary taxes and a flat tax of 15%. Their economic stance included tax cuts, a more simple bureaucracy and competitiveness on the job market. On

social issues that parties' position was against the influence of former nomenklatura members and against abortion and not against the church influence although these issues were not very important in 2001 (Jasiewicz, 2003). The party had a pro European integration stance position open to influences from Western Europe (Markowski and Tucker, 2010). This is one of the new parties that changed the type of competition in Polish politics in the beginning of 2000 leading to a new phase in the Polish transformations of the group of political parties.

[Law and Justice \(PiS – Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc\)](#)

The other party formed from parties from AWS called Law and Justice was created by Jaroslaw Kaczynski and his twin brother Lech Kaczynski. Jaroslaw Kaczynski was the leader of the Center Agreement (Porozumienie Centrum) a Christian conservative party. In 2001 elections the party came in on the fourth place with 9% and received for the first time 44 seats in Sejm. The political platform of PiS focused on anticorruption measures implemented through fiscal policies (Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc, 2001). On economic policies that party emphasized the development and protection of national economy. They had several liberal measures for the national economy. They also expressed concerns in raising the standard of living for Poles and a special protection for families. On social issues the party was traditional Christian opposing abortion being against nomenklatura's influence and supporting a state that protects Polish national interest. The party was Euroskeptic. The party considered national economic interest above European integration and viewed integration as a process that could harm these political interest. Later on this political party became an important political actor in the new party system configuration of Poland after 2001.


[League of Polish Families \(LPR – Liga Polskich Rodzin\)](#)

The party was created in 2001 months before the parliamentary elections and it was a splinter of the intensely fragmented and collapsing Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS). The president of the party was Roman Giertych. The party became quickly popular with the help of Radio Maria a catholic nationalist radio station. Roman Giertych created this party a politician coming from a family with rich political history. The party's program emphasized the two issues claimed by populist parties: the corrupt elite and the simple citizens. The title of their political platform declared that Poland should be independent and all Poles should have bread, and a house. The party gained 8% of the votes in 2001 and obtained 38 seats in Sejm. The political party platform contained statements opposing the integration in European Union for geographical reasons. The party considered that the Polish historical regions would be affected. Secondly economic motives included the subjugation of Polish national interest to foreign investors' interest. The third motive was value and social and it referred to European Union as a sinful Babel and warned Polish citizens of foreigners coming to work in Poland and stealing Polish jobs and bread (Liga Polskich Rodzin, 2001). The party was against abortion and considered that the Church should have an influence over state matters although in the 2001 elections the issue was not that important.

Self Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP – Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej)

SRP was founded by Andrzej Lepper in 1992. It entered Sejm in 2001 on the third place gaining 10% of the vote and 53 seats in Sejm. The party had the characteristics of a populist party. It thrived on the social effects of the liberalization policies implemented by Leszek Balcerowicz. Andrzej Lepper was famous for the demand "Leszek Balcerowicz must go" (Leszek Balcerowicz musi odejsc)(Samoobrona, 2002) as a reaction to the Balcerowicz plan of transforming the Polish economy into a competitive one. It addressed the corruption of the politicians and the poverty in which the average Polish citizen lived. It opposed reforms that according to the party indebted polish peasants. It opposed privatization due to the high social costs it included. The party wanted to turn Poland into a presidential regime, with a strong president that can govern by decrees. It considered that the Catholic Church values should be embedded in the Polish education system. Consequently the party opposed abortion, euthanasia and the legalization of drugs. This party was Eurosceptic (Markowski and Tucker, 2010) opposed European and NATO integration. Instead it promoted stronger relationship with Russia and Belarus or strengthening economic ties with China.

Fig. 5.2. Ideological mapping of political parties in Poland



The following chapter will describe the programmatic linkages between citizens and political parties in Poland and Hungary.

Chapter 6.

The picture of political representation in Poland and Hungary

Political representation ensures that citizens get what they want (Huber and Powell, 1994). Politicians have to be accountable and responsive to citizens preferences (Dalton, Farrell and McAlister 2011). It is extremely challenging to discover what citizens want or which part of the principals a representative should take into account (Pollak et al., 2009). In this section the aim is to discover similarities, congruence of opinions and to discern patterns in which they occur. If similarities are discovered than we can cautiously affirm that there is correspondence between citizens and parliamentarians on several political issues in Hungary and Poland. To find out in which direction the causal arrow goes it is a different task. In democracies the causal arrow between citizens' preferences and representatives' opinions should be from the former to the latter. However in this part of the research we will take a minimal approach of discovering congruence. Several studies in political representation work with these limitations carefully described by Eulau (1978). Kitschelt et al. (1999) draw inferences on mass-party linkages by measuring the correspondence between party officials and masses. Casado-Asensio and Lefkofridi (2011) measure congruence between European parliament representatives positions and citizens stances. Huber and Powell (1994) compare party manifesto data with mass surveys.

The aim is to discover occurrences in which certain types of issues yield closer correspondence between citizens and the parliamentary elite. The issues cover four dimensions: economic, social, value based and foreign policy. These were used in several studies of political representation starting from Miller and Stokes (1963) to Kitschelt et al. 1999 or Markowski and Tucker (2010). These are also issues that seem to be important to citizens and parliamentarians in both countries and they can meaningfully place themselves on these issues. This is proved by the variance of responses and the low incidence of non-responses of citizens and the parliamentary elite. Following Kitschelt et al. (1999) findings the expectation regarding the data is that on economic issues people should be more reluctant to adopt pro market attitudes than representatives resulting in less correspondence between preferences while parties supporting a protectionist social stand should be closer to citizens (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 327). Given Poland and Hungary's legacy of national accommodative decision making practices of the communist elite (Markowski, 1997, Kitschelt et al. 1999) on economic issues the expectation s to find convergence within the elite towards pro market stance and a more conservative electorate.

According to the picture of representation on economic and foreign policy issues the expectation is to discover issue leadership as well as on value based issues. On values the expectation is to discover bigger distances between citizens and respective parties. The reason is that as social psychology theories (Aronson, et al. 1994, Katz, 1960) claim value based issues are those that are closest to both citizens and parliamentarians ego. They are closer to the characteristics of individuals thus more strongly held and more clear than other types of issues. Miller and Stokes (1963) found that on foreign policy there was a weak relationship between citizens and representatives. Kitschelt et al. (1999) found assymetries in representation on socio-cultural issues but discovered that relative representation was

present. Thus the expectation is that on values parties would be more polarized than on economic issues with party supporters being relatively close to their party's preference.

Protectionist stances on social issues should yield close correspondence between citizens and parliamentarians (Kitschelt et al. 1999). There is an increased likelihood that these would be issues on which there also would be the closest correspondence between citizens and the elite and also among elite and citizens. They would be the closest to what one would call valence issues or issues on which everyone agrees and considers salient. It is on these issues on which the elite are more eager to represent than on any other issues (Reher 2012, Hawes 2009, Hawes, 2013). The description of the data will unfold in the subsequent structure. First I will present the distribution of preferences on economy issues and then discuss the way correspondence occurs in the two countries.

I am trying to discover if there are some patterns emerging comparatively and longitudinally. First the expectation would be that relative representation would be more present in terms of issues covering the economy (Kitschelt et al., 1999). This is because citizens in both countries would be less knowledgeable about economy issues and more conservative regarding liberal measures that concern the structural reforms needed for two countries undergoing important democratization processes. Secondly correspondence should increase in Poland from 1997 to 2001 due to a process of democratic learning about parties' positions and citizens' desires on how the economy would work (Svolik, 2010).

The second section will display the citizens and parliamentarians options on social issues. Here the expectation is that the correspondence between citizens and politicians would be high. The reason is that social issues have the potential of becoming salient issues. Salient issues bring together citizens and create overall unity of opinions (Reher 2012, Hawes 2009, Hawes, 2013). The third section will cover value based issues. Unlike social issues, socio cultural issues can divide citizens and create polarization of preferences (Kitschelt et al. 1999). Sociocultural issues are closer to our ego to how we are and what we believe in that is why they are more difficult to change (Aronson, 1994). People have the tendency to defend their system of values and resist against attempts to change. Political parties represented by parliamentarians would also consider their stances on value based issues as defining what the party is ultimately for or what defines the party as different. Although they might not be the most salient issues they define identity. Parties in order to express more clearly their identity to their voters or supporters would be more inclined to have more radical positions than their voters (Downs, 1957). These would be the issues in which the electorate and parties would be more divided overall than for other issues. These are the issues in which citizens can correctly use their gut feeling in choosing one option over the other.

The fourth section will refer joining the European Union and NATO that stands for foreign policy topics. This is where the expectation is that citizens would all be for European integration because the issue bears some social desirability effects in the Eastern European context. Another explanation is that citizens would not know what European integration entails or they are not presented with an alternative option of not being a European Union member.

The fifth section will present the distribution of preferences on the left right scale and how correspondence occurs on this scale. Citizens in both countries will know how to use the left right scale in terms of discerning between political parties and correspondence between citizens and the parties they support will tend to be high (Markowski, 1997,

Kitschelt et al. 1999). Also issues that correlate well with the left right scale will reveal better correspondence between preferences. The reason is that left and right scale is an enhancer of the signaling process between voters and representatives (Huber and Powell, 1994, Klingemann, 1989).

Finally I will discuss the capacity of citizens to use issues when supporting parties, the importance of issue voting, and the implications of the findings for the research on political representation in democratizing contexts. I will also relate my findings to earlier research on political representation in the two countries.

The extent to which people have preferences

In order to analyze the positions people have on various issue dimensions it is worth analyzing what is the extent to which citizens have declare political preferences on those issues. One measurement that seems somewhat valid is measuring the rate of non-responses on issues (Van Der Eijk, Franklin and Van Der Brug 1999) in Hungary 1998, Poland 1997 and Poland 2001. The rate of non-response is expected to be quite elevated due to very few years of democratic experience that might lead to insufficient internalization of the important issues discussed in national politics.

Table 6.1. The rate of non-response on issues in Hungary and Poland

	Privatization	Foreign Capital	Church-State	Nomenclatura	EU	Left right
Hungary 1998	1.5%	0%	0%	1.5%	1%	22%
Poland 1997	14%	15%	5%	12%	16%	10%
Poland 2001	8%	10%	3%	11%	10%	21%

Percentages are non-responses and for left right measurement in Poland it includes the answer “it is hard to say”

Table 6.1 reveals that the overwhelming majority of citizens have preferences on issues. For Poland the rate of non-response is higher than in Hungary and in Europe in 1994. In Europe on several issues the non-response rate did not exceed 5% for valence issues or 15% for self-placement on the left-right scale (Van Der Eijk and Van Der Brug 1999). However for both countries the non-response rate did not exceed 16% and for left and right placement did not pass 22% threshold. People in Poland and Hungary have political preferences on issues that are important in national politics. They also place themselves on the left and right scale creating the potential for testing for its usage to know party preferences on issues.

Secondly it is important to analyze the capacity of citizens to perform issue rankings. For less sophisticated citizens all issues will be considered important. In the responsible party model or the Downsian models of explaining how people express preferences on issues ranking of candidates or of parties is considered essential for their models to work. If citizens' responses vary on issues and they consider some issues more important than others it is permissible to support the hypothesis that people have preferences on issues and they can rank them according to their personal importance.

Table 6.2. How citizens in Hungary and Poland rank the importance of issues

Issues	Hungary 1998	Issues	Poland 1997	Issues	Poland 2001
NATO and EU	8.9	Crime	8.9	Unemployment	9.7
Family policy	8.5	Unemployment	8.9	Crime	8.8
Territorial inequalities	7.8	Tax Policy	8.2	Tax Policy	8.1
Foreign capital	7.6	State social responsibility	7.7	State social responsibility	7.8
Privatization	6.6	NATO and EU	7.1	Subsidies for agriculture	7.5
Church	5.1	Subsidies for agriculture	6.9	NATO and EU	5.9
Tuition fees	4.9	Foreign capital	5.9	Foreign capital	5.3
Communists	4.7	Privatization	5.9	Privatization	4.8
		Church	5.5	Church	4.4
		Abortion	5.3	Communists	3.2
		Communists	4.5		

Table 6.2 shows a quite varied ranking of issues. For Hungary the rankings range from 4.7 to 8.9 on a scale from 0 to 10, for Poland in 1998 the scale ranges from 4.5 to 8.9 while for Poland in 2011 the scale ranges from 3.2 to 9.7. In both countries citizens are not only able to have preferences on important political issues but they are also able to rank these issues. Moreover the issue ranking of Polish citizens is similar to citizens from other European countries (Van Der Eijk and Van Der Brug 1999) with a longer uninterrupted democratic experience than Poland.


To conclude this section it is possible to observe that citizens in both countries exhibit the capacity of using political issues. They express preferences on a variety of issues and are able to discern that some issues are more important than others. These results offer a fundament for using the correspondence of issues as a tool for using issues as a tool for describing how representation occurs in both countries. The next section will assess the distribution of political preferences at the elite and citizen level and the presence of correspondence between citizens and representatives at the level of parliament. Some would argue that the parliament should be the representative body of a country and represent as a whole all citizens' preferences. That is why I consider it relevant to scrutinize correspondence between preferences between citizens and representatives at the country level.

Distribution of political preferences in Hungary 1998, Poland 1997 and Poland 2001

This part will compare distributions of preferences between voters and the elite. Comparing distributions of preferences is a more sensitive method of measuring correspondence of

issues than simply comparing means and standard deviations. In this way we can find out which issues polarize voters and elite. It can also show on which issues both the elite and parties agree or issues on which the citizens and their representatives are at odds. There are three distributions that are expected. The first is the Downsian type considered the normal distribution of political preferences. These should be the most common distribution both at the elite and the citizens' level. The second is the skewed distribution in which a great majority of preferences are bundled to support an option. The third one is a polarized distribution in which there are opposing camps on supporting one option or the other. These are common distributions of public opinion (Janda Berry and Goldman 1989: 156) to be expected in both countries. Regarding the distributions of preferences I have three expectations: First if citizens' preferences have a skewed distribution of preferences on an issue then the representative will mirror the option of the majority of citizens. It is plausible to argue that on issues that almost all citizens agree representatives will be more eager to follow the wishes of the constituents. The second expectation is that where citizens' preferences have a polarized distribution elite will have the same distribution. Polarized preferences might be more incidental on value based issues since they imply emotional attachment to an issue. Studies in social psychology show that when a preference implies emotional attachment people will guard it since it characterizes their ego. These are the issues that are least resistant to change. The third expectation is that the normal distribution will be more characteristic to citizens than to MPs who would prefer to have clear preferences rather than moderate ones. The reason is that MPs want to send clear messages to their electorate on issues that seem important for citizens. Figure 1 presents the three possible distributions discussed above.

Figure 6.1. Possible distributions of preferences



In the following section I will analyze the distribution of preferences for both representatives and citizens in the two countries. The issues were categorized covering the economic social and value dimensions. Attitudes towards the EU were placed in separate category.

Hungary

As we can see in the figures the highest similarity and as expected the highest similarity of preferences is to be noticed on political values. These are state-church relations and nomenclatura. Economic issues have distributions that are dissimilar.

ECONOMY

Fig. 6.2. The representation of distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on privatization

0 = state enterprises must be privatised quickly, the non-profitable ones to be closed down,
 10 = state enterprises must be kept in the hands of the state, the non-profitable ones must be modernized with the help of the state budget.





Fig. 6.3. The representation of distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on on foreign capital

0 = The inflow of foreign capital must be regulated, since it subordinates the Hungarian economy to foreign interests

10 = It does not matter whether the capital is Hungarian or foreign, the point is that it helps production and creates working places



SOCIAL ISSUES

Fig. 6.4. The representation of distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on territorial inequalities

0 = the difference between the underdeveloped and rich areas must be diminished by state regulation
 10 = one must leave for the enterprises to decide where to invest. Territorial inequalities should not be artificially diminished.




Fig. 6.5. The representation of distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on tuition fees

0 = university studies must be free for the students
 10 = one should introduce tuition fee which covers the costs of higher education





Fig. 6.6. The representation of distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on family policy

0 = The proper family policy is that every family with children receives GYED , GYES and family allowance

10 = It is not proper if the rich families receive the same support as the others



SOCIOCULTURAL ISSUES

Fig. 6.7. The representation of distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on state-church relations

0 = religion and churches must be kept away from politics

10 = churches must fight for their right to implement their views and their justified demands in politics





Fig. 6.8. The representation of distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on the role of nomenclatura in post 1989 politics

0 = it is extremely harmful if the office holders of the Kadar regime have a decisive influence in enterprises and institutions


10 = there are exceptions, but usually those are the best leaders who gained experience already in the Kadar regime



EUROPEAN UNION

Fig. 6.9. The representation of distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on European Union

0 = our foreign policy should strive for joining NATO and European Union as soon as possible
 10 = our foreign policy should strive for political and economic independence



On social issues the results are mixed. In two instances the distributions are different yet (territorial inequalities and tuition fees) on family policy the distribution is very similar. The first expectation was that on issues on which the distribution is polarized and on which all

citizens agree we would find similar distributions. There is only one issue that polarized voters. It is the issue of family policy. On this issue the polarized distribution is mimicked by the elite thus supporting my hypothesis. There are four issues on which the distribution of citizens' preferences is skewed. These are joining the European Union, state-church relations, tuition fees and territorial inequalities. Only on tuition fees the elite does not mirror the preferences of the citizens. This issue asks citizens whether they should pay tuition fees for graduate studies or whether these should be free of tax. My suspicion is that this issue is very similar to asking people whether they would like to pay taxes or not. Thus it is an issue on which citizens would tend to support lower taxes a position often observed in voting behavior studies (see Dalton 2008). For the issues of privatization and foreign capital covering the economic dimension citizens and the elite have different opinion distributions. While citizens have a normal distribution of preferences on privatization and seem equally distributed on three positions on the issue of foreign capital, the elite have a skewed distribution of preferences.

To conclude the distribution of preferences between the citizens and the members of parliament across the eight issues reveals that distributions are similar in six issues out of eight. The two issues on which similarity does not occur are covering the economy. Thus for Hungary economic issue seem to bring less similarity of preferences than other types of issues.

Poland 1997

As it has been argued before the similarity of distribution offers a richer depiction of the similarity of preferences between citizens and representatives. Contrary to our expectation for Poland it seems that the normal distribution of preferences is rather atypical. Out of the ten distributions of citizens' preferences only the issue of privatization is close to this type of distribution. On the other issues the distribution are either skewed or citizens' attitudes are distributed in three groups supporting different opinions.

ECONOMY

Fig. 6.10. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on privatisation

0 = state owned enterprises should be privatized quickly: the inefficient ones should be liquidated
 10 = enterprises should remain state property and their modernization financed from the state budget




Fig. 6.11. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on tax policy

0 = the higher one's income the higher the percentage at which it should be taxed

10 = everyone should be taxed the same percentage of his/her income, irrespective of the income level




Fig. 6.12. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on agricultural subsidies

0 = agriculture should receive subsidies from the budget and should be protected by duties, even if it leads to price growth of agricultural products

10 = Agriculture should not receive subsidies from the budget and should not be protected by duties, because it stops the process of its reform and thus leads to price growth of agricultural products





Fig. 6.13. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on foreign capital


0 = It should not matter whether capital is Polish or foreign as long as it boosts investment, production and creates new employment opportunities

10 = Inflows of foreign capital should be deliberately limited as it makes the Polish economy dependent upon foreigners

REPRESENTATIVES



CITIZENS




SOCIAL ISSUES

Fig. 6.14. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on crime prevention

0 = crime policies should be „tough” even if they restrict basic freedoms of average citizens

10 = crime ought to be fought against, but the policies should not restrict basic freedoms of average citizens

REPRESENTATIVES



CITIZENS




Fig. 6.15. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on unemployment

0 = fighting unemployment should be an absolute policy priority of the government, even if it leads to higher

10 = many other – more important than unemployment – issues should be governmental priority i.e. balanced budget, fighting inflation etc.





Fig. 6.16. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on state's social responsibility

0 = the state should grant its citizens the widest possible social safety net i.e. free health care, social welfare, education etc.

10 = citizens should take their own responsibility for their healthcare, children's education, etc.



SOCIO-CULTURAL ISSUES

Fig. 6.17. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on church-state relations

0 = the church should be completely separated from the state and should not interfere with politics
 10 = the church should exert influence over politics and state policies




Fig. 6.18. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on nomenclatura

0 = individuals occupying high positions under communism („nomenclatura“) should now be forbidden to perform responsible state functions
 10 = these individuals („nomenclatura“) should have the same rights as all others in competing for public offices and state positions





Fig. 6.19. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on abortion


0 = a woman if - she decides so – should have a free choice of abortion at any time
 10 = A woman - irrespectively of her social situation and health condition - should have no right to abortion



EUROPEAN UNION

Fig. 6.20. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on foreign policy

0 = our foreign policy should pursue joining the EU as soon as possible
 10 = Polish foreign policy should not pursue joining the EU, and should instead protect our political and economic sovereignty



As in the case of Hungary in Poland the values bring citizens and the elite closer. Citizens and the elite have the closest distribution of preferences on values. On social issue the similarities do not exist. The same can be said about economic issues. Polish citizens seem to be more inclined to be more radical in expressing their opinions than Hungarians. Out of the ten issues, on six citizens have clear opinions with majority of them preferring the extreme of the scales that range from 0 to 10. The parliamentary elite has more nuanced stances than citizens. The expectation would be that issues that have distributions skewed towards a clear option would be mirrored by the citizens. This expectation is verified only on two issues. These are church and state and NATo and EU.

In terms of issues that create polarization only crime prevention comes closest to the ideal distribution. The elite does not mirror the citizens' division. For the elite, equal groups support different stances on crime prevention. In several cases the distribution of preferences is similar. Both the elite and citizens have similar attitudes only on joining NATO and the European Union as well as attitudes toward nomenclatura, state-church relation and abortion. Citizens preferences are most at odds with the representatives preferences on social issues and economic issues. The elite chose moderate views on both economy and social issues with the exception of tax policy in which elite supports a flat tax while citizens support progressive taxation.

Thus to conclude we can argue that citizens distribution of preferences in Poland in 1997 are not well represented on the economic and social dimensions. While the elite tends to have moderate attitudes the citizens clearly favor a state that would take care of them. Clear demands of citizens are not respected by the MPs and this is supported by the mismatch of distributions on issues on which citizens preferences have a skewed distribution. Similarly to Hungary values are best represented in Poland in 1997.

Poland 2001

Four years later the mirroring of preferences distribution improves supporting the general hypothesis that in a transitional democracy the quality of democracy measured by correspondence between citizens and representatives is improving.

ECONOMY

Fig. 6.21. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on privatisation

0 = state owned enterprises should be privatized quickly: the inefficient ones should be liquidated
 10 = enterprises should remain state property and their modernization financed from the state budget




Fig. 6.22. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on tax policy

0 = the higher one's income the higher the percentage at which it should be taxed

10 = everyone should be taxed the same percentage of his/her income, irrespective of the income level




Fig. 6.23. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on agricultural subsidies

0 = agriculture should receive subsidies from the budget and should be protected by duties, even if it leads to price growth of agricultural products

10 = Agriculture should not receive subsidies from the budget and should not be protected by duties, because it stops the process of its reform and thus leads to price growth of agricultural products





Fig. 6.24. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on foreign capital

0 = It should not matter whether capital is Polish or foreign as long as it boosts investment, production and creates new employment opportunities

10 = Inflows of foreign capital should be deliberately limited as it makes the Polish economy dependent upon foreigners



SOCIAL ISSUES

Fig. 6.25. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on crime prevention

0 = crime policies should be „tough” even if they restrict basic freedoms of average citizens

10 = crime ought to be fought against, but the policies should not restrict basic freedoms of average citizens




Fig. 6.26. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on unemployment

0 = fighting unemployment should be an absolute policy priority of the government, even if it leads to higher

10 = many other – more important than unemployment – issues should be governmental priority i.e. balanced budget, fighting inflation etc.




Fig. 6.27. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on state's social responsibility

0 = the state should grant its citizens the widest possible social safety net i.e. free health care, social welfare, education etc.

10 = citizens should take their own responsibility for their healthcare, children's education, etc.




Fig. 6.28. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on church-state relations

0 = the church should be completely separated from the state and should not interfere with politics
 10 = the church should exert influence over politics and state policies




Fig. 6.29. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on nomenclatura

0 = individuals occupying high positions under communism („nomenclatura“) should now be forbidden to perform responsible state functions
 10 = these individuals („nomenclatura“) should have the same rights as all others in competing for public offices and state positions





Fig. 6.30. The distributions of preferences for citizens and political parties on foreign policy

0 = our foreign policy should pursue joining the EU as soon as possible

10 = Polish foreign policy should not pursue joining the EU, and should instead protect our political and economic sovereignty



Hungary and Poland

Economic issues seem to bring the largest disparities between citizens and representatives. The attitudes toward privatisation and foreign capital reveal that representatives in both countries were more inclined to support economic reforms through privatization and foreign investments. Citizens in both countries seem less willing to support these measures. On several issues there is similarity between the distribution of preferences. This similarity indicates a higher quality of representation than expected for two countries that have been in ten years of transition to democracy. In terms of distributions polarizing issues bring improved congruence compared to other issues. One speculation that I could advance is that these are issues of party identification that parties use in order to distinguish themselves in the eyes of their voters and other parties. On issues on which citizens seem to all agree upon one solution create similar distributions. With a few exceptions (tuition fees in Hungary) the elite will prefer to have the same positions as citizens.

The databases for Poland allows for a longitudinal assessment of the evolution of similarity of distributions. What we can notice is that changes of attitudes toward issues at the citizens level is followed by changes in attitudes at the elite level although we do not know what is the direction of causality. There are three possible situations that could explain the congruence of changes. The first explanation is that once the elite changes its opinion on an issue they will try to communicate and eventually persuade their voters to have the same attitude. Thus the opinion change originates from the elite which communicates its messages to their voters. Voters would adhere to their MPs opinions. This is a situation in which the elite identifies problems provides solutions and citizens form opinions on these solutions. This would be an elite oriented model of political representation supported by Thomassen and Mair (2011). However this model is very remote to the definition of democratic political representation in which citizens attitude influence elite preferences. The second alternative is that citizens changed their opinion and the elite followed the change of attitudes. The causal arrow thus goes from the citizens to the elite indicating the presence of political representation thus showing that the new democratic system performance improves. The third possible explanation is that the similarity of distributions between representatives and citizens is occurring by chance. No matter which is the alternative explanation it would be safe to argue that once we indicate some sort of common distribution which is backed up by commonality of opinions and by a statistically significant associational relationship we could argue that a representational exchange is occurring.

Conclusions

This part of the study had as its purpose to use a novel approach in measuring congruence based on issues. Most studies make use of congruence of means by subtracting the position of citizens from the position of the elite, correlation or regression to display similarities between citizens and the elite. The comparison of distributions of preferences offer a picture of how preferences distribute on the scale. Unlike measuring representation with the use of means, it can identify valence issues, polarizing issues or issues with a normal distribution.

The measurement of congruence by comparing the distribution of preferences yielded results that confirm some of the expectations that I had about the similarity of shapes

congruence had. I expected three types of distribution. The first is the normal distribution that I expected to be most common. The second was the skewed distribution that would picture valence issues. The third was the distribution of preferences into two camps a possible indication of polarization. The normal distribution of preferences was rare in terms of citizens preferences and more used especially on economic issues at the elite level. Citizens and elite seemed more inclined to have preferences that are clear in favor on one issue or another or divide in two or more camps. On several issues citizens are supporting their parties position which in multi party systems like in Hungary and Poland seem to result into distributions with several camps of voters behind two or more likely three to four issue positions.

Valence issues are more likely to bring up common distributions of preferences. Polarizing issues have the same effect. Thus issues on which citizens agree on a position bring increased levels of similarity between voters and the elite in both countries. Polarizing issues, that is issues that divide voters into two camps have a similar effect. Thus what is to be concluded is that whenever voters have clear stances on an issue or have two opposing views on an issue then the distribution of preferences tends to be similar with that of the elite. The possible explanation of this finding is that when citizens are clear about their will then the elite is ready to follow what the represented desire. The same can be argued for polarizing issues. Clear issues stances and polarizing issues tend to be better communicated by the media or by politicians. Citizens send clear signals when a majority of them prefers a certain solution to an economic, social or cultural problem. Polarizing issues have the role of clarifying which are the main ideological camps in a party system. Parties are more eager to communicate their position on these issues because these identify the party as distinct from the other parties.

The next section will present the stances of political parties and citizens as well as comparing the level of congruence between Hungary and Poland. The aim is to provide an overview of the level political representation measured by congruence of opinions in two democratizing countries. A second question is whether certain types of issues have some effect on correspondence between citizens and representatives.

Representation of Issues in Hungary and Poland: The Overall Picture of Correspondence

The representative institution in any democracy is the parliament. The Parliament is considered the representative body in a democracy. It should mirror what citizens want from this institutions. The data will present the image of representation whether the representative chamber is representative overall of citizens' preferences. This vision of the representative chamber as being representative for the entire society is especially important in political systems that do not explicitly link the representative to a district. For instance in systems that have a PR (proportional representation) system like in Poland the idea of the parliament being representative for the whole citizenry is important and less so in majority systems or mixed with majoritarian tendencies such as in Hungary.

Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 reveal the level of correspondence between the preferences of citizens and all representatives. The distance represents the absolute distance between all citizens, voters and non-voters and all representatives in the lower representative chamber

for Poland and Hungary. A value of 0 represents perfect correspondence between citizens and the elite. A value of 10 is the maximum possible difference between the parliamentarians and voters showing the citizens and their representatives have opposing views on an issue.

Looking at the distances in the three tables we can see that there is not one issue on which citizens and the members of parliament would have completely opposite views (distance = 10) on any of the issues. This means that there is no issue on which citizens and the elite would have opposite views.

Table 6.3. Aggregate mean preferences of MPs and citizens Hungary 1998

Issue	MPs	Citizens	Distance
Economy			
Privatization	3.6	5,6	2
Foreign capital	7.4	5	2.4
Territorial inequalities	3.1	3,7	0.6
Social issues			
Tuition fees	3.7	2,3	1.4
Family policy	5.1	4	1.1
Values			
Communists	3.5	4,5	1
Church state	3.4	2,9	0.5
Foreign policy			
EU	2	3,5	1.5

Table 6.4. Aggregate mean preferences of MPs and citizens Poland 1997

Issue	MPs	Citizens	Distance
Economy			
Privatisation	4	5.4	1.4
Tax policy	4.7	3.1	1.6
Foreign capital	3.1	4.8	1.7
Agricultural policy	4.4	3.5	0.9
Social Issues			
Crime	5.1	4.2	0.9
Unemployment	4.5	3.2	1.3
Social responsibility of the state	3.8	2.1	1.7
Values			
Church	3.2	2.5	0.7
Nomenclatura	4.7	4.1	0.6
Abortion	4.8	3.1	1.7
Foreign policy			
European Union	3.2	3.5	0.3

Table 6.5. Aggregate mean preferences of MPs and citizens Poland 2001

Issue	MPs	Citizens	Distance
Economy			
Privatisation	5	7	2
Tax policy	4.1	3	1.1
Foreign capital	4	5.2	1.2
Agricultural policy	3.3	2.5	0.8
Social Issues			
Crime	3.9	3.6	0.3
Unemployment	2.4	1.6	0.8
Social responsibility of the state	2.9	1.6	1.3
Values			
Church	3	2	1
Nomenclatura	5	5	0
Foreign policy			
European Union	3.6	5.1	1.5

Similarity is what characterizes the comparison between the preferences of citizens and parliamentarians. Although the elite might have different motivations to have certain political preferences than the citizenry they display a close correspondence with the citizens preferences on most economic, social or value based issues or the attitude towards the European Union. The date supports the argument the both the Polish and the Hungarian parliamentarians tend to closely mirror what their citizens prefer in terms of economic and social policies, values and attitude towards the European Union. This result is encouraging for the end of 90ies in both countries. It is an indicator that although there was high distrust in politicians or the parliament as an institutions and people felt disengaged by what democracy had to offer democracy in some way it was achieving the goal Robert Dahl posited; that citizens should get what they want from their government. Having similar preferences between the parliamentary elite and citizens is a first step towards achieving that goal. The fact that citizens in both countries were able to express preferences on complex issues shows that citizens in these countries with only 10 years of uninterrupted democratic experience shows the capacity of citizens to understand how democracy functions. Although highly critical towards their politicians both Polish and Hungarian citizens elect representatives with remarkably similar preferences. It is still yet unknown whether this similarity is due to chance alone or to the outcome of elections or reciprocal signaling or cuing between the elected and the electors. This result does not go in line with Roberts survey of mandate responsiveness. He surveyed several Eastern European countries finding that the lack of clarity of party programs had a negative effect on mandate responsiveness (Roberts, 2010, 86) and electoral accountability seemed to work strongly.

In Hungary the closest correspondence on issues is regarding the role of church in politics in which both citizens and politicians support the idea that church and state should be separated. The largest discrepancy between citizens and parliamentarians is on the issue of foreign capital. For this case the members of parliament clearly prefer foreign investment in the economy with citizens having a more moderate approach on these issues. Citizens are

more reluctant towards privatization than MPs. This is because they probably felt during 90ies the costs of this process that resulted in the closing down of factories and or loss of jobs. They seem to be more moderate in their attitudes toward communists than MPs and more radical towards the church interference in politics. They support the integration of Hungary in NATO and EU but are less supportive than their representatives. They are more supportive for social protection of the state than MPs. They support no tuition fees for universities, support from the state for families with children and reducing territorial inequalities between rich and poor regions of Hungary mainly between Budapest and some western cities and the poor east part of Hungary. Thus although citizens support protective measures of the state in term of social issues they are reluctant towards liberal measures such as privatization or large investments of foreign capital. In these terms citizens prefer a state that takes care of them and a state that has to find economic policies with minimum social costs.

In Poland in 1997 the smallest distance between citizens and the parliamentarians is on foreign policy. Both citizens and MPs support the view that Poland should join both NATO and EU as soon as possible. In 1997 Poland and Hungary were invited to join NATO. In 1999 both joined NATO alongside Czech Republic. The largest distances between citizens and MPs can be found on three issues. These are foreign capital, social responsibility of the state and abortion. In terms of foreign capital, similarly to Hungary, citizens are more reluctant to foreign investments than the members of parliament. This is because foreign investments go together with restructuring or selling off factories lead to unemployment. Poles prefer a more interventionist state claiming that the state should have a pronounced role in providing social services like health care or education for free. In terms of abortion citizens have a more pro-choice attitude than their representatives. Polish citizens seem to be more moderate than their representatives. They are more reluctant towards the process of privatization they are more inclined towards progressive taxation, a state that should provide a wide social safety net, reduce unemployment and be more lenient towards communist, strong against the interference of church in state affair and more pro-choice than their representatives. The discrepancies are not high and they reveal a Polish citizenry less inclined to support for a longer time the sacrifices incurred during the 90ies era that lead to high unemployment rate high as 20%. They prefer a state that is more protective ready to spend fund for social services than a state that would encourage freedom or private initiative.

The data for 2001 does bring remarkable changes of preferences for both citizens and representatives in Poland. The smallest distance between voters and citizen is on the issue of role of nomenclatura in after 1990 politics. Both citizens and MPs are moderate towards former communists not supporting strong lustration measures nor ignoring the issue. The preferences however could indicate some polarization not shown by the aggregate measure of correspondence used in this part of the study. Subsequent section will test whether the distribution of preference according to party represents a discrepancy between parties on the issue of former communist leaders.

The largest discrepancy in terms of correspondence is on the issue of privatisation. Although in 1997 citizens had mixed feelings towards privatization (5.4) their attitude changed and moved toward a clear position against privatization and encouragement of state grip on the modernization of factories. Poles in 2001 seem to be less inclined to

support liberal ideas and policies than in 1997. Thus they stronger express support for progressive taxation and they are more nationalistic regarding the economy than in 1997.

This part of the chapter presented an overall picture of correspondence between citizens and representatives. There were no radical discrepancies between voters and representatives in both countries. We could not find a discrepancy greater than 2.4 on a scale from 0 to 10. On several issues representatives are close to their voters' opinions. Economic issues reveal higher discrepancies than social issues on which both voters and the elite in both countries tend to agree. Citizens tend to be systematically more moderate than representatives on economic issues yet more liberal on values. From a glance it seems that social issues tend to bring closer citizens and the elite. Values and the economy divide them with citizens being more conservative on both countries on the economy and more moderate on values than parties. These findings are consistent with other studies that report that parties overstate their position in order to send distinct messages from the other parties either occupying the same ideological camp or parties with a different ideological background. The attitudes on foreign policy measured by attitudes towards the European Union and NATO (with the exception of Poland in 1997) yielded discrepancies. The elite tend to be more Pro-European than citizens.

Correspondence or congruence is measured by the absolute distance between the preference of the political party represented by the members of parliament and the party supporters. This measure is a relatively blunt tool for measuring the political representation of citizens' preferences since it does not take into account relative representation. In this type of representation we intend to discover patterns in discrepancies. More precisely we try to identify whether the mean position of the supporters of a party is relatively closer to their own party than to the other parties on the ideological landscape. The subsequent parts will cover the identification of instances of relative representation. The next section will unfold in the following way: First I will analyze the representation patterns according to issue dimensions. I will look for degrees of congruence and indices of relative representation. The objective is to find out what types of issues are prone for a better representation of political preferences.

Political representation according to types of issues

According to Miller and Stokes (1963) some types of issues would yield better representation or congruence than other issues. They showed that on foreign policy there is less correspondence measured by correlation between citizens and congressmen within the same district than on welfare and civil rights. The closest correspondence was on civil rights and in the middle we find social welfare issues. Kitschelt et al. (1999) analyzed whether the type of issue has an effect on political representation in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. They discovered that on economic issues parties have more radical stances than citizens. First I will try to identify whether there are differences in political representation between Poland in 1997 and in 2001 and Hungary in 1998. These differences will be scrutinized according to issue dimensions. The expectation is that economic issues and foreign policy issues would yield the highest discrepancies while social issues and attitudes toward values will yield higher correspondence. The second expectation is that there will be no difference in terms of representativeness according to issue

dimensions in both countries. The reasons lie in the similitudes between both countries of their transition patterns. The third hypothesis is that the citizens attitudes towards the European Union will be overwhelmingly for integration and the similarity between voters and the elite will increase in time in Poland.

Last but not least this section will analyze the role of left and right as a tool for yielding better correspondence between citizens and the elite. Several studies (Barnes et al. 1979, Klingemann et al. 2006, White 2011) revealed that the left and right scale is a useful tool for identifying what parties stand for. If citizens use this scale it is easier for them to find out whether their political preference is in accordance with the preferences of political parties they like the most. The left and right scale is a tool of information processing for citizens. Parties communicate their positions in policies connected by ideology. The ideological positioning should then enhance communication between citizens and representatives.

First I will show whether people use the left and right scale. Then I will reveal the level of correspondence between citizens and the representatives on the left and right scale. Thirdly I will support the argument that issues correlating well with the left right scale lead to better correspondence between citizens and representation. The reason is that if the left and right scale is a tool of communication between citizens and political parties then the chance of citizens knowing the issue position of parties is higher leading to correct choices on issues.

[Economic issues](#)

For the evaluation of the quality of political representation I have chosen to compare the preferences of both representatives and citizens on several issues that tap economic issues important at the end of the nineties in both Hungary and Poland.

In Hungary the issues covering the economy are privatization and foreign capital. Citizens and the elite were asked to express their preferences on a scale ranging from 0 to 10 on both issues. The citizens and elite survey worded in the same way both questions thus avoiding any semantic confusion that could induce a bias of the responses. Thus the scaling and the wording are the same in both surveys. Of course there could be an argument that the elite might have a different understanding when responding to economic issues than the citizens might have. That is why it would have been very interesting to find out how citizens and the elite conceptualize the issues of privatization and role of foreign capital in the economy. If the qualitative inquiry would find similarities in the way citizens and members of parliament conceptualize these issues then there would be solid ground to support the comparison between citizens and elite preferences. For this research assumptions have to be made regarding the similarities of meanings both at the elite and citizens level.

Citizens are asked to choose how close they feel to two opposing statements. The first stands for rapid privatization of public enterprises that are profitable and the second considers that state owned factories must remain in the hands of the state no matter whether they are profitable or not. Non profitable factories could be made profitable under state management. On foreign capital citizens and representatives had to choose between the regulation of foreign capital in order to protect national interest and foreign capital presented as an opportunity to create jobs.

For Poland in 1997 and in 2001 I identified four issues that refer to economy. These are privatization, foreign capital, agricultural policy and tax policy. In the 1997 survey on citizens, on the topic of privatization respondents had to answer on a scale from 0 to 10 whether factories that are owned by the state should be privatized and those that are not competitive should be closed down or whether these factories should remain in the hands of the state and be modernized by state funds. On the inflow of foreign capital citizens chose between accepting capital inflow regardless of its origin or encourage and protect national capital. On the third issue citizens had to decide whether agriculture should be subsidized a process resulting in slowing down of agricultural reform or that agricultural subsidies should not be offered even if it leads to some farms to be closed down. The fourth issue is tax policy in which citizens had to choose between progressive taxation and flat taxation.

Table 6.6. Differences between political preferences of citizens and MPs on economic issues

Economic issues	Poland 1997			Poland 2002			Hungary 1998		
	V	MPs	-	V	MPs	-	V	MPs	-
Privatisation	5	3.7	1.3	6.8	5	1.8	5.6	3.6	2
Taxation	3	4.9	1.9	3	4.1	1.1			
Foreign capital	4.7	3.1	1.6	5.1	4	1.1	5	7.4	2.4
Agricultural policy	3.7	4.5	0.8	2.6	3.3	0.7			
Territorial inequalities							3.7	3.1	0.6
Sum of differences				5.6		4.7			5

The results display significantly large differences of opinion between citizens and the elite in both countries. Hungarians elite seems to be more distant from citizens that voted for them on privatization and foreign capital. The distance is especially high on the role of foreign capital but on privatization as well. In Poland in 1997 citizens and the elite are more congruent than in Hungary. The highest difference between voters' positions and representatives' preferences is on taxation. The smallest is on agricultural policies. Four years later the discrepancy between representatives is on privatization with voters opposing privatization to a greater extent than Hungarians or Poles four years ago. On taxation and foreign capital and agricultural policy there is an improvement of the congruence scores. It seems that on economic issues representation understood as congruence improves over time.

Figures that display the picture of representation provides us with valuable information. Below you will find the pictures of representation for issues on which the comparison between the three data bases is possible.

In Hungary and in Poland in 1997, 1998 the discrepancy between voters and citizens is high. The figures however are indicative of relative representation. In both countries although representatives are quite far away from their voters they are relative to the other parties close to them. For example in Hungary the most liberal party (SZDSZ) is the strongest supporter of a speedy privatization among the all the Hungarian parties. The supporters of SZDSZ are among the supporters of other parties the closest to the SZDSZ parliamentary group opinion. MIEP was a nationalist party supporting the populist measure of the state grip on industry to avoid (Blokker 2005: 378) unemployment. It is also the party least inclined to support privatization. It seems that its voters are even less inclined to support

privatization measures. As the party that supports their views they are relatively the closest to the state lead reform of factories. As expected, all parties are more inclined to support privatization measures than their respective voters.

In Poland in 1997 we encounter the same situation. All parties are more inclined to support privatization than their party supporters. In absolute terms all parties are not congruent with the citizens' wishes. Instead relative representation is present. UW the party that is closest in 1997 to the option that supports quick privatization of state enterprises has its party supporters as being most supportive for this stance relatively to the supporters of the other parties. PSL the party closest to the option of the state hold on the privatization process has its supporters being more reluctant than the party in encouraging privatization. Compared to the other party supporters they are the closest to the option that supports a state managed restructuration of enterprises.

In 1997 all parties were more in favor of privatization than their respective voters. This situation changed in 2001. The representatives of two new parties (LPR and SRP) unlike all the other parties support a state lead privatization being more radical than their voters and the other members of parliament in Sejm. In 2001 in Poland party supporters are more grouped than in 1997. The distance between the most dispersed preferences dropped from 2.8 to 1.7 (distance between the average positions of the supporters of the two parties that are most distanced on privatization).

Table 6.7. Mean opinions of parties and party supporters on privatization in Hungary 1998 (standard deviations in parentheses)

	MDF	SZDSZ	FKgP	MSZP	FIDESZ	MIEP
Privatization Party	3,7 (0,9)	1,4 (1)	4,4 (2,1)	3,6 (1,9)	3,7 (1,9)	5,8 (1,6)
Voters	5,5 (2,7)	4,4 (2,6)	6,1 (3,1)	5,2 (3,2)	5,6 (3,2)	6,9 (2,7)
Difference	1,8	3	1,7	1,6	1,9	1,1

Table 6.8. Mean opinions of parties and party supporters on privatization in Poland 1997 (standard deviations in parentheses)

	SLD	PSL	UW	AWS
Privatization Party	4,6 (2,3)	5,7 (2,3)	1,3 (1,8)	3,6 (2,4)
Voters	5,0 (3,1)	6,6 (2,8)	3,8 (3,2)	5,0 (3,1)
Difference	0,4	0,9	2,5	1,4

Table 6.9. Mean opinions of parties and party supporters on privatization in Poland 2001 (standard deviations in parentheses)

	SLD	PSL	PO	SRP	PiS	LPR	UP
Privatization Party	5 (2,2)	5,3 (1,4)	2,1 (2,4)	8,6 (1,3)	3,5 (2,4)	8,4 (1,5)	4,5 (2,7)
Voters	7,2 (2,7)	7,8 (2,4)	5,7 (3,2)	7,4 (3)	6 (3,3)	7,4 (2,4)	7,2 (2,7)
Difference	2,2	2,5	3,6	1,2	2,5	1	2,7

Fig. 6.31. The picture of representation of voters' preferences by political parties on privatization in Hungary 1998

Quick privatization (0) vs. State property of enterprises(10)




Fig. 6.32. The picture of representation of voters' preferences by political parties on privatization in Poland 1997





Fig. 6.33. The picture of representation of voters' preferences by political parties on privatization in Poland 2001



At the same time the distance between parties increased from 4.4 to 6.5. None of the supporters of any party have a position supporting privatization. The reason behind this opposition is an outcome of the harsh economic measures that had to be implemented that led to unemployment levels as high as 20% in 2002 (Narozny 2006). Although the positions of the parties remained unchanged two new parties appeared with clearly different issues and voters became even more distant from the other parties. Interestingly, however, even if voters' positions were grouped one could identify the presence of relative representation.

Foreign capital

The attitudes on foreign capital in Poland and in Hungary reveal the absence of absolute representation and similar patterns of relative representation.

Table 6.10. Mean opinions of parties and party supporters on foreign capital in Hungary (standard deviations in parentheses)

Hungary 1998		MDF	SZDSZ	FKgP	MSZP	FIDESZ	MIEP
Foreign capital	Party	4,5 (2,3)	9,1 (1)	5,7 (2,7)	8,6 (1,3)	6,9 (1,8)	2,5 (3,1)
	Voters	4,2 (3,2)	5,9 (3)	4,5 (3,7)	5,6 (3,4)	5 (3,4)	2,4 (3)
	Difference	0,3	3,2	1,2	3	1,9	0,1

Table 6.11. Mean opinions of parties and party supporters on foreign capital in Poland 1997 (standard deviations in parentheses)

Poland 1997		SLD	PSL	UW	AWS
Foreign capital	Party	2,6 (2,2)	5,9 (2,2)	1,1 (1,4)	3,7 (2,2)
	Voters	4,5 (3,2)	5,1 (3,6)	4,0 (3,0)	4,7 (3,2)
	Difference	1,9	0,8	2,9	1,0

Table 6.12. Mean opinions of parties and party supporters on foreign capital in Poland 2001 (standard deviations in parentheses)

Poland 2001		SLD	PSL	PO	SRP	PiS	LPR	UP
Foreign capital	Party	2,8 (1,8)	4,4 (2,4)	1,5 (1,5)	6,6 (3,3)	4,3 (3)	8,4 (1,8)	3,7 (2,3)
	Voters	5 (3,4)	6,7 (3,2)	3,7 (3,1)	5,6 (3,5)	5,6 (3,6)	5,2 (3,5)	5 (3,4)
	Difference	2,2	2,3	2,2	1	1,3	3,2	1,3

Fig. 6.34. The picture of representation of voters' preferences by political parties on foreign capital in Hungary 1997

Friendly to foreign capital inflows vs. Foreign capital damages national interest




Fig. 6.35. The picture of representation of voters' preferences by political parties on foreign capital in Poland 1997

Friendly to foreign capital inflows vs. Foreign capital damages national interest





Fig. 6.36. The picture of representation of voters' preferences by political parties on foreign capital in Poland 2001

Friendly to foreign capital inflows vs. Foreign capital damages national interest



In both countries the elite and citizens are at odds supporting different views on this topic. The majority of parties agree that foreign capital is important. Citizens are less convinced. Yet each party manages to place itself into the ideological space shared by voters relative to the other parties. In Hungary the extremist MIEP parliamentarians have a separate opinion from the other MPs. The voters of this party are also distinguished from the other party supporters in being the most critical towards this issue. In Poland only PSL (an agrarian party) is more critical towards foreign capital in 1997. Its voters mirror, relatively to other party supporters the MPs preferences.

The two extremist parties LPR and SRP have hostile attitudes toward foreign capital that are at odds with their supporters' preferences. All the other parties engage in relative representation by being systematically more radical supporters of foreign capital inflow than citizens were.

The images of political representation (figures 6.5 to 6.10) on economic issues reveal that in both countries MPs are supporters of privatization and foreign capital inflow. This supports previous evidence (Kitschelt et al. 1999) and my expectation that on economic issue parties would be more supportive of issues that tap economic reform with the electorate being more centrist than the elite. Relative congruence indicates that voters distinguish parties' positions quite clearly. In Poland in 2001 the party positions do not change significantly. Parties become more spread with the appearance of two extremist parties in the party system and a more liberal organization such as PO. However the spread is not dramatic. Four out of six parties support the inflow of capital with the two extremist populist parties supporting the opposite option.

Attitudes towards Nomenclatura

The issues covering the value dimension referred to attitudes toward nomenclatura and the relationship between church and state. In Hungary the attitudes toward nomenclatura revealed to opposing party camps. On the one side MIEP, FKG, and FIDESZ are being clearly against nomenclatura with the socialists MSZP and ultraliberal SZDSZ are having more moderate positions. SZDSZ and MSZP are congruent with their voters. Opponents of nomenclatura's influence are relatively congruent. In Hungary the supporters of nomenclatura are congruent with their voters. The opponents are relatively congruent with supporters. MDF is the only party not representing its voters.

In Poland one can clearly see the presence of relative representation in which citizens are pulled away from the center by parties. The liberal AWS is a strong opponent of the influence of nomenclatura while the former communist SLD supports the equality of rights of former communists in the new political system. The voters follow the party opinion and their opinion can be discerned obviously.

Table 6.12. Mean opinions of parties and party supporters on nomenclatura in Hungary 1998 (standard deviations in parentheses)

Hungary 1998	MDF	SZDSZ	FKgP	MSZP	FIDESZ	MIEP
Nomenclatura Party	3,7 (0,9)	4,1 (1,1)	1,8 (1,6)	5,5 (1,8)	1,9 (1,7)	1,4 (1,5)
Voters	2,2 (2,6)	4,7 (2,6)	3,9 (3,3)	5,9 (2,8)	3,5 (2,9)	2,9 (3,1)
Difference	1.5	0.6	2.1	0.4	1.6	1.5

Table 6.13. Mean opinions of parties and party supporters on nomenclatura in Poland 1997 (standard deviations in parentheses)

Poland 1997	SLD	PSL	UW	AWS
Nomenclatura Party	8,4 (2,5)	5,3 (3,1)	4,5 (2,4)	1,1 (1,8)
Voters	6,5 (3,1)	5,2 (3,3)	3,5 (3,0)	2,2 (2,8)
Difference	1,9	0,1	1	1,1

Table 6.14. Mean opinions of parties and party supporters on nomenclatura in Poland 2001 (standard deviations in parentheses)

Poland 2001	SLD	PSL	PO	SRP	PiS	LPR	UP
Nomenclatura Party	7,2 (2,9)	5,1 (1,1)	3,1 (2,3)	5,8 (3,5)	1,3 (1,7)	1,5 (2,5)	9,3 (1,6)
Voters	6,3 (3,3)	5 (3,3)	3,8 (3,2)	4,6 (3,6)	3,9 (3,3)	3,2 (3,1)	6,3 (3,3)
Difference	0,9	0,1	0,7	1,2	2,6	1,7	3

Fig. 6.37. The picture of representation of voters' preferences by political parties on nomenclatura in Hungary 1998

It is harmful for nomenclatura vs. former nomenclatura to have influence over policies are experienced and competent




Fig. 6.38. The picture of representation of voters' preferences by political parties on nomenclatura in Poland 1997

Forbid nomenclatura to have public offices vs Nomenclatura should enjoy the same rights





Fig. 6.39. The picture of representation of voters' preferences by political parties on nomenclatura in Poland 2001

Forbid nomenclatura to have public offices vs Nomenclatura should enjoy the same rights



UW and PSL are more moderate toward this issue. Parties have opposing views on the role of nomenclatura in the democratizing state. It is this topic on which we can see clearly the ideological differences between parties especially in Poland.

In Poland in 1997 the parties were more radical than their voters engaging in relative representation. There are two opposing party camps. Although this is not an issue that is considered important by the members of parliament and citizens it is an issue on which party identities are the clearest.

In 2001 the party positions radicalized although voters remained moderate. There is no change in the style of representation parties being more radical than their voters and away from the opposing parties. PiS is the most radical party against former communists. UP is the strongest supporter of equal rights for nomenclatura.

Role of church in politics

This is an issue on which in Hungary the two opposing camps are grouped around the two options offered by this issue. The parties are engaging in relative congruence overemphasizing the ideological differences between the two camps. While SZDSZ and MSZP are against church influence, FIDESZ, FKgP, MDF and MIEP are militant supporters. Voters are somewhat moderate yet more inclined to support the socialist parties' stance. In Poland absolute congruence is more present.

Table 6.15. Mean opinions of parties and party supporters on church and state in Hungary 1998 (standard deviations in parentheses)

Hungary 1998	MDF	SZDSZ	FKgP	MSZP	FIDESZ	MIEP
Church and state Party	7 (1)	0,7 (1,3)	6,7 (2,8)	1,2 (2,1)	4,9 (2,7)	7,4 (2,1)
Voters	3,1 (3,5)	1,9 (2,6)	3,2 (3,5)	2,3 (2,9)	3,3 (3,2)	3,7 (3,4)
Difference	3,9	1,2	3,5	1,1	1,6	3,3

Table 6.16. Mean opinions of parties and party supporters on church and state in Poland 1997 (standard deviations in parentheses)

Poland 1997	SLD	PSL	UW	AWS
Church and state Party	1,0 (1,5)	3,0 (2,0)	2,2 (1,8)	5,9 (2,2)
Voters	1,0 (1,9)	1,9 (2,3)	2,2 (2,7)	4,4 (3,6)
Difference	0	1,1	0	1,5

Table 6.17. Mean opinions of parties and party supporters on nomenclatura in Poland 2001 (standard deviations in parentheses)

Poland 2001	SLD	PSL	PO	SRP	PiS	LPR	UP
Church and state Party	1,2 (1,3)	3,4 (2,3)	3 (2,4)	1 (1,1)	6,8 (1,7)	8 (2,1)	1,1 (2,2)
Voters	1,1 (2)	1,8 (2,3)	2,3 (3,1)	2,5 (3,1)	2,2 (3)	5,2 (3,7)	1,1 (2)
Difference	0.1	1.6	0.7	1.5	4.6	2.8	0

Fig. 6.40. The picture of representation of voters' preferences by political parties on church and state in Hungary 1998

Church and state should be separate vs. church and state should exert influence




Fig. 6.41. The picture of representation of voters' preferences by political parties on church and state in Poland 1997

Church and state should be separate vs. church and state should exert influence





Fig. 6.42. The picture of representation of voters' preferences by political parties on church and state in Poland 2001

Church and state should be separate vs. church and state should exert influence



Each party is quite close to their voters. SLD and UW are the closest while PSL and AWS seem at odds with their voters preferences.

In 2001 in Poland only the socialist parties SLD and UP manage to be congruent with their supporters. The other parties are divided. One the one hand we have PSL and PO with similar positions and PiS and LPR with favorable attitudes towards church influence. Indicators of relative representation are absent. With the exception of LPR voters the supporters of other parties are not represented. For example, SLD voters could be well represented by UP or SRP parliamentarians. PSL and PiS supporters are better represented by PO representatives.

SLD and PSL voters did not change their attitudes from 1997 to 2001. The right wing parties have split attitudes. In 2001 PO becomes a supporter of secularized politics while the conservative PiS is a supporter of church influence. However, voters do not seem to react to the split between the two parties.

Attitudes of on values like the role of communists and church state relations discern between parties ideological programs quite clearly in Hungary. The distance between the right represented by FIDESZ, MIEP, FKgP and left wing parties SZDSZ and MSZP is fairly large. It is this issue on which parties are better differentiated than on economic issues.

In Poland, although the preferences towards the church state relations does not lead to differentiated opinions between parties, the attitudes toward former communists creates oppositions with voters being more moderate and parliamentarians being radical within their respective ideological camps. In conclusion state-church relations differentiate clearly among parties in Hungary while attitudes toward nomenclatura have this role in Poland. In time, the polarization among parties on this issue increases. Thus while the distance between the opinions of citizens decreased from 3,7 to 3,1 the distance among parties increased from 7,3 to 8. On the church state relations the distance between parties increased from 4,9 to 6,8. The distance between preferences at citizens level increased from 3,4 to 4,1.

In Hungary the distance between parties on church relations is 6,7 at elite level and 3,3 at citizens level. Preferences on nomenclatura indicated that the distance between elite opinion is 3,7 and citizens 1,7.

Although issues covering values are considered by both citizens and the elite as the least important issues they also are the ones that differentiate among parties. It seems that issues that refer to the ideological identity of parties are the ones that manage to differentiate among parties with citizens following their representatives but with more moderate attitudes. Polarization would occur only if citizens and/or elite would perceive these issues as important. Not being so their function remains to state the identity of the party. For this to happen it means that on values the correlation between the left right axis and value based issues should be higher than on other issues. Indeed in 1997 the correlation between elite preferences on all issues and the left-right scale indicated .197** for church state relations and a statistically insignificant result for attitudes on nomenclatura. In 2001 the correlation coefficient indicated 680** for church state relations and -.650** for nomenclatura attitudes at the elite level the highest correlation indicators with self-placement on the left right scale. At the citizens level however these results do not hold. Citizens are less engaged in holding radical positions than representatives.

Attitudes toward the European Union

In 1997 and 1998 Poland and Hungary were invited to NATO. They joined the organization in 1999. They both became EU members in 2004. In Hungary 68% of the population supported Hungary's accession to the EU in 1998. In the Hungarian media or political elite there was little knowledge about the impact of the European accession. The media was characterized as Euro pessimist. Politicians were afraid of extra European taxes and of their lack of their bargaining experience (Hegedus 1999). The less people and politicians seem to know about the impact of the European Union accession the more they would agree that it is a good idea to join this organization. Lack of viable political alternatives (Belarus is the only country in the region choosing a different path. It was hardly considered as a credible political alternative to not joining the European Union) would make citizens and the elite agree that joining the EU seems to be an important alternative. The only party opposing EU accession was MIEP a party that was also against Hungary's accession to NATO. That is why both citizens and parliamentarians in Hungary would favor a pro-European integration attitude with the exception of MIEP which opposed NATO integration as well. In Poland support for the European Union was large in the mid 90ies and decreased by the end of 1998 until 2001 when two Eurosceptic parties entered the Sejm representing the voices of those opposing political and economic reforms (Markowski and Tucker 2010). The reforms were necessary for the accession of Poland to the European Union. Thus in 1997 the expectation is that similarly to Hungary in Poland as well we could encounter large support from the side of citizens and politicians for integration in the EU with citizens being more moderate. By 2001 those suffering from reforms would gain representation by two Eurosceptic parties SRP and LPR. Although the joining of the European Union is not an important issues in the eyes of citizens and parliamentarians in the two countries it is an issue that separates extremist parties from moderate ones.

Table 6.18. Mean opinions of parties and party supporters on attitudes towards European Union in Hungary 1998 (standard deviations in parentheses)

Hungary 1998	MDF	SZDSZ	FKgP	MSZP	FIDESZ	MIEP
European Union Party	2,7 (1,5)	1 (1,2)	3,2 (3,1)	1,2 (2)	2,1 (1,8)	6,6 (2,6)
Voters	3,5 (3,2)	2,3 (2,7)	4,7 (3,7)	2,7 (3,1)	3,5 (3,2)	6,2 (3,3)
Difference	0.7	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.4	0.4

Table 6.19. Mean opinions of parties and party supporters on attitudes towards European Union in Poland 1997 (standard deviations in parentheses)

Poland 1997	SLD	PSL	UW	AWS
European Union Party	2,8 (2,6)	6,2 (2,5)	1,5 (2,2)	3,5 (2,6)
Voters	3,2 (2,9)	4,4 (3,1)	3,2 (3,1)	3,1 (3,0)
Difference	0.4	1.4	1.7	0.4

Table 6.20. Mean opinions of parties and party supporters on attitudes towards European Union in Poland 2001 (standard deviations in parentheses)

Poland 2001	SLD	PSL	PO	SRP	PiS	LPR	UP
European Union Party	1,3 (1,4)	4,7 (1,4)	0,9 (1,9)	8,4 (2,3)	4,1 (2,6)	9,8 (0,6)	2,4 (2,7)
Voters	4,7 (3,3)	6 (3,6)	3,6 (3,3)	6,1 (3)	4,9 (3,7)	6,8 (3,2)	4,7 (3,3)
Difference	3.4	1.3	2.7	2.3	0.8	3	2.3

Fig. 6.42. The picture of representation of voters' preferences by political parties on European Union in Hungary 1998

Join EU and NATO as soon as possible vs. political and economic sovereignty




Fig. 6.43. The picture of representation of voters' preferences by political parties on European Union in Poland 1997

Join EU and NATO as soon as possible vs. political and economic sovereignty





Fig. 6.44. The picture of representation of voters' preferences by political parties on European Union in Poland 2001

Join EU and NATO as soon as possible vs. political and economic sovereignty



As the data show in Hungary the distance between five out of six political parties ranges from 1 to 3.2. The only party against European integration is MIEP a party opposed to NATO integration as well. Voters have positions that are more moderate from 2,3 to 4,7 with the exception of MIEP voters (6,2) that closely follow their party's position. Politicians are engaged in relative representation. Both sides largely agree that it is necessary to agree with integration in the European Union with parties being more pro-European than voters.

In Poland in 1997 the three out of four parties support EU integration with the exception of the agrarian PSL. The party switched a few years later to supporting European Union integration.

Voters positions range from 3,2 to 4,4. Citizens, similarly to Hungarians support the European integration with elite being more supportive than their voters. In 1997 however parliamentarians do not represent well citizens' opinions. While voters are bundled parties have slightly different positions. Probably on this issue parties fail to communicate their positions on an issue that does not raise much interest from both citizens and the elite.

In 2001 the issue of European Union integration becomes more important. The failure of economic reforms implemented by the pro European right wing governments from 1997 to 2001 raised skepticism towards the benefits of joining European Union. On the one hand Hungarians were afraid of increase on tax burdening. On the other hand Poles were afraid of losing competitiveness in the agricultural market against powerful competitors from the European Union. The majority of parties support European Union integration (1,3 to 4,7). PSL that was against European integration switched its position to a moderate support. Two new parties are against European integration: SRP and LPR. Voters support similar positions. Unlike in 1997 in 2001 parties managed to communicate the differences of positions. The picture of representation reveals parties engaging in relative representation with two camps the anti and pro European integration attitudes. Voters manage to follow closely their parties and supporters of different parties do not have overlapping preferences. The only party that does not manage to represent voters is PSL. While the MPs have become moderate supporters of European Union integration their voters became moderate opponents of EU. PSL had an ambiguous position towards European Union and used Euroskepticism more as an electoral tool. Since 2001 it did not have a Eurosceptic and became a centrist party with agrarian support (Markowski and Tucker, 2010).

In 1997 and 1998 in both Poland and Hungary voters supported the European Union integration. While in Hungary parties had different level of support and were closely followed by their voters in Poland parties did not manage to communicate differentiated messages to their supporters. In 2001 the situation changes with improvements in terms of relative representation.

Thus the expectation that parties would engage in relative representation on the issue of European integration is partially supported. In 1997 voters of all parties with the exception of PSL supporters had very similar positions showing a lack of congruence between citizens and the elite.

This section revealed the display of political representation according to issues in two periods of time in Poland and one in Hungary. It reviewed the level of issue congruence across three types of issues that cover three arenas: the economy, values and attitudes towards European Union. The survey of the data looked at similarity in the display of preferences on issues that were common to the three databases. That is the reason why social issues, considered the most important ones by Poles and Hungarians are not presently

discussed in this section. The data revealed that on economic issues in both countries parties seem to agree upon the need for privatization and the need for foreign capital inflows. This finding confirms previous research that argued that in the 90ies on economic issues Hungarian and Polish politicians seem to have liberal reformist attitudes that paid off until 1997 (Tarki Group, 1998).

Economic issues reveal display a high level of relative congruence. It seems that parties exercise issue leadership on the economic dimension. In both countries citizens are less inclined to support economic measures that bear high social costs. The implementation of privatization processes and the inflow of foreign capital that brought unemployment and the worsening of economic conditions of the citizenry is the cause of less support. The decrease of support for economic measures in Poland from 1997 to 2001 provides an example of the costs citizens are not ready to bear for an uncertain theoretically better future.

In terms of values it seems that voters and parties have very similar attitudes in both countries. These issues seem to bring closer congruence between voters and parties and differentiate between parties and voters. In both countries you have groups of parties that are more reluctant to church influence over state matters and are more inclined to let former nomenklatura members influence national politics and a second group of parties more in favor of church influence and radically against nomenklatura members. Citizens seem to be more moderate on these issues however they have relatively similar positions with their voters. Value based issues although they are considered the least salient by voters in citizens in both countries they seem to be issue of identification. Parties send differentiated messages which are received by voters thus the differences between the stances citizens have on these issues.

In Poland, although the issues become less important they remain significant in terms of differentiating between parties. These issues correlate well with the left and right axis suggesting the ideological identity of parties is judged by using values as determinants in Poland and Hungary.

Political representation does not seem to work very well in terms of attitudes towards integration in the European Union. Although voters are in favor of the integration it seems that parties are more divided than voters. They also fail to mobilize voters to support their stances. In 2002 in Poland however the rise of two Eurosceptic parties lead to an improvement of congruence on this issue and the representation of the preferences of those who did not find any party in Poland to represent their negative attitudes toward integration in the European Union.

We know from the previous chapters that saliency matters for political representation. The more salient issues bring improved representation. This relationship strengthens over time. In terms of issues the type of issue matters for the type of political representation. Economic issues emphasize relative representation while value based issues are somewhat closer to absolute representation. The integration into the European Union, a foreign policy issue, does not bring improved representation in 1997 in Poland and Hungary yet representation improves over time on this issue.

The data confirms many of the expectations we had about the quality of political congruence. What is remarkable for Poland is that political representation improves on all issues from 1997 to 2001 despite the change of the party system. More generally democratic consolidation measured through the quality of political representation has positive results in a very unstable party system as the Polish system was from 1997 to 2001.

Chapter 7.

Political Representation, Time and Importance of Issues.

The role of party cohesion and the style of representation

Saliency: The Ordering of Issues

The survey in Hungary in 1998 included eight issues on which representatives had to express an opinion. The survey in Poland 1997 had eleven issues on which only citizens were asked to rank. In 2001 both citizens and representatives expressed opinions on ten issues. Five topics were common to all surveys. These are: privatization, the role of church in politics, the role of former nomenclatura and the role of foreign capital. Ten issues are common for the surveys in 1997 and 2001 in Poland. Only abortion is an issue not asked in the 2001 survey. The importance is decided by looking at the maximum and minimum value of importance. The most important issue is being graded 9.8 and the least important has a score of 3.2 on a scale from 0 to 10. Therefore the thresholds of importance are established at 7.6 and 5.5. Any issue that scores more than 7.6 is important, between 5.5 and 7.6 the issue is moderately important and below 5.5 the issue is considered less important.

The hypotheses of the research are:

Hypothesis 1. The importance rankings of issues of the representatives and citizens is the same.

Hypothesis 2. Saliency attributed to an issue brings less diversity of opinions hence more cohesion of opinions for representatives and supporters of a party.

Hypothesis 3. Issues viewed by citizens and the representatives as salient have improved congruence scores compared to issues that are less important.

Hypothesis 4. Representation improves over time in a consolidating democracy such as Poland.

The expectation is that citizens and representatives would have different categories of issues that they consider salient because of different incentives or motivations for support for certain policies. For example an economic issue or a foreign policy issue might be considered as more important by representatives because they are more aware than citizens about the implication of policies that involve complex topics. Due to limitations imposed by the data the comparison rankings is only possible only in Poland in 2001. For Poland I have also included the rankings of citizens that do not intend to turn out to vote. The inclusion of the preferences of non-voters is important especially in a country in which turnout in parliamentary elections is low. Non-voters represent 42% in the 1997 survey and 41% in 2001. Possibly the reason they do not turn out to vote is that there would be a mismatch between their views of what issues are the most important and what representatives consider as important issues. However, the data reveal no difference in rankings between non-voters, voters and representatives (Tables 1 and 2).

The response rate to issue stances is very high in 1997 and 2001 showing that citizens are inclined to express their opinions. Data are available only for Poland. In 1997 the non-response rate ranged from 1 to 14% and in 2001 from 0.8 to 9%. In Poland all respondents from Sejm expressed an opinion on the issues. In Hungary one or two only refused to answer to some of the issues.

Table 7.1. The percentage of non-responses and undecided citizens in Poland 1997 and 2001

Issues	Poland 1997(%)	Poland 2001 (%)
Unemployment	1	0.8
Crime	2	1
Tax Policy	4	3
State social responsibility	5	4
Subsidies for agriculture	8	4
NATO and EU	11	7
Foreign capital	14	8
Privatization	10	6
Church	5	4
Communists	11	9
Abortion	11	-

The rankings of importance of issues from 1997 to 2001 are surprisingly similar. For Polish representatives, in 2001 the NATO and EU issues is considered more important than for citizens while for citizens the issue on states' social responsibility seems to be more important than for MPs. All the other issues are ranked in the same order.

Poland 2001

Table 7.2. Perception of issue priorities in Poland in 2001. Citizens, voters and nonvoters, mean position with standard deviation in parenthesis.

Issue	Overall citizens importance of issues	Declared Non voters	Declared Voters	MPs
Important				
Unemployment	9,7 (0,8)	9,7 (0,8)	9,6 (0,9)	9,4 (1,2)
Crime	8,8 (1,7)	8,8 (1,7)	8,9 (1,6)	8 (1,8)
Tax Policy	8,1 (2)	8 (2)	8,2 (2)	7,5 (1,8)
State social responsibility	7,8 (2,1)	7,8 (2,1)	7,7 (2,1)	6,5 (2,3)
Moderately important				
Subsidies for agriculture	7,5 (2,3)	7,4 (2,4)	7,6 (2,3)	7 (1,8)
NATO and EU	5,9 (2,9)	5,7 (2,8)	6 (2,9)	7,9 (2,7)
Less important				
Foreign capital	5,3 (2,8)	5,4 (2,8)	5,3 (2,8)	6 (2,3)
Privatization	4,8 (2,9)	4,7 (2,9)	4,9 (2,9)	6 (2,2)
Church	4,4 (3)	4,1 (3)	4,5 (3)	4,1 (2,7)
Communists	3,2 (2,7)	3,1 (2,6)	3,2 (2,8)	3,3 (2,7)

N = 1794 for citizens and N = 176 for Polish MPs

Table 7.3. Perception of issue priorities in Poland in 1997; citizens' average positions with standard deviation in parenthesis.

Issue	Overall citizens perception of importance of issues	Declared Non voters	Declared Voters
Important			
Crime	8,9 (1,7)	9,0 (1,7)	8,9 (1,7)
Unemployment	8,9 (1,6)	9,0 (1,5)	8,8 (1,7)
Tax Policy	8,2 (2,0)	8,3 (2,0)	8,2 (1,9)
State social responsibility	7,7 (2,1)	7,8 (2,0)	7,6 (2,2)
Moderately important			
NATO and EU	7,1 (2,5)	6,9 (2,7)	7,2 (2,4)
Subsidies for agriculture	6,9 (2,6)	7,2 (2,5)	6,7 (2,7)
Foreign capital	5,9 (2,5)	5,9 (2,5)	5,8 (2,5)
Privatization	5,9 (2,5)	5,6 (2,5)	6,1 (2,4)
Less important			
Church	5,5 (2,9)	5,2 (2,9)	5,7 (2,9)
Abortion	5,3 (3,4)	5,6 (3,4)	5,1 (3,4)
Communists	4,5 (3,1)	4,1 (2,9)	4,8 (3,2)

N = 2003

Table 7.4. Perception of issue priorities and stances in Hungary in 1998. MPs mean position with standard deviation in parentheses.

Important	
NATO and EU	8,9 (1,3)
Family policy	8,5 (1,5)
Territorial inequalities	7,8 (1,7)
Moderately important	
Foreign capital	7,6 (1,7)
Privatization	6,6 (2)
Less important	
Church	5,1 (2)
Tuition fees	4,9 (2,5)
Communists	4,7 (3,1)

N = 200

The ranking of issues by citizens in Poland from 1997 and 2001 is similar. The same issues are important in 1997 as in 2001. The most unimportant issues are the role of church in politics and the role of former communists in present day politics. The most important issues remain unemployment, crime prevention, states social responsibility and tax policy (Table1 and 2).

The data for Hungary only allow for ranking of issue priorities by the members of parliament. The importance of issues ranges from 8.9 for NATO and the EU to 4.7 for the

role of communists in present day politics. The most important issues are integration into EU and NATO and distribution of family allowance for children. The most unimportant issues are the role of communists in present day politics, tuition fees for universities and what should be the role of church in society.

According to the rankings in the two countries we expect that representatives would be least inclined to represent on the role of former communists, and influence of church on society. This is a surprising result. Some authors (Szelényi and Hanley, 1996: 193, Tworzecki, 2003: 82) were arguing that especially in Poland from the fall of communism the issues of abortion and influence of Church in society would be important issues. It seems that in four years probably due the economic concerns these issues became irrelevant for both citizens and representatives in Poland. The same can be stated about the role of former communists. Although in both societies issue of communism and its legacies was debated and discussed quite often it does not prime over economic and security concerns of representatives and citizens. Yet it has been shown (Markowski, 1997, Markowski and Tucker, 2010, Kitschelt et. Al, 1999) that these issues are important for deciding whom to vote.

This section revealed that citizens were eager to rank issues. The saliency rankings are almost identical from 1997 to 2001 in Poland and very similar between representatives and citizens in Poland in 2001. The same can be said about the unimportant issues in Poland and Hungary. In both countries church and role of communists seem to be the least salient. The next section will test for the cohesiveness of responses of both citizens and representatives. On salient issues the expectation is that citizens as well as representatives will be more cohesive.

Saliency and cohesion of opinion

We have seen that both representatives and voters perceive the same issues to be important in Poland 2001. Moreover from 1997 to 2001 the same issues were considered as salient for Poles and their MPs.

Hungarian representatives consider integration in the EU as the most important issue followed closely by family policy and seem to be less divided on both. These issues yield the lowest standard deviations out of the eight issues. The least important issues are considered the role former communists should play in the new democratic regime and the introduction of tuition fees for universities. They also yield the highest standard deviation score, an indication that politicians are divided upon that issue. Politicians seem to be more divided on issues that they consider less important.

In Poland in 1997 citizens consider equally important, crime and unemployment. These issues have the lowest standard deviation scores showing unity of opinions. For Polish citizens the least important issue is the role of nomenclatura yielding together with abortion the highest standard deviation.

In 2001 in Poland the most important issues perceived by citizens and representatives is unemployment. This issue has the lowest standard deviation scores for both representatives and citizens. The least important issue is the role of former communists in the new democratic regime for both citizens and representatives. Citizens are most divided about the importance of church in politics, privatization and attitudes toward NATO and EU. These

issues have moderate importance scores. Representatives are mostly divided on the role of nomenclatura, church and NATO and EU.

The Polish and Hungarian data reveal that issues that are perceived salient display less confusion among respondents. This statement holds for both members of parliament in Hungary and in Poland in 2001 and citizens in all three data bases. The diffuseness of the issue positions is measured by standard deviation of responses. The greatest crystallization is to be found at salient or important issues. This is most striking when one compares across tables 2 to 4 the important issue stances with the less important ones.

In order to test the relationship between dispersion and saliency a simple linear regression ($n = 39$) was ran between the average importance attributed to an issue by representatives and citizens and the dispersion of the answers measured by the standard deviation. The unit of analysis was the standard deviation of the mean importance rankings on all issues of citizens in Poland in 1997 and citizens and representatives in 2001 and only representatives rankings in Hungary. The result revealed an inverse relationship between the importance attributed to an issue and the cohesion of voters and representatives' preferences.

$$\text{Dispersion of voters and MPs preferences} = -.284^{**} \text{Average importance of issue} + 4.143$$

*** $p < .001$, $R^2 = .673$, std. error .033

This section revealed that the higher cohesion of opinions of both elite and citizens is associated with more importance attributed to an issue. So far the three conclusions seem conducive to discover a directly proportional linkage between importance and representation. First the rankings of issues are similar between elite and citizens. Secondly, the rankings of citizens do not change much over time. Thirdly citizens and elite seem to be more cohesive on important issues. The following section will relate saliency to absolute and relative representation. The expectation is for representativeness to improve when saliency is taken into account. Representation also improves over time as a result of democratic learning.

The main hypothesis is that important issues are better represented than other issues. The less important issues yield lower representation scores. In terms of absolute and relative representation, issues that are more important for citizens are the ones that would yield higher absolute, mandate representation. These are issues on which parties are eager to represent voters' preferences. Less important issues are more likely to yield no representation or weaker programmatic linkages.

I follow Achens' (1977, 1978) approach and cautions regarding the measurement of political representation. Therefore absolute or mandate political representation is measured as the absolute distance D between the average issue stance of voters of a party and the average position of the party representatives in the parliament. Relative representation captures congruence indices not captured by the mandate approach. The relative representation is measured by the slope of the regression line of a linear equation having as dependent variable the self-positioning of members of parliament and as independent variable the mean position of the voters supporting the party to which the member of parliament belongs too. The intercept complements the indices of mandate or absolute representation measured in terms of proximity.

$$\text{Representatives'position on issue a} = b^a \text{ average position of supporters on issue a} + B$$

Poland 1997

The strongest match between voters and MPs is a moderately important issue, that asks voters and MPs about integration into NATO and EU. The most unrepresentative issue in absolute terms is an important issue and is tax policy which asks citizens and voters to express opinions whether tax should be flat or progressive. It seems that in 1997 Polish voters and MPs do not engage into representation. None of the regression indicator explains 10% of the variance of responses. In terms of absolute or relative representation there is no relationship between importance and representativeness.

Table 7.5. The relationship between salience, absolute and relative representation on issues;

Poland 1997					
Important issues		Moderate issues		Less important issues	
Crime prevention		NATO and EU		Church	
Citizen-Party distance	D = 0.8	Citizen-MP	D = 0.1	Citizen-MP	D = 0.6
Intercept	B = +4.8	distance	B = 2.9	distance	B = 3.3
Slope	b = .044**	Intercept	b =	Intercept	b = .018
Variance explained	R ² = .017	Slope	.073***	Slope	R ² = .004
		Variance explained	R ² = .066	Variance explained	
Unemployment		Agricultural policy		Abortion	
Citizen-MP distance	D = 1.4	Citizen-MP	D = 0.7	Citizen-MP	D = 1.7
Intercept	B = 4.8	distance	B = 4.7	distance	B = 4.7
Slope	b = -.024*	Intercept	b = -	Intercept	b =
Variance explained	R ² = .009	Slope	.032**	Slope	.099***
		Variance explained	R ² = .017	Variance explained	R ² = .067
Tax policy		Foreign capital		Nomenclatura	
Citizen-MP distance	D = 2.0	Citizen-MP	D = 1.5	Citizen-MP	D = 0.5
Intercept	B = 5.1	distance	B = 2.8	distance	B = 4.8
Slope	b = -	Intercept	b =	Intercept	b = .046**
Variance explained	.052***	Slope	.055***	Slope	R ² = .014
	R ² = .028	Variance explained	R ² = .048	Variance explained	
State social responsibility		Privatisation			
Citizen-MP distance	D = 1.8	Citizen-MP	D = 1.2		
Intercept	B = 4.7	distance	B = 3.6		
Slope	b = -.031**	Intercept	b = .021		
Variance explained	R ² = .018	Slope	R ² = .006		
		Variance explained			
Average D	1.32		0.8		0.9

*p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001

D = absolute difference between the average position of voters and members of parliament on issue x

B – intercept of the regression equation

b – slope of the regression equation

R² – R square of the regression equation

Poland 2001

In 2001, the rankings of issues suffered only minor changes yet the indices of statistically significant representation scores increase dramatically. In 1997 none of the representation relationships crossed the 10% threshold of variance explained. In 2001 nine issues yield some form of representational relationship over the same threshold. In time political congruence improved probably due to learning about parties and their positions or improved opinion exchanges between citizens and the elite.

In terms of proximity the smallest distance is at the least important issue and the highest at an in important issue (crime prevention). Crime prevention is also the issue with no representative relationship whatsoever. The two highest b scores (indicating the presence and strength of the representative relationship) are important issues. These are tax policy ($b = 3.8$) and state social responsibility ($b = 3.1$). The weakest statistically significant linkages are at one moderately important (agricultural policy $b = 1.4$) and a least important issue (foreign capital $b = 1.3$).

The results are mixed. All categories of issues rate indices of relative representation. All four unimportant issues have statistically significant representative relationships. For important issues only three out of four issues have statistically significant relationships. Both moderately important issues reveal statistically significant representative relationships.

Table 7.6. The relationship between salience, absolute and relative representation on issues;

Poland 2001		Moderate issues	Less important issues	
Important				
Unemployment		Agricultural policy	Foreign capital	
Citizen-MP distance	D = 0.9	Citizen-MP distance	Citizen-MP distance	D = 0.9
Intercept	B = -.885	Intercept	Intercept	B = -3.0
Slope	b = 1.936***	Slope	Slope	b = 1.386***
Variance explained	R ² = .177	Variance explained	Variance explained	R ² = .124
Crime prevention		EU	Privatisation	
Citizen-MP distance	D = 1.3	Citizen-MP distance	Citizen-MP distance	D = 1.3
Intercept	B = 2.9	Intercept	Intercept	B = -10.0
Slope	b = .264	Slope	Slope	b = 2.201***
Variance explained	R ² = -.001	Variance explained	Variance explained	R ² = .291
Tax policy			Church	
Citizen-MP distance	D = 1.2		Citizen-MP distance	D = 1.3
Intercept	B = -7.464		Intercept	B = -.151
Slope	b = 3.855*** R ²		Slope	b = 1.570***
Variance explained	= .403		Variance explained	R ² = .335

Poland 2001		Moderate issues	Less important issues
Important			
State social responsibility	D = 1.2	Nomenclatura	
Citizen-MP distance	B = 3.1	Citizen-MP distance	D = 0.1
Intercept	b = 3.153***	Intercept	B = -5.0
Slope	R ² = .231	Slope	b =
Variance explained		Variance explained	2.039***
Average D	1.15	0.7	R ² = .443

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

D = absolute difference between the average position of voters and members of parliament on issue x

B – intercept of the regression equation

b – slope of the regression equation

R² – R square of the regression equation

In 2001 the relationship between importance and absolute representation does not change showing rather an inverse relationship between representation and importance of issues. Relative representation is at work in Poland in 2001. The largest b are at two of the most important issues, tax policy and social responsibility. These are followed by preferences towards EU and privatization which is a less important issue. The most unrepresentative issue is crime prevention one of the most important issues in 2001. Several issues here reveal indices of relative representation.

Hungary 1998

Hungary displays a remarkably similar image of representation as Poland in 1997. Simply put there are no indices of congruence or relative political representation. None of the representative relationships surpasses a 5% threshold of explained variance. The only statistically significant indices are small (nomenclatura b = .025 and NATO and EU b = .049).

Table 7.7. Absolute and relative representation on issues;

Hungary 1998					
Privatisation		NATO and EU		Nomenclatura	
Citizen-MP distance	D = 2.0	Citizen-MP distance	D = 1.5	Citizen-MP distance	D = 1.0
Intercept	B = 3.5	Intercept	B = 1.9	Intercept	B = 3.2
Slope	b = .023	Slope	b = .049*	Slope	b = .025*
Variance explained	R ² = .006	Variance explained	R ² = .021	Variance explained	R ² = .025
Tuition Fees		Foreign capital		Church	
Citizen-MP distance	D = 1.4	Citizen-MP distance	D = 2.4	Citizen-MP distance	D = 0.5
Intercept	B = 3.6	Intercept	B = 7.3	Intercept	B = 3.4
Slope	b = .030	Slope	b = .010	Slope	b = -.010
Variance explained	R ² = .006	Variance explained	R ² = .001	Variance explained	R ² = -.000
Family policy		Territorial inequalities			
Citizen-MP distance	D = 1.1	Citizen-MP distance	D = 0.6		
Intercept	B = 4.83	Intercept	B = 3.0		

Slope	$b = .080$	Slope	$b = .009$
Variance explained	$R^2 = .017$	Variance explained	$R^2 = -.001$

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

D = absolute difference between the average position of voters and members of parliament on issue x

B - intercept of the regression equation

b - slope of the regression equation

R^2 - R square of the regression equation

The Style of Representation

Since only in 2001 we have statistically significant results my attention will be focused on the 2001 data on Poland. A picture of political representation will discover possible patterns of representative styles in which issue leadership is taking place or in the case of important issues a mandate style of representation with parties being urged to follow closely the preferences of party supporters. The figures below reveal that issue leadership is important in Poland in 2001 supporting previous research (Kitschelt et al. 1999) on the style of representation in Eastern Europe. What is interesting to notice is that on important issues parties tend to be more grouped around their supporters. The less important the issue the more parties engage into issue leadership (figures 7 to 16). In order to substantiate my argument I subtracted the maximum value of the issues stance from the minimum value at both parties and citizens.

$|\max - \min|$ issue stance of party compared with $|\max - \min|$ issue stance of citizens

The results are presented in Table 7.8. Table 7.8 complements what we can see from the figures portraying representation patterns. On important issues parties tend to be closer to their electorates compared to non-important issues on which they engage in issues leadership and relative representation. The only issue diverging from the observed pattern is tax policy. This is due to an unusually radical position of Platforma Obywatelska (PO). Once this position is eliminated the difference between the most radical position and the least radical one drops.

Parties tend to closely mirror citizens' preferences on important issues and be systematically more radical on issues that are less important for citizens.

Fig.7.1. Unemployment






Fig. 7.2. Crime prevention



citizens


Fig. 7.3. Tax Policy



citizens

Fig. 7.4. State Social Responsibility

representatives



citizens

Fig. 7.5. Agricultural Policy




Fig. 7.6. Attitude towards EU




Fig. 7.7. Foreign Capital




Fig. 7.8. Privatisation




Fig. 7.9. Role of Nomenclatura





Fig. 7.10. Role of Church



The data on which the drawing of figures are based can be found in the Annex (Table A1)

Table 7.8. The difference between the maximum and minimum value of the issue position at representatives and voters across ten issues in Poland in 2001

Issues	representatives	citizens
Important		
Unemployment	4.2	1.4
Crime prevention	4.2	1.1
taxation	8 (4.2 without PO)	1.4
Social responsibility of the state	3.6	1.2
Moderately important		
Agricultural policy	3.6	1.5
EU	8.9	3.2
Less important		
Foreign capital	6.9	3
Privatisation	6.3	2.1
Role of church	7	4.1
Role of nomenclatura	8	3.1

Chapter 8.

The Role of Party Ideology, the Left Right Axis. Ideological Orientation and Salience.

The Role of Party Discipline and Method of Election in Hungary. A Research Note

8.1. Introduction

The previous chapters presented the picture of political representation in Hungary and Poland. It compared the distribution of preferences between the elite and the citizens across the common issue dimensions in the three data bases. This analysis was followed by assessing the quality of political representation according to the type of issue. As we know from previous research (Miller and Stokes 1963, Kitschelt et al. 1999 and Markowski and Tucker 2010) issues covering certain arenas improve the programmatic linkages between voters and political parties. The presence of absolute and/or relative representation indicated the existence of linkages between citizens and political parties. The results indicated that economic issues tend to yield relative political representation in which all of the elite and citizens agree on privatization and the inflow of foreign capital. The citizens as expected are more moderate on economic issues than the political parties. On values absolute type of representation is prevalent with the exception of Hungary on which relative representation is more present. These are issues that are not perceived as salient by citizens or politicians but they identify the opposing camps in the political scenes of Hungary and Poland. While in Poland it is the attitudes towards nomenclatura that bring divisions among the electorate and parties in Hungary the role of church seems to bring more polarization among parties. The reason for this difference lays in the fact that Hungarian former nomenclatura members reformed after 1990 by supporting liberal policies of economic transformation. In Poland the prevalent role of church in the anti-communist movements and its importance in everyday lives of Poles creates less divided citizens and parties. Finally the attitudes towards European Union were not well represented by parties with some parties succeeding in engaging in relative style of political representation. By now we know that saliency matters for political representation in Poland and Hungary. Salient issues seem to yield improved representation scores compared to less salient issues. Less salient issues discern between parties and voters. Salient issues bring unity between voters and between parties.

The left and right axis has beneficial effects in providing cues for citizens about the positions of political parties on issues (Klingemann, 1989). Therefor the use of left right scale may have beneficial effects on congruence between the opinions of citizens and political parties (Huber and Powell, 1994). The meaning of the left and right seem to be less clear in several countries in Eastern Europe (Markowski, 1997). In Hungary and in Poland countries with legacies of accommodating type of decision making of elites, former communists were more inclined to support economic reforms (Kitschelt et al. 1999, Markowski, 1997). Thus

political elites would be liberal on the economic left right. On the other hand the parties would polarize and differentiate positions on socio cultural issues. In Poland the left right scale corresponded more with national/religious versus secular/libertarian dimension (Kitschelt et al. 1999). In Hungary the conservative national versus religious was doubled by a cosmopolitan/particularist dimension (Enyedi, 2005, Markowski 1997, Toka, 1998).

The following section will look at the left right ideological dimension of competition and issues and relate it to the quality of political representation. First I will try to see whether citizens and parties can place themselves on the left right scale. Secondly I will look at the similarity of the distribution of preferences on this scale between voters at different time (Poland 1997 and Poland 2001) different countries and between voters and representatives. Thirdly I will try to find out whether there is congruence between voters and the parties on the left right scale followed by the looking at the correlation between the left right scale and the issue stances of voters and parties. The presence of correlation might indicate which issues are used to differentiate parties and identify their ideological profile.

8.2. The level of congruence on the left right scale

The correlation between the left right scale and the most salient issues will be lower than the correlation on value based issues. The reason is the more than often salient issues transcend the left right dimensions of competition. Similarly to other European countries, in Poland crime prevention and unemployment are the most salient issues. These are issues on which all parties and citizens agree that crime prevention is important and that unemployment should be reduced.

The left-right scale is considered an important dimension of competition in many European democracies. In several countries the economic dimension of competition describes best this scale. On the one hand the left represents the redistributive dimension of politics with an emphasis on the state as having a key role in redistributing benefits. The right views the state more as an actor that intervenes only when the freedom of citizens is endangered by manifestations of citizens, laws and institutions. Citizens often use the left right scale in order to decide which party to support at elections. The left right scale is considered a sophisticated tool of finding out what parties stand for in elections. In Poland and Hungary after the fall of communism the left and right scale were not considered as tools of finding out what parties stand for. It was considered that political parties might initiate different appeals than the parties from more consolidated democracies. Citizens living only a few years under democratic rule would not understand what left right scale is. The reason is that political parties might not make use of ideological terms when they appeal to voters. They might refer to the individual character of candidates or to context dependent issues.

These are some of the reasons why it seems important to test for the capacity of citizens to use on the left right scale before engaging into a discussion about its potential usefulness to understand parties' appeals and make meaningful decisions. In order to test this question I looked at how many citizens in Poland and Hungary did not respond when they were asked to express their ideological profile.

Table 8.1. The percentage of citizens that refused to answer, could not answer and never heard of the political parties mentioned in the survey on the left right scale.

	Self placement	MDF	SZDSZ	FKgP	MSZP	FIDESZ	MIEP
Hungary 1998	22%	28%	25%	24%	23%	24%	28%
Poland 1997	Self-placement	SLD	PSL	UW	AWS		
	10%	15%	22%	21%	17%		
Poland 2001	Self-placement	SLD	PO	SRP	PiS	PSL	LPR
	23%	13%	27%	27%	27%	22%	36%

The percentages are aggregated responses of citizens that refused to answer and those that declared that it is hard to say and those that never heard of the party.

Table 8.1 reviews the level of non-responses to the left right scale for citizens in Poland and Hungary. The lowest and the highest rates of non-response on self-placement are to be found in Poland in 1997 (lowest) and 2001 (the highest). The reason for this fluctuation is contained by the radical changes occurring within the party system from 1997 to 2001. Only two parties remained present in the 2001 Sejm from the four parties in 1997. Four new parties entered the Sejm in 2001 leaving a very short time frame for voters to evaluate their positions. In times of important changes within the party system voters might seem confused about what are their options. This explains the increase of non-responses on placing the new parties in the Polish political system. However most of citizens in Poland and Hungary place themselves on the left right scale. The number of citizens being able to respond did not increase in Poland from 1997 to 2001. The increase would have been expected due to time that has passed experiencing every day politics. Turbulences in the party system from 1997 to 2001 account for the increase of citizens not being able to place parties or themselves on this dimension of competition. The knowledge of left and right politics did not increase in an incremental fashion. It had ups and down often depending on the fluctuations in the party system.

The ability of citizens to place themselves on the left right scale is not the same with the ability to make correct judgments about parties and their ideological positions. It refers to the fact that citizens are somewhat familiarized with the scale. One method of finding out whether voters in Hungary and Poland placed political parties correctly is to compare the self-positioning of the voters of a party with the self-positioning of the party representatives. Tables 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 compare the preferences of both citizens and representatives. In Poland and Hungary, by the end of the 90ies we can witness a close similarity between voters and their representatives positioning. The most accurate citizens are in Poland in 1997. The similarity in positioning on the left right scale (range of differences from 0 to 0,3) did not indicate that four years later citizens would be more confused about their parties positioning.

Table 8.2. Self positioning of party supporters and the positioning of parties by MPs in Hungary 1998 (standard deviation in parentheses)

Hungary 1998		MDF	SZDSZ	FKgP	MSZP	FIDESZ	MIEP
Left-right	Party	6,7 (1,7)	4,1 (1,7)	6 (2)	3,6 (2)	5,5 (1,8)	7,3 (2,3)
	Voters	8 (1)	4,7 (0,5)	7,3 (1,7)	2,3 (1,2)	6,2 (1,1)	8,2 (1,6)

	Difference	1,3	0,6	1,3	1,3	0,7	0,9
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Figure 8.1. The placement of parties and their voters on the left right scale in Hungary 1998




Table 8.3. The self positioning of representatives and their party supporters in Poland in 1997 (standard deviation in parentheses)

Poland 1997		SLD	PSL	UW	AWS
Left right	Party	2,8 (1,4)	4,9 (0,9)	6,1 (1,2)	7,5 (1,2)
	Voters	2,6 (1,9)	4,9 (2,4)	6,1 (1,9)	7,8 (2,0)
	Difference	0,2	0	0	0,3

Regression equation:

Party preference = Citizens preference X b1 + B

b1 = .145**; B = 5,4.

Figure 8.2. The placement of parties and their voters on the left right scale in Poland 1997




Table 8.4. The self positioning of party representatives and supporters in Poland in 2001 (mean position) (standard deviation in parentheses)


Poland 2001		SLD	PSL	PO	SRP	PiS	LPR	UP
Left-right	Party	2,8 (1,6)	4,7 (0,9)	7,1 (1,3)	4 (2,4)	8,3 (1,1)	9,4 (0,9)	2,9 (1,4)
	Voters	2,6 (2)	5,1 (2,1)	6,5 (2,1)	5 (2,5)	6,8 (2,1)	7,2 (2,3)	2,6 (2)
	Difference	0,2	0,4	0,6	1	1,5	2,2	0,3

Regression equation:

$$\text{Party preference} = \text{Citizens preference} \times b_1 + B$$

$$b_1 = .003 \quad B = 4.6$$

Figure 8.3. The placement of parties and their voters on the left right scale in Poland in 2001



In 1997 in Poland the relationship between voters and their parties is that of absolute political representation. The regression on MPs preferences by citizens positioning revealed a significant relationship (.145**) of similarity between the elite and their supporters. Figure 8.1 testifies that the degree of congruence between party voters and party representatives is strikingly high. In Hungary the elite is engaging in issue leadership on this scale. With the exception of the Hungarian socialist party MSZP which is more to leftist than its supporters, representatives are systematically more right wing than their party supporters. However it is still possible to distinguish difference in positionings among parties. Figure 8.1 reveals that parties are engaging in relative representation of the voters' preferences. It was not possible to compute a regression coefficient for Hungary since the data did not contain the MPs self placement on the left right scale. In Poland in 2001 we can observe three groups of voters represented by three groups of parties. The most leftist group is represented by the socialist SLD and UP. The second leftist group is represented by Samoobrona and PSL. The third group of parties are the right wing PO, PiS and LPR. Although there is no pattern that we can observe among parties at the party level we can notice that the left is more close to their voters while the right wing parties are more extremist than their voters. SLD and UP are engaged in absolute representation of citizens preferences while the other parties are more extreme than their voters positioning on the left right scale. The lack of linkage between voters and parties is shown also by the statistically insignificant regression coefficient ($b = .003$).

One important observation which could be followed upon in a subsequent research that both party supporters of the extremist parties and the representatives of these parties are less united in expressing their parties ideological positions than more moderate parties. The standard deviations of voters preferences of MIEP and FKgP in Hungary and SRP and LPR in Poland in 2001 are larger than for the other parties. At the elite level MIEP and SRP representatives seem at least as confused as their voters. This suggests that extremist

parties might not have such a ideologically pure electorate as the more moderate centripetal parties. It would be a very interesting endeavour to test whether small extremist parties are less coherent than bigger party. This finding is counterintuitive because small parties would be considered as having incentives to send clear messages to their electorate. Unity of vision enhances the communication with the electorate. Lack of clarity indicated by inconsistency of opinions at the level of parliamentarians may indicate that parties have less like minded elite than assumed.

This part revealed that the over 75% of citizens and all of the elite in Poland and Hungary are capable of placing themselves on the left right scale. The comparison of preferences revealed that citizens place themselves in the vicinity of their party's position. Parties in Poland in 1997 engage in absolute representation while in Hungary relative representation is more present. In 2001 in Poland new parties appear generating confusion and a change of the distribution of preferences. Although SLD and PSL remained with their positions unaltered two extremist parties, one on the left and one of the right, and two moderate new right wing parties, split voters into three groups represented by: two groups of left wing parties and one group of right wing parties. This suggests that the process of learning about party preferences during the process of democratic consolidation on the left right scale is not a linear development but it is interrupted by turbulences generated by the appearance and waning of political parties.

8.3. The distribution of political preferences. Underlying issue dimensions

The following section will reveal the usefulness of the left right scale as a dimension of competition among political parties in Poland and Hungary. In many democracies the left right scale is used by citizens as a shortcut for pointing parties positions on different issues. It is more often that the placement on the economic dimension covers issues that refer to the left and right. Some authors use expert judgments in order to find out the meaning of left and right. Others make use of party programs or look at surveys to find out what issues make out the left and right political dimensions. Each approach has its limitations. Party programs are documents that no one reads but it is not so much influenced by issues that are temporarily present in the public discourse which might be at odds with the ideological profile of the party.

For my purposes I used the factor analysis to identify the dimensions that are behind the preferences of citizens and elite. Factor analysis is used in several studies where data availability permits. In other cases the underlying dimensions are identified with help of experts or the relevant literature for the country. Others would use party programs to evaluate which issues seem to be more relevant in a country. In this case data availability permits the discovery of the underlying issue dimensions for Poland and Hungary at two levels, the elite and citizens.

I compared the results cross sectionally between the elite and citizens in Hungary and Poland and longitudinally for the latter. The similarity between the elite and citizens dimensions can be viewed as a measure of congruence. If the underlying dimensions are different one could argue that citizens have different sets of preferences than parliamentarians. This would be at odds with a previous finding in this study. When comparing the way citizens and representatives see the degree of importance attributed to

an issues the results indicated a remarkable level of similarity in both countries between as elite and citizens and longitudinally as well in Poland.

Secondly the underlying dimensions on which citizens express preference might be correlated with the left right axis of competition. Several build the left right scale using factor analysis and placing parties on the dimension this statistical method produced. These dimensions are then considered the main axis of competition between political parties or sometimes as the most important issues in the political life of a country. The statistical data permits for the testing of these assumptions. I correlate the identified relevant components with positioning on the left right scale and look at the congruence levels on these issues. Issues that are relevant and correlated with the left right scale should indicate a higher level of congruence. This would show that the left right scale is an indicator associated with underlying dimensions of competition among parties yielding improved representation. Thus the following section will relate three features of issues often assumed to go together: the importance attributed to an issue, its relationship with the left right positioning and how well the elite represents the citizens preferences on that issue.

Hungary

Table 8.5 reveals that for Hungarian parliamentarians there are three dimensions considered the most important. The first line reveals the factors that have eigen value over 1. This method of selection is called Kaiser normalization. There are other methods of reducing factors. One of them is to introduce factors until the explanatory power increases to 90%. With the application of the Kaiser normalization the explanatory power of the factors reaches 69% for MPs and 61% of variance for citizens. Using the 90% threshold leads to the inclusion of seven factors from eight issue dimensions thus making the factor reduction method redundant.

For the members of parliament the first factor is a value dimension characterized by the relationship between the state and church followed by two economic dimensions. The second refers to privatisation an important issue during the transition period. The third dimension refers to territorial inequalities. It seems that the data from 1998 confirms earlier findings (Kitschelt, 1992 and Kitschelt et al. 1999) indicating that value dimensions influence to a greater degree the positioning on different issues followed by an economic dimension.

Table 8.5. Factor analysis of MPs and citizens issue preferences in Hungary in 1998

	MPs			Citizens			
Eigen Values	3,146	1,326	1,116	1.496	1.313	1.083	1.006
Privatization	-.491	.663	-.077	.135	.670	-.396	.035
Territorial inequalities	.070	-.128	.908	.527	-.053	-.242	.309
Church and state	-.811	-.069	.112	.136	.282	.237	.834
Nomenclatura	.619	.597	-.140	.525	.201	-.438	-.276
Foreign capital	.711	-.279	-.249	.621	-.411	-.239	.074
Tuition Fees	.677	.113	.373	.546	-.116	.527	-.033
NATO and EU	-.534	.515	.187	.034	.724	.200	-.135
Family Policy	.781	.390	.128	.471	.186	.495	-.337

Extraction method: Principal component analysis

Components with Eigen values with Kaiser normalization

The findings indicate that at the elite level the value and economic dimensions explain more of the variance in the responses than foreign policy or social issues. More confusion seem to be present at the citizens level. For citizens there are four statistically relevant dimensions covering primarily the economy, foreign policy, a social issue and a value based issue. For citizens the inflow of foreign capital explains best the preferences on other issues. The second dimension is the attitude toward NATO and EU, the third issue is the attitude towards the introduction of tuition fees and the fourth relates to state and church relationship.

The factorial analysis shows a lack of correspondence between citizens and elite in terms of which issues structure preferences. It seems that only for MPs the data confirms findings that account for the primacy of values over economic issues. Citizens are more concerned with economic issue or with the social costs of transition or with integration on NATO or the EU than with values. It seems that the analysis revealed the distribution of preferences confirms that the relevance of values over economic issues is displayed only at the elite level.

Poland 1997

Polish politics was considered to be divided across several dimensions with value orientations being more important than economic considerations. Similarly to Hungary, in Poland economic issues would not bring divisions amongst the elite or the citizens.

The factor analysis (table 8.6) confirms these initial expectations. None of the identified factors relate to economic issues.

Table 8.6. Factor analysis of MPs and citizens preferences in Poland in 1997

	MPs			Citizens		
Eigen values	3.646	3.019	1.216	2.093	1.616	1.403
Crime prevention	-.026	-.442	.264	.384	-.023	.140
Privatization	-.705	.255	.086	-.410	.115	.584
State–church	.392	.766	-.146	.069	.797	-.068
Nomenclatura	-.498	-.600	.284	.024	-.418	.522
Unemployment	.669	-.210	.460	.723	-.042	.130
Tax policy	.713	-.051	.269	.515	.007	.085
NATO and EU	-.275	.648	.525	.083	.160	.628
Subsidies to agriculture	.492	-.495	.263	.627	-.150	.010
State social responsibility	.764	.195	.330	.747	.063	.068
Foreign capital	-.347	.715	.296	-.100	.301	.579
Abortion availability	.514	.727	-.091	.127	.805	-.080
Public administration	-.710	.150	.452			

Extraction method: Principal component analysis

Components with Eigen values with Kaiser normalisation

For the members of parliament the social responsibility of the state, state church relations and NATO and EU relate to the three identified factors. For citizens in remarkably similar way state social responsibility, state-church and abortion as well NATO and EU relate to the three factors identified by principal component analysis. Unlike in Hungary in Poland in 1997 both the elite and citizens identified the same issues as underlying dimensions. It seems that in Poland that congruence did not occur only in terms of left and right positioning and expressing preferences on issues but also in the type of issues that seem more important when expressing preferences.

A second interesting factor is that one of the underlying dimension is a foreign policy issue. Studies starting from (Miller and Stokes 1963) showed that on foreign policy citizens are unable to express consistent positions. However there are some exceptions. When a foreign policy issue becomes salient citizens are more ready to express opinions on those issues while the day to day issues such as unemployment or crime rates decline become less important. In 1997 Poland and Hungary joined NATO being the first countries from the Warsaw pact to join this organization. Thus the importance of this moment was captured by the way citizens expressed preferences. This issue should become less important in 2001.

In 2001 the ranking of issues changes for Poland. For the elite, privatization, state church and crime prevention relate more to the three identified factors. Citizens consider state social responsibility, unemployment, joining European Union and nomenclatura as factors that explain the way citizens express preferences on issues.

Unlike the preferences of the elite citizens attitudes did not change significantly.

The results reveal that the stability of citizens preferences is higher than for the political elite. The Polish menu of parties changed radically from 1997 to 2001. With the exception of SLD and PSL all the other parties joining the Sejm were new. The right restructured radically and two new euroskeptic parties appeared that covered the need for this attitudes (Markowski and Tucker, 2010).

Poland 2001

Table 8.7. Factor analysis of MPs preferences in Poland in 2001

	MPs			Citizens		
Eigen values	3.733	2.121	1.076	2.338	1.387	1.111
Crime prevention	-.174	-.278	.812	.189	.237	-.037
Privatization	-.833	.197	.250	-.584	.396	.172
State-church	.103	.810	-.066	.260	.280	-.594
Nomenclatura	-.234	-.713	.169	-.134	.101	.791
Unemployment	.653	.223	.419	.625	.290	.056
Tax policy	.729	.261	.232	.557	.099	.216
EU	-.686	.561	.150	-.343	.682	.023
State subsidies to agriculture	.711	.048	.201	.680	.233	.121
State social responsibility	.745	.330	.034	.691	.265	.131
Foreign capital	-.674	.544	.167	-.343	.634	-.140

Extraction method: Principal component analysis

Components with Eigen values with Kaiser normalisation

It seems that in 2001 congruence among factors is not achieved. On the one hand economy seems to be more important for the Polish elite. For citizens a state involvement in social matters seems more relevant.

The factor analysis of issues loadings revealed mixed results. Factor analysis unlike saliency ranking identifies what are the factors that explain which issues have the highest relevancy in explaining how preferences are expressed. In Hungary there is a mismatch between what factors count for MPs and what seems important for citizens. For Hungarian MPs as other studies showed values matter more than the economy. For Hungarian citizens influence of foreign capital and NATO membership come first followed by attitudes toward the role of church and state.

In Poland in 1997 the prospects for congruence between the rankings of factors for elite and citizens are similar. Poland similarly to Hungary was considered a country in which values seem to be more important than economy issues. In 1997 however the role of state in solving social problems is more important and is followed by the relationship between state and church and a foreign policy issue salient in 1997 for both Poland and Hungary.

In 2001 privatization of MPs and the social costs of transition for citizens become more important. The matching of factor loadings disappears mainly because the MPs changed their priorities from 1997. The reason for this change is that the party system suffered radical changes from 1997 to 2001. This section compared the citizens and politicians policy priorities. It revealed that in both Poland and Hungary values are important for both representatives and the represented yet social and economic and salient issues like NATO membership overshadow the importance of values. Although previous literature indicated that preferences on values matter more than other issues the data indicated that citizens consider social and economic issues as more important. Only Hungarian politicians' distribution of preferences showed the importance of values over economy. Polish politicians and citizens answers in 1997 and in 2001 indicated the primacy of social and economic issues over values. However state-church represented an issue that related with a relevant factor in five of the six databases. This result is surprising. It shows that it matters whose responses are surveyed in order to find out which issue preferences matter more.

The following section will analyze the relationship between the ranking of issues revealed by factorial analysis, saliency ratings of politicians and citizens, left right placement and congruence indicators on issues.

8.4. Left-right, saliency and representation

This section evaluates that potential of left-right to influence political representation. The left right axis is considered a tool used by some voters to distinguish among parties and make more meaningful choices. It is considered to be a useful tool for communication and a super issue on which parties and voters can relate to (Aldrich, Dorobantu, Fernandez 2010, 6). Left right has having an important role for the functioning of a democratic regime (Downs 1957) and it can absorb new issues so that voters and parties would be able to express their attitudes in an enhanced manner (Aldrich, Dorobantu and Fernandez 2010, 8).

The linkage between left and right and congruence of opinions could be perceived as important. If this axis enhances communication between parties and voters (Downs 1957, Converse 1964) then issues that relate to the left right scale would improve political representation. Studies (Huber and Powell, 1994 and Powell, 2009) linked ideological congruence to the type of electoral system. Yet few studies linked issues to the left-right scale. If an issue is linked to the left right scale and citizens have the capacity to use the scale correctly then parties could communicate clearly their message which would result in citizens correct placement on that issue.

The purpose of this endeavor is multifold. First the underlying dimensions identified through factorial analysis could be correlated well with the left right scale. I expect that the correlations would be especially significant for the MPs because MPs are more familiarized than citizens with the meaning of left right in terms of preferences on issues. A higher correlation with left and right would indicate that factorial analysis revealed the dimensions covering the meaning of left and right.

Secondly I relate factors and saliency rankings to left and right positioning and congruence. I expect that issues that relate to factors and correlate with the left right to yield higher congruence compared to other issues. Salient issues that have factor loadings and correlate to the left and right self-positioning would indicate increased congruence between voters and political parties.

Tables 8.8, 8.9 and 8.10 present the results of linking left right to saliency, factors and congruence. As stated in the previous section in Hungary the distribution of parliamentarians preferences yielded that church and state, family policy, privatization and territorial inequalities are the underlying dimensions identified by factor analysis while for citizens foreign capital, NATO and EU, tuition fees and church and state were identified. Thus only MPs preferences yield a similar result to previous research on what issues seem to be more important (see Kitschelt, 1992, Kitschelt et al. 1999, Korosenyi 1999) in Hungary after 1990. The prevalence of values over economy is not obvious when we look at the citizens preferences. Social issues, economy and a contextual issue such as joining NATO represent issues that are more important than state church.

The issues that were correlated with left and right were not the ones identified by factorial analysis. The attitudes towards former communist party leaders correlate well with the left rights scale (Table 8.8) followed by foreign capital, state church and NATO and EU integration. Thus I could not find a strong linkage between what issues correlate well with the left right scale and factor loadings. However church state relates to left and right and was identified as a factor for both elite and citizens thus showing that is an issue of some importance although it was not identified as a salient issue. Maybe issues that are not salient make politicians and citizens express differentiated preferences. With the assistance of the left right scale this issue becomes useful tool for identifying parties' ideological profile. In terms of congruence two issues reveal significant relationships: attitudes toward nomenclatura and integration in NATO and EU. The issue that discusses attitudes toward nomenclatura is not a factor and it is not a salient issue for either citizens or the elite yet it is related with the left right scale and it indicates the presence of a linkage between citizens and the elite. Perhaps this is also an issue of identification among parties precisely because it is not salient or it is not an underlying dimension. It could be an issue that on which citizens and parties identify parties with the left right scale, yet the issue does not explain any of the variance in preferences of both elites and citizens.

The issue that correlates with the left right scale and was identified as a factor by both citizens and the elite was a foreign policy issue: the integration of Hungary on NATO and the European Union. It is an issue that was particularly important in 1997 the year in which Poland and Hungary joined NATO. Thus it seems that when an issue is important for the elite and potentially for citizens, then factorial analysis reveals it as important and it correlates with left right and congruence scores are better than on other issues.

Table 8.8. The relationship between issue saliency, left-right placement and congruence of MPs Hungary 1998

MPs Hungary 1998	L-R MPs	(D)	B	b	R ²
Important					
NATO and EU	.116**	1.5	1.9	.049*	.021
Family policy	-.019	1.1	4.83	.080	.017
Territorial inequalities	-.005	0.6	3.0	.009	-.001
Moderately important					
Foreign capital	-.180**	2.4	7.3	.010	.001
Privatization	.072*	2.0	3.5	.023	.006
Less important					
Church	.121**	0.5	3.4	-.010	-.000
Tuition fees	-.042	1.4	3.6	.030	.006
Nomenclatura	-.270**	1.0	3.2	.025*	.025

*<.05; **<.0

Poland 1997

The data from Poland in 1997 show a remarkable similarity between voters and political parties. In terms of factor loadings the same three issues explain the variance of responses on the other issues. For citizens and the elite state-church, NATO and EU and state social responsibility relate to the identified factors. Thus the relationship of representation should be somewhat stronger than for Hungary. Out of the 11 issues only on two issues congruence is not occurring. Remarkable is that the issue that is considered the most important as indicated by factor analysis was not only one of the least important issues but it did not yield a statistically significant representation scores. State-church and NATO and EU had the lowest congruence scores (D) revealing a close relationship between citizens and political parties.

NATO and EU received the second highest congruence score as indicated by (b) the regression coefficient. As in the case of Hungary, NATO and EU represented a temporary issue considered important by both citizens and parties, relates to one of the important factors at both citizen and elite level and it yields better representation. As in Hungary the issue of state and church although deemed less important it is an issue that allows politicians and citizens to have differentiated position precisely because it is perceived by citizens as less important. That is probably why this issue yields the highest correlation coefficient in Poland and the second highest in Hungary with the left right axis. It seems that in order to

identify issues on which parties differentiate their positions have to be less salient so that the electoral costs of supporting an unpopular position on a salient issue is lower.

The similarity the between factor loadings, saliency, congruence scores shows that the quality of democratic performance in terms of political representation is higher in Poland than in Hungary. The prospects for democratic consolidation and improvement of the relationship between citizens and parties in Poland were higher in 1997 for this country.

Table 8.9. The relationship between citizens' ranking of issue saliency and the correlation between left-right placement of MPs and citizens in Poland 1997

Poland 1997	MPS	Citizens	D	B	b	R ²
Important						
Crime	-.069	-.091**	0.8	4.8	.044**	.017
Unemployment	-.006	-.099**	1.4	4.8	-.024*	.009
Tax policy	-.021	-.047	2.0	5.1	-.052***	.028
State social responsibility	.032	-.091**	1.8	4.7	-.031**	.018
Moderately Important						
NATO and EU	-.054	-.031	0.1	2.9	.073***	.066
Subsidies for agriculture	.039	-.128**	0.7	4.7	-.032**	.017
Foreign capital	.124	.124**	1.5	2.8	.055***	.048
Privatization	.001	.063*	1.2	3.6	.021	.006
Less Important						
Church	.197**	.138**	0.6	3.3	.018	.004
Abortion	-.011	.107**	1.7	4.7	.099***	.067
Communists	-.078**	-.110**	0.5	4.8	.046**	.014

*<.05; **<.01

Poland 2001

As stated in the previous section the prospects for the improvement of the quality of democracy in terms of political representation measured by congruence indicators seemed optimistic. Data from 2001 (Table 8.10) reveal an increase of political representation and congruence scores on nine out of ten issues. This result confirms initial expectations that there is a linear development of the performance of a democracy that is in a process of consolidation. The comparison between factor loadings between the preferences of citizens and political parties revealed clear differences. For polish political parties the variance in responses on issues can be explained privatization, state- church and crime prevention. For citizens however unemployment, state social responsibility, integration in the European Union and attitudes toward nomenclatura are more important. Compared to 1997 polish politicians priorities shifted. State church remained an important issue but an economic issue took over as importance. Citizens' priorities shifted as well with the elimination of state church as an important issue, this issue being replaced by concerns over unemployment and nomenclatura. What is very interesting is that while the most important issue for MPs is an economic policy that concerns economic reforms such as privatization, citizens are more

concerned with the social costs of adopting such a policy thus unemployment and the state capacity to protect citizens from economic harsh measures (state social responsibility). For citizens the issue of unemployment is also the most salient one and it does not correlate with left and right. For MPs the issue of privatization is one of the least salient issues and it does not correlate as well with left and right. For political parties church and state and nomenclatura issues correlate well with left right as in 1997 and correlation indicators increased dramatically. For citizens the correlation indicators in 2001 revealed that subsidies for agriculture and European integration correlate with the left right. Yet what we notice is that all issues correlate much more moderately than in 1997. This reveals a differentiated process of development for political parties and citizens. For political parties the four years that have passed from 1997 to 2001 indicated a strengthening of the relationship between left and right and issues that is left and right positioning could better account for preferences expressed on issues. For citizens a reversal occurred. The capacity of the left right scale to explain preferences on issues had significantly decreased. It seems that political representation indicators have improved despite the damaged capacity of left and right scale to explain political preferences of citizens in 2001. Thus from 1997 to 2001 the correlation between preferences on issues and left-right has decreased despite expectations that democratic learning would make citizens improve their capacity to relate left and right to policies from different areas.

Table 8.10. The relationship between citizens' ranking of issue saliency and the correlation between left-right placement and issues of MPs and citizens in Poland 2001

MPs	Citizens		D	B	b	R ²
Important						
Unemployment	.363**	Unemployment	-.034	0.9	-.885	1.936*** .177
Crime	-.273**	Crime	-.077*	1.3	2.9	.264 -.001
Tax Policy	.438**	Tax Policy	-.048	1.2	-7.464	3.855*** .403
NATO and EU	.248**	State Social Responsibility	-.088**	1.4 (ssr)	-10.7	2.884*** .589
Moderately Important						
Subsidies for agriculture	.210*	Subsidies for agriculture	-.092**	.04	1.4	1.426*** .125
State social responsibility	.391**	European Integration	.097**	1.2 (EU)	3.1	3.153*** .231
Less Important						
Foreign capital	.155	Foreign capital	-.011	0.9	-3.0	1.386*** .124
Privatization	-.164	Privatization	.048	1.3	-10.0	2.201*** .291
Church	.680**	Church and state	.076*	1.3	-.151	1.570*** .335
Communists	-.651**	Nomenclatura	-.053	0.1	-5.0	2.039*** .443

Congruence between elite and citizens has improved from 1997 to 2001. From 1997 to 2001 congruence increased on several issues. The increase was statistically significant on nine issues out of ten. At the same time in Poland voters had decreased their capacity to place political parties on the left right scale. The left and right indicated weakened

correlation between preferences of citizens on issues and the left right scale. At the same time at the elite level the increase is dramatic. In 1997 at the elite level, the left right had weak associations with preferences expressed on two issues. The two significant correlations did not pass the .200 threshold. In 2001 on eight out of ten issues the preferences of the members of parliament correlate to the left right scale. On all issues the correlation with the left right scale was over .200. Possibly the improvement of congruence levels is due to the political parties capacity to relate to the left right scale and thus improving communication with voters. Thus the relationship between the left right scale and congruence got stronger at the elite level.

8.5. Ideological orientation and congruence

As mentioned in the previous sections the left and right scale proved to be a useful tool only at the elite level. Yet we do not know whether at the individual level a Member of Parliament left wing or right wing orientation improves congruence with the preferences of citizens on issues. This is what this part is set to reveal. In order to accomplish this I correlated the congruence score obtained by each Member of Parliament with their left right self-placement. The congruence score is the absolute difference between the average score of preferences on issues of the supporters of a political party from which the MP belongs to. Thus for all MPs the party supporters score is the same. The higher is the congruence score the less there is congruence between citizens and the members of parliament.

Table 8.11. Correlation between congruence and ideological orientation of MPs in Poland and Hungary

Issue	Hungary 1998	Poland 1997	Poland 2002
Crime prevention	–	.134	-.102
Privatization	-.029	.002	.200*
Church state	.264**	.134	.543**
Nomenclatura	.222**	.116	-.049
Unemployment	–	.139	.339**
Taxation	–	.173*	.396**
European Union	.121	.165*	-.073
Agricultural policy	–	.171*	.170
State social responsibility	–	.175*	.388**
Foreign capital	-.217**	.165*	.181*
Abortion	–	.175*	–
Territorial inequalities	-.023	–	–
Tuition fees in universities	-.249**	–	–
Family Policy	-.497**	–	–

*<.05; **<.01

Hungary 1998

The results revealed that the correlation between the congruence score on an issue and the left right scale matters for 5 out of eight issues. There was no relationship between ideological orientation of a member of parliament and congruence on privatization, integration in NATO and EU and territorial inequalities. The correlation with church state and nomenclatura revealed that right wing parties political attitudes on these issues are associated with less congruence. Thus left wing parties are better in representing on church and state and nomenclatura.

The more leftist a MP the less is able to represent on economic and social issues such as foreign capital, tuition fees and family policy. In Hungary on issues belonging to the value arena leftist attitudes are associated with improved congruence. On social and economic issues right wing attitudes are assoiated with improved congruence between the preferences of citizens and the elite.

Poland

In 1997, in Poland the relationship between congruence and ideological orientation of MPs is somewhat different. It seems that a leftist orientation of an MP is associated with improved congruence score on six out of eleven issues. These issues are taxation, NATO and European integration, agricultural policy, state social responsibility, foreign capital and abortion. The issues cover values, economy and social issues. Right wing attitudes are not associated with improved congruence on any of the eleven issues. This relationship holds true for Poland in 2001. The relationship between (Table 8.11) leftist ideological orientations and congruence on issues strengthened from 1997 to 2001. Possibly then the improved congruence scores from 1997 to 2001 are caused by the left wing parties capability to closely represent citizens preferences. To conclude, congruence is more associated with leftist ideological orientation of MPs in Poland in 1997 and in 2001 while in Hungary the image of congruence and left and right is differentiated. On economic issues right wing orientations improve congruence scores while on values left wing parties yield improved performance.

The next section will associate political representation with party discipline and method of election in Hungary. The particularity of the survey on elites allows for testing the relationship between the citizens preferences and how disciplined Hungarian MPs would be. In 1998 some Hungarian MPs were elected in single member districts and others on party lists. This would allow for testing if representatives elected on single member districts are more inclined to represent the preferences of their constituency than the MPs selected on party lists.

8.6. The Role of Left-Right axis of competition, party discipline and how the MP was elected in Hungary. A research note

Party Discipline and Political Representation

Party discipline was measured with four questions. These refer to the discipline of the members in the Hungarian parliament. In order to make comparisons between cases the

variables were transformed into scale variables. For q5 it was considered that the MPs were undisciplined if he or she had chosen the answers "MP himself" or "somebody else".

Table 8.12. Average of issue congruence between voters and MPs based on the degree of discipline within the party

MSZP		FIDESZ	
		disciplined	undisciplined
q5	4,8	6,1	2,6
q6	4,5	5,5	2,3
q7	5	5,5	2,3
			7,5

Table 8.13.

q5 – As far as your parliamentary party is concerned, who has decide which MP will be a member of which committee?

Party	q5		Total
	MP himself, somebody else	Parliamentary party meeting, parliamentary party executive, national	
MDF		4	4
SZDSZ		16	16
FKGP		19	19
MSZP	16	52	68
FIDESZ- MPP	24	42	66
MIÉP		8	8
MKSZ		1	1
Other	2		2
Total	42	142	184

For q6 the MPs were considered undisciplined if they had chosen the answers "someone else" or "I would not ask prior approval"

Table 8.14.

q6 – If you would ask a written question, would you then seek approval from the...

Party	q6		Total
	someone else, I would not ask prior approval	Chairman of the parl. party, the parl. party meeting	
MDF		4	4
SZDSZ	1	14	15
FKGP	2	17	19
MSZP	45	24	69
FIDESZ- MPP	12	45	57

Party	q6		Total
	someone else, I would not ask prior approval	Chairman of the parl. party, the parl. party meeting	
MIÉP	4	2	6
MKSZ	1		1
Other	2		2
Total	67	106	173

In the case of q7 the MPs were undisciplined if they have chosen the answers "own opinion" or "it depends".

Table 8.15.

q7 – If an MP has to vote, but holds an opinion which is different from the one held by his parliamentary party, should he then vote in accordance with the opinion of the parliamentary party or should he follow his own opinion?

Party	q7		Total
	Own opinion, it depends	Opinion of the parliamentary party	
MDF	1	3	4
SZDSZ	1	16	17
FKGP	4	15	19
MSZP	15	52	67
FIDESZ-MPP	3	65	68
MIÉP	2	6	8
MKSZ		1	1
Other		2	2
Total	26	160	186

The last question on MPs discipline has been disregarded since there is a large number of inconclusive answers. A large share of MPs answered "it depends" when they had to take a stand on the diverging opinion between the executive and parliamentary party meeting. (Table 8.16)

Table 8.16.

q8 – If your parliamentary party and the party's national executive differ in opinion, who, in your view should have the final say?

Party	q8		Total
	it depends	Parliamentary party, national executive	
MDF	3	1	4
SZDSZ	13	4	17
FKGP	12	7	19
MSZP	35	33	68
FIDESZ-MPP	36	29	65

Party	q8		Total
	it depends	Parliamentary party, national executive	
MIÉP	5	1	6
MKSZ	1		1
Other	2		2
Total	107	75	182

Overall, the members of the Hungarian parliament are disciplined since a large proportion listens to their leaders in parliament and outside of parliament. (Tables 8.12 to 8.16) At the first, second and third questions the totals show a large degree of discipline of the MPs. But if one takes a closer look at how MPs express opinions about conflicting issues with the leadership some patterns can be noticed. The conservative, national block formed by FIDESZ, FKG, MDF and to a certain extent MIEP (an outside supporter of FIDESZ) is more obedient to leadership than MSZP. SZDSZ MPs are very obedient and disciplined in the same proportion as FKG. The single element that supports the hypothesis that party discipline influences representation can be found when comparing FIDESZ and MSZP. Their number of MPs is the largest one and the samples are of equal size. FIDESZ has the best overall issues position representation. MSZP has an overall worse score of representation so in these two cases it could be argued that there is a relationship between party discipline and representation. MDF has only 4 MPs in the sample that are disciplined while and represents better its voters than MIEP that has undisciplined MPs.

Table 8.12 shows the average issue congruence between voters and members of parliament based on the degree of discipline of the representatives. The data shows that on the average in the case of FIDESZ and MSZP the undisciplined MPs tend to be less representative to their voters. The difference is striking at q7 for FIDESZ and Q5 for MSZP. Consequently party discipline and representation influence each other in the case of MSZP and FIDESZ. MSZP and MIEP have a larger share of undisciplined MPs together with a worse record in representation. FIDESZ and MDF, MPs are more disciplined and they also are more representative to their voters. Within parties it can be noticed the more undisciplined MPs are representing worse the interest of the voters than disciplined MPs. Thus, when there is a larger share of undisciplined MPs the party also tends to be less representative to its voters preferences.

Method of Election and Representation

The question is whether there is a relation between how the MPs are elected and representation. Two arguments were presented. The first mentioned that the larger proportion of national list MPs are the more disciplined is the party since these MPs should represent the whole nation so their discourse is more general and centrist, not polarized like it might be in the case of individual district chosen candidates. The second argument was stating that the national list MPs would not represent their voter's will since they have safe places on lists and they are incumbents of the party. They can change according to their will the policy position of the party without taking into account the will of the people.

Table 8.17.

Q4 – By means of which method were you elected as an MP?

Q4		Total	
Territorial list, national list		Individual district	
MDF		4	4
SZDSZ	15	2	17
FKGP	14	5	19
MSZP	37	32	69
FIDESZ-MPP	30	39	69
MIÉP	8		8
MKSZ		1	1
other	2		2
Total	106	83	189

Table 8.18. Issue congruence results between the voters of the party and the MPs elected on district and list level

Issue congruence levels									
FIDESZ.		MSZP		FKGP		MDF		SZDSZ	
District	List	District	List	District	List	District	List	District	List
3,4	3,8	2,7	2,3	0,6	4,1	3,1	8,5	0,96	
0,3	1,8	1,1	1,4	1,1	0	0,0	1,0	0,94	
2,5	1,7	3	1,3	15,4	11,4	14,7	1,2	14,44	
2,2	3,3	0,1	0,2	4,7	4,5	2,3	0,3	2,16	
2,6	5,2	11,3	7,7	0	2,7	0,1	11,0	0,59	
0,7	0,2	6,3	4	0,4	0	1,0	13,2	0	
0,5	5,5	1,5	1,4	3,8	1,9	1,0	1,5	1,27	
3,5	4,1	24,2	15,7	8,3	6,7	1,5	17,4	2,56	
N	39	30	32	5	14	4	15	8	

The results are shown in the table 8.17. FIDESZ-MPP has more MPs elected in individual districts. MDF has also all its MPs elected on district level. SZDSZ has only two MPs elected on district level and MSZP has more MPs elected on party lists. FKG has 14 members of parliament elected on list and 5 on district level. MIEP MPs in the sample are all elected on party lists. Then the issue congruence was calculated separately for district elected MPs and party list elected MPs in order to see whether there is a difference in the representation of voter's interest. (Table 8.18) The results are inconclusive. No significant difference could be traced between the two kinds of MPs. The issue positions of all MPs are too close to see relevant differences. Consequently, in the Hungarian case the method of election is not related to political representation. The findings showed that political representation entails more than simple comparison between issue positions of voters and MPs. It revealed different dimensions of policy position representation on the eight issues presented in the survey. It also tried to highlight relations between left and right positioning and issue

positions as well as between party discipline, method of election and representation. The next chapter will present concluding remarks as well as the importance of this study for the theory of political representation.

8.7. Conclusions

This chapter had as aim to describe the linkage between several determinants of political representation. More precisely the chapter surveyed the relationship between ideological orientation and political representation in Poland and Hungary by comparing distributions of preferences among elite and citizens, correlations between left and right and preferences expressed on issue, correlations between left and right, saliency and factor loadings identified by dimensionality reduction through principal component analysis and focused on party discipline and method of election in Hungary. The data revealed that Polish and Hungarian citizens and members of parliament are capable of using the left and right scale allowing for testing the usefulness of this scale in improving representation. The descriptive part revealed remarkable similarities between citizens self placement on the left right scale and the political party parliamentary members self positioning. In Hungary the picture of representation on the left right scale indicate the presence of relative representation with parties being more radical than their voters. In Poland in 1997 absolute representation prevailed with parties and voters having remarkably similar preferences. In 2001 representation seem to disappear in Poland with voters being confused by the rise of new political parties. The image of representation revealed that at the end of 90ies parties and citizens were close in terms of ideological profile. However although democratic consolidation theory would have predicted a gradual consolidation of ideological preferences it seems that the positions of voters and political parties in 2002 in Poland do not match the positioning of the political preferences in 1997.

Next, factor analysis performed on the preferences expressed by citizens and the elite revealed what were the underlying dimensions of competition for political parties and the people. The principal component analysis revealed, that in Hungary, the elite considered values and economics as the most relevant issue arenas while for citizens economic issues and NATO integration seemed more relevant. For Poland in 1997 the same issues were relevant for both parties and citizens namely the social responsibility of the state, state-church and NATO integration seemed more relevant partially confirming earlier research on the prevalence of values over social and economic issues. The apparition of a foreign policy issue as relevant is somewhat surprising since citizens are usually less interested on such topics. The 1997 integration of Poland and Hungary in NATO created the context for such an issue to become relevant. Data from 2002 in Poland showed that NATO integration is not anymore on the agenda of parties only European integration being present. Relevancy of issues differed between elite and masses. For MPs privatisation, state church and crime prevention seemed to be most relevant while for citizen unemployment, states social responsibility, European integration and the role of nomenclatura are more relevant. Contrary to the expectations the elite were at odds with citizens wishes. The correlation with the left and right scale in Hungary in 1998 revealed that NATO integration not only correlates well with the left and right but is perceived as an important issues and the factor analysis revealed it as relevant suggesting that temporary issues could improve the

relationship between citizens and the elite. Nonemclatura, foreign capital and church state are issues that correlated well with the left and right but non of the issues are viewed as important according to saliency rakings. In Hungary only the NATO integration issue relates with the left and right scaale and reveals imporved representation. Left and right does not improve congruence or make some issues more relevant than others. In Poland in 1997 at the elite level only church and state and attitudes toward nomenclatura are associated with left and right scale. These issues are not considered important by both elite and citizens. Possibly these issues permit parties to have differentiated positions since these are not salient or present in everyday politics. With the exception of tax policy and NATO and EU the other issues are associated with the left and right scale. There is no relationship between the left right scale and improvement of congruence scores. In 2001 the correlation between issues and left right significantly improved at the elite level. In 1997 there were only two issues associated with the left right scale with both coefficients below .200. In 2002 eight issues correlated with the left and right scale with the highest correlation coefficient of .68. This increase is associated with an increase in congruence scores measured by the slope of the regression coefficient on elite's preferences. Conversely the correlation of issues with left right at the citizens has deteriorated in four years. The capacity to relate left and right to policies from different areas is not related with improved congruence. Although state church and role of nomenclatura are issues that correlate well with the left and right in 1997 and 2002 they do not show better congruence scores compared to other issues. However the overall improvement of the association between left and right and issues from 1997 to 2002 could be attributed to the improved scores of congruence. Next, the association between individual level ideological orientation of the members of parliament in Hungary and Poland and absolute congruence scores revealed interesting results. In Hungary, in 1998, the left wing orientation of MPs makes them more representative on values while the right wing ideological orientation makes representatives be more congruent with citizens. In Poland in 1997 and in 2001 a left wing orientation at the individual level is associated with improved congruence. It seems that in Poland the right wing politicians are not close to Polish citizens preferences. The good representative had a socialist profile in Poland. Possibly the overall improved score of congruence between citizens and the elite from 1997 to 2001 is due to the capacity of socialists to represent preferences and not to right wing politicians that belonged to superfluous political parties. Finally the case study on Hungarian political elite surveyed the relationship between party discipline, method of election and political congruence. The small extremist political parties seem to be less disciplined than the large governing parties. More disciplined parties are more congruent than parties with undisciplined members of parliament. In Hungary MPs were elected at the district level, regional party lists and national party lists. There was not difference between how an MP is elected and issue congruence. This chapter revealed that congruence of distributions of preferences and of left and right can bring valuable information about the intricate relationship between political parties and their voters. It had indicated that certain aspects in terms of ideological profile, left right knowledge, relevance of issues and party discipline impact political congruence. The left right scales' relationship with issues does not have an effect on political congruence indicating its limited effect in enhancing the communication between parties and citizens. However from 1997 until 2001 the correlation of issues with the left right scale at the elite level increased together with an increase of political congruence. However at the individual level it is left wing politicians that improve

congruence scores from 1997 until 2001. The following chapter will conclude study and it will indicate future paths to researching political representation of citizens' preferences in Poland and Hungary and it will relate the findings to the general stream of research on political representation.

Chapter 9. Conclusions

This book tried to answer questions and puzzles that account for the presence and the variation of political representation in a democratic setting. Some of the puzzles were addressed and explained, such as the impact of saliency or left and right over representation while others lingered on the proper tools for investigation of such an indefinable and complex concept as political representation. The questions that arise from the study of political representation in Hungary and Poland were answered through a variety of methods. For the support of the party type of representative democracy the literature review shed light on the puzzles that political representation faces at the theoretical level. In case of measuring the impact of saliency over political representation comparison was used and quantitative methods of analysis yielded its impact that is mediated by cohesion. Thirdly, the impact of ideology on political representation included two tiers of analysis: the individual level and the political party level. Fourthly, the availability of the data permitted a longitudinal analysis the influence of ideology, saliency cohesion and issue arena on political representation in Poland.

The three major questions of this book were related to the form political representation has in democracies in transition. One is whether the type of issue, economic or value based or salient, shape the linkages between citizens and the political parties. The second is whether ideology impacts on representation. The third is whether during transition, in time, due to the process of democratic consolidation political representation improves. These questions among other ones were tested and confirmed initial hypotheses. This chapter proposes an inventory of the puzzles and questions political representation faces. It does this by presenting again the questions and results of the analyses delivered from chapters 2 to 8. Subsequently it will direct to some effects the findings might have on studying the two countries in transition in particular and political representation in general.

Theoretical Puzzles of Political Representation

Political representation is an elusive concept (Eulau 1978, Manin 1997, Pitkin 1967.). It brings afore several difficulties that are difficult to challenge. One of them is to link the theoretically rich underpinnings to its rudimentary operationalizations. The complex character of representation involves trade-offs when this phenomenon is empirically tested. Political representation brings questions that address important concepts such as legitimacy, sovereignty and consent. Some considered important to measure political representation as a process that yields legitimacy. Therefore the focus of such studies was on elections that were equated with political representation. Others focused on its important symbolic dimensions accentuating its strength in building consent of the governed and sovereignty.

Political representation is a dynamic process in which citizens and representatives are involved to different degrees. Representatives should strive to represent better that is why

the approach supported in this book is a popular view of political representation. Unlike other studies (Kitschelt et al 1999) this one tries to capture the dynamic character of political representation not without inferring theoretical implications from static observations. Therefore a characterization of political representation that seems well suited to the study of this phenomenon must include its dynamic character, and its goal to minimize its inherently undemocratic character. It is in the actions and decisions of representatives to mitigate the aristocratic feature of the process. That is why an indicator of similarity of preferences, a more open political system to the input of citizens' will is an indicator that democratic institutions are doing what citizens want them to do. This process cannot be thought of without political parties as linkage providers. The models of representative democracy that were reviewed include the deliberative model, the leadership democracy, the audience democratic representative system and the party democracy. The study of political representation in transition countries in Eastern Europe is to be performed within the frameworks of party democracy. That is why most of the analysis will cover the programmatic linkages between citizens and political parties. This literature review of models of systems of political representation concluded with a characterization of party democracy the model best suited for the analysis of representation and the essential role of political parties in representation in Hungary and Poland.

Political representation in Poland and Hungary: Which distribution of preferences is conducive to increased congruence?

The survey of how representative is a political party entails several routes of analysis. Before engaging into the level of similarity of preference, the comparison of the distribution of preferences was performed. This will allow for the identification of valence issues, polarizing issues and issues with a normal distribution and their effect on the degree of similarity between preferences between members of parliament and voting citizens. Surprisingly the normal distribution of preferences was rare in terms of citizens' preferences in both countries while the members of parliament displayed a normal distribution of preferences only concerning economic issues. Valence issues are more likely to bring up common distributions of preferences. Polarizing issues have the same effect. Thus issues on which citizens agree on a position bring increased levels of similarity between voters and the elite in both countries. Polarizing issues, that is issues that divide voters into two camps have a similar effect. Thus what is to be concluded is that whenever voters have clear stances on an issue or have two opposing views on an issue then the distribution of preferences tends to be similar with that of the elite. The possible explanation of this finding is that when citizens are clear about their will then the elite is ready to follow what the represented desire.

Political party and voter degrees of congruence. General remarks

It is not a surprise that the discrepancy between citizens and representatives is quite high confirming the results of previous studies (Kitschelt et al, 1999, Roberts, 2010). Economic

issues bring less congruence than social ones. This is a plausible finding suggesting that on economic reforms citizens in both countries are not prepared to bear the costs of transition. As expected values and foreign policy bring more division between citizens and political parties. Political parties are more radical on these issues possibly indicating a well known finding in political party theory that parties overstate their positions in order to signal voters that they have distinct preferences from the other parties. Voters seem to respond in both countries to this signaling game. The preferences of voters are similar to their party relative to the positions of voters from other parties.

Political representation according to types of issues: What types of issues bring more congruence?

Four issue domains were taken into account: social issues, the economy, values and foreign policy. The comparison across the three datasets allowed for the comparison for only three of the domains leaving out social issues. The economic issues bring unity among parties in both Poland and Hungary confirming previous research results (Tarki Group 1998). Relative political representation portrays economic issues and values in both countries with citizens being less and less inclined (Poland 1997 to 2001) to support the hardships economic measures bring to citizens. Political representation does not seem to work very well in terms of attitudes towards integration in the European Union. In 2001 in Poland however the rise of two Eurosceptic parties lead to an improvement of congruence on this issue and the representation of the preferences of those who did not find any party in Poland to represent their negative attitudes toward integration in the European Union. The data confirms several of the expectations about the quality of political congruence. What is remarkable for Poland is that political representation improves on all issues over time. It seems that the longer the period of learning about policies and political parties through day to day experiences improves the similarity of opinions between parties and their supporters.

Saliency, Cohesion and Political Representation

In democracies people should be able to get what they want. This argument is especially important for issues that are salient for citizens. The saliency rankings of issues are remarkably similar between members of parliament and party supporters. Saliency brings more cohesion of party representatives and citizens. The relationship between saliency and representation revealed itself to be less straightforward. In 1997 in Poland and 1998 in Hungary the relationship between congruence and salience was almost nonexistent showing no influence of citizens' preferences regardless of the type of issues. The representation indicators showed dramatic improvements in 2001. In Poland in 2001 saliency is related to political congruence and the style of representation. On salient issues absolute representation prevails while on less salient issues a trustee style of representation is present. Possibly on less salient issues political parties can afford to have ideologically pure stances that have low electoral costs compared to issues that are salient.

Left-right, Factor loadings, saliency and representation: Is left right a tool for improving congruence?

Before engaging into an analysis it is important to test the capacity of citizens and members of parliament to place themselves on the left right scale. The tests revealed that the level of non-response did not surpass the 30% threshold, for citizens. In all data sets the level of non-response of representatives was very low. There are remarkable similarities between party voters' placement and party representatives. In Hungary trustee representation depicts the type of linkage between ideological orientation of citizens and parties while in Poland absolute representation describes the linkage between citizens and political parties. As expected the correlation between left and right and socio cultural issues was higher in both Poland and Hungary than any other type of issues. In 2001 voters and parties seem confused by the rise of new political parties but the correlation of left and right with socio cultural issues increased. The image of representation revealed that at the end of 90ies parties and citizens were close in terms of ideological profile. From 1997 to 2001 there was a consolidation of the linkage between the ideological preferences and the issue stances on all dimensions. This consolidation is especially striking for attitudes towards church and former nomenclatura confirming the importance of these issues in describing left right orientations of Polish citizens and political parties (Markowski, 1997). More longitudinal data would shed light on how ideological preferences consolidate in new democracies. The factor analysis of the preferences of citizens and political parties identified no more than three dimensions that explain the preferences of citizens and political parties. However the identified dimensions did not match the political salience rankings of citizens and representatives. The dimensions identified at the party and the citizens' levels were similar in 1997 in Poland. In 2001 other issues become important for both elite and citizens even if political congruence increased across all issue domains. The social responsibility of the state, church and state and EU and NATO integration were the issues identified by the principal component analysis revealing the importance of values, social topics and foreign policy over the economic domain. There was no relationship between the correlation of an issue with the left right scale and congruence. For Hungary or Poland the correlation of an issue with the left right axis is not conducive to more congruence between citizens and political parties. Moreover in Poland the correlation between preferences on issues and the left right deteriorated in four years and this is associated with an increase of the congruence from 1997 to 2001. The association between individual level ideological preferences revealed significant effects. In Hungary citizens are better represented on values by leftist representatives and on economy by right wing political preferences. In Poland in 1997 and in 2001 the leftist representatives are better in representing citizens' preferences. This linkage strengthens from 1997 to 2001. It seems that in Poland the right wing politicians are not close to Polish citizens' preferences. The good representative had a socialist profile in Poland. Possibly the overall improved score of congruence between citizens and the elite from 1997 to 2001 is due to the capacity of socialists to represent preferences and not to right wing politicians that belonged to superfluous political parties.

Does party discipline and method of election of the representative impacts congruence?

Finally the case study on Hungarian political elite surveyed the relationship between party discipline, method of election and political congruence. The small extremist political parties seem to be less disciplined than the large governing parties. More disciplined parties are more congruent than parties with undisciplined members of parliament. In Hungary MPs were elected at the district level, regional party lists and national party lists. There was not difference between how an MP is elected and issue congruence.

The picture of political representation presented in this book is far from being complete. Some of the limits of this study are evident. More contextually rich information like interviews with some of the representatives could have revealed the roles representatives assume when being engaged in the representative process. The scrutiny of roll-call behavior could have linked preferences to decisions in parliament thus yielding the policy implications of being a party that represents well. This study focused more on features of issues and included minor references to characteristics of parties such as discipline, method of elections, cohesion or ideology. The methodological limitations include the low number of parties that come from only two countries and reducing political representation to congruence. Having in mind limitations the findings shed light on several problems the study of political representation is faced with. Political representation is a process that was present at the end of the 90ies in Hungary and Poland. The discrepancies between citizens and political parties' preferences were low despite political institutional instability. Political representation increases according to issue saliency rankings. It decreases when political parties have less cohesive representatives. Social issues are better represented compared to economic reform topics. Unlike the findings of Miller and Stokes (1963) Hungarian and Polish citizens know how to place themselves on a foreign policy issue like the integration in NATO and European Union. The quality of political representation on the left right axis is not related to representation on issues. However individual ideological orientation of the MPs shows that in Poland a leftist MP is more congruent with its voters than a right wing one. Party discipline is associated with improved congruence and surprisingly in Hungary representatives of extremist parties are less disciplined than moderate parties. All these findings reveal the presence of political representation in a political context in which there is party instability, politicians and citizens are new to the game of democratic politics.

Transition in Hungary and Poland was marked by political failures and successes, economic hardships, protest and citizens dissatisfaction. Political representation would seem an unlikely outcome after only ten years of radical transformation. Yet it developed and consolidated over the years showing that the democratic reforms and practices have positive outcomes allowing for citizens to obtain a fair representation of their preferences.

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ANNEXES

A1. Questions from the Hungarian questionnaire on MPs and citizens

Hungary 1998

1. Privatisation

State enterprises must be privatised quickly, the non-profitable ones to be closed down.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

State enterprises must be kept in the hands of the state, the non-profitable ones must be modernized with the help of the state budget.

2. Territorial inequalities

The difference between the underdeveloped and rich areas must be diminished by state regulation.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

One must leave for the enterprises to decide where to invest. Territorial inequalities should not be artificially diminished.

3. Role of church

Religion and churches must be kept away from politics.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Churches must fight for their right to implement their views and their justified demands in politics.

4. Role of former nomenclatura

It is extremely harmful if the office holders of the Kadar regime have a decisive influence in enterprises and institutions.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

There are exceptions, but usually those are the best leaders who gained experiences already in the Kádár-regime.

5. Foreign capital

The inflow of foreign capital must be regulated, since it subordinates the Hungarian economy to foreign interests

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

It does not matter whether the capital is Hungarian or foreign, the point is that it helps production and creates working places.

6. Tuition fees

University studies must be free for the students One should introduce tuition fee which covers the costs of higher education.

0_____1_____2_____3_____4_____5_____6_____7_____8_____9_____10

7. Foreign policy

Our foreign policy should strive for joining NATO and European Union as soon as possible Our foreign policy should strive for political and economic independence.

0_____1_____2_____3_____4_____5_____6_____7_____8_____9_____10

8. Family policy

The proper family policy is that every family with children receives GYED, GYES, and family allowance. It is not proper if the rich families receive the same support as the others.

0_____1_____2_____3_____4_____5_____6_____7_____8_____9_____10

A2. Questions from the Polish questionnaire on MPs and citizens in 1997 and 2001

Poland 1997 and 2001

1. Crime prevention

Crime policies should be "tough" even if they restrict basic freedoms of average citizens

0_____1_____2_____3_____4_____5_____6_____7_____8_____9_____10

Crime ought to be fought against, but the policies should not restrict basic freedoms of average citizens

2. Privatization

State owned enterprises should be privatized quickly; the inefficient ones should be liquidated

0_____1_____2_____3_____4_____5_____6_____7_____8_____9_____10

Enterprises should remain state property and their modernization financed from the state budget

3. Role of church and religion in public life

The Church should be completely separated from the state and should not interfere with politics

0_____1_____2_____3_____4_____5_____6_____7_____8_____9_____10

The Church should exert influence over politics and state policies

4. Former "communist nomenklatura" problem

Individuals occupying high positions under communism ('nomenklatura') should now be forbidden to perform responsible state functions

0_____1_____2_____3_____4_____5_____6_____7_____8_____9_____10

These individuals ('nomenklatura') should have the same rights as all others in competing for public offices and state positions

5. Unemployment

Fighting unemployment should be an absolute policy priority of the government, even if it leads to higher spending and inflation

0_____1_____2_____3_____4_____5_____6_____7_____8_____9_____10

Many other - more important than unemployment -issues should be governmental priority, i.e. balanced budget, fighting inflation, etc

6. Tax policy

The higher one's income, the higher the percentage at which it should be taxed

Everyone should be taxed the same percentage of his/her income, irrespective of the income level

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

7. Foreign policy (joining EU)

Our foreign policy should pursue joining the EU as soon as possible

Polish foreign policy should not pursue joining the EU, and should instead protect our political and economic sovereignty

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

8. Agricultural policy

Agriculture should receive subsidies from the budget and should be protected by duties, even if it leads to price growth of agricultural products

Agriculture should not receive subsidies from the budget and should not be protected by duties, because it stops the process of its reform and thus leads to price growth of agricultural products

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

9. State social responsibility

The state should grant its citizens the widest possible social safety net, i.e. free health care, social welfare, education, etc.

Citizens should take their own responsibility for their healthcare, children's education, etc.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

10. Inflow of foreign capital

It should not matter whether capital is Polish or foreign, as long as it boosts investment, production and creates new employment opportunities

Inflows of foreign capital should be deliberately limited as it makes the Polish economy dependent upon foreigners

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11. Abortion

A woman - if she decides so - should have a free choice of abortion at any time

A woman - irrespectively of her social situation and health condition - should have no right to abortion

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

(asked only in 1997)

12. Public administration reform

Radical reform of public administration
should be implemented as fast as
possible

In current political and economic situation
reform of public administration should not be
implemented

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____ 5 _____ 6 _____ 7 _____ 8 _____ 9 _____ 10

(asked only in 1997 and only the representatives were asked)

A3. The list and names of the surveyed political parties in Poland and Hungary

The political parties in Poland and Hungary

Poland 1997

SLD	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	Democratic Left Alliance
PSL	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowej	Polish Peasants' Party)
UW	Unia Wolności	Freedom Union
AWS	Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność	Solidarity Electoral Action

Poland 2001

SLD	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	Democratic Left Alliance
PSL	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe	Polish Peasants' Party
PO	Platforma Obywatelska	Citizenship Platform
PiS	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	Law and Justice
SRP	Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej	Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland
LPR	Liga Polskich Rodzin	League of Polish Families

Hungary 1998

MSZP	Magyar Szocialista Párt	Hungarian Socialist Party
FIDESZ	Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség	The FIDESZ - The Hungarian Civic Union
FKgP	Független Kisgazda, Földmunkás és Polgári Párt	The Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party
SZDSZ	Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége – a Magyar Liberális Párt	Alliance of Free Democrats – The Hungarian Liberal Party
MIEP	Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja	Hungarian Justice and Life Party

Annex for chapter 6

A6.1. Poland 1997 Political preferences on issues of parties and voters

		SLD	PSL	UW	AWS
Left-right	Perceived position of voters				
	MP's position	2,8 (1,4)	4,9 (0,9)	6,1 (1,2)	7,5 (1,2)
	Voter position	2,6 (1,9)	4,9 (2,4)	6,1 (1,9)	7,8 (2,0)
	All non-voters position	1,9 (2,1)	3,9 (2,2)	5,5 (2,0)	7,9 (2,5)
	Perceived position of party by MP	-	-	-	-
	Perceived position of party by voters				
Crime prevention	Perceived position of voters	4,6 (2,9)	4,3 (3,1)	6,0 (2,6)	4,1 (3,4)
	MP's position	5,7 (3,2)	4,3 (2,9)	6,5 (3,0)	3,9 (3,2)
	Voter position	3,9 (3,8)	3,6 (4,1)	5,3 (3,8)	4,1 (4,0)
	Perceived position of party by MP	6,1 (2,8)	4,8 (3,0)	7,1 (1,8)	4,6 (2,6)
	Perceived position of party by voter	-	-	-	-
		SLD	PSL	UW	AWS
Privatization	Perceived position of voters	5,6 (2,2)	6,2 (2,4)	2,8 (2,3)	4,6 (2,0)
	MP's position	4,6 (2,3)	5,7 (2,3)	1,3 (1,8)	3,6 (2,4)
	Voter position	5,0 (3,1)	6,6 (2,8)	3,8 (3,2)	5,0 (3,1)
	Perceived position of party by MP	4,9 (1,9)	6,5 (2,2)	2,1 (2,1)	4,5 (1,6)
	Perceived position of party by voter	4,5 (2,4)	6,1 (2,7)	2,8 (2,8)	4,8 (3,0)
		SLD	PSL	UW	AWS
Role of church in politics	Perceived position of voters	2,8 (1,6)	4,6 (1,6)	3,4 (1,4)	6,3 (1,9)
	MP's position	1,0 (1,5)	3,0 (2,0)	2,2 (1,8)	5,9 (2,2)
	Voter position	1,0 (1,9)	1,9 (2,3)	2,2 (2,7)	4,4 (3,6)
	Perceived position of party by MP	1,3 (1,8)	4,0 (2,0)	2,7 (1,4)	6,6 (1,8)
	Perceived position of party by voter	1,2 (1,9)	5,4 (2,5)	4,2 (2,5)	7,9 (2,3)
		SLD	PSL	UW	AWS
Role of nomenclatura	Perceived position of voters	7,7 (2,3)	4,7 (2,2)	4,4 (1,9)	1,7 (1,0)
	MP's position	8,4 (2,5)	5,3 (3,1)	4,5 (2,4)	1,1 (1,8)
	Voter position	6,5 (3,1)	5,2 (3,3)	3,5 (3,0)	2,2 (2,8)
	Perceived position of party by MP	8,4 (2,4)	5,6 (2,3)	4,9 (1,9)	7,0 (1,8)
	Perceived position of party by voter	7,5 (2,9)	6,1 (2,5)	3,6 (2,7)	2,0 (3,1)
		SLD	PSL	UW	AWS

		SLD	PSL	UW	AWS
Unemployment	Perceived position of voters	3,2 (2,2)	3,5 (1,8)	6,1 (1,8)	4,1 (2,1)
	MP's position	3,8 (2,4)	3,7 (2,0)	7,0 (1,7)	4,8 (2,3)
	Voter position	3,3 (3,1)	2,8 (2,9)	4,6 (3,0)	3,8 (3,0)
	Perceived position of party by MP	3,6 (2,1)	3,2 (1,5)	6,9 (1,7)	4,3 (1,7)
	Perceived position of party by voter	-	-	-	-
Taxation		SLD	PSL	UW	AWS
	Perceived position of voters	3,0 (2,1)	3,1 (1,9)	6,1 (2,2)	4,3 (2,2)
	MP's position	3,6 (2,8)	2,7 (1,5)	7,3 (2,4)	5,7 (2,8)
	Voter position	3,1 (3,3)	2,7 (3,3)	3,6 (3,2)	2,6 (3,0)
	Perceived position of party by MP	3,3 (2,2)	2,6 (1,5)	6,7 (1,6)	6,0 (4,6)
Joining the EU	Perceived position of voters	3,7 (2,8)	3,6 (2,7)	4,5 (2,7)	3,6 (3,0)
	MP's position	-	-	-	-
	Voter position	-	-	-	-
	Perceived position of party by MP	-	-	-	-
	Perceived position of party by voter	-	-	-	-
Agricultural policy		SLD	PSL	UW	AWS
	Perceived position of voters	4,1 (2,1)	7,2 (2,0)	2,1 (1,6)	4,3 (2,2)
	MP's position	2,8 (2,6)	6,2 (2,5)	1,5 (2,2)	3,5 (2,6)
	Voter position	3,2 (2,9)	4,4 (3,1)	3,2 (3,1)	3,1 (3,0)
	Perceived position of party by MP	2,6 (2,4)	7,1 (2,0)	1,1 (1,2)	3,2 (1,8)
Social responsibility of the state	Perceived position of voters	-	-	-	-
	MP's position	-	-	-	-
	Voter position	-	-	-	-
	Perceived position of party by MP	-	-	-	-
	Perceived position of party by voter	-	-	-	-

		SLD	PSL	UW	AWS
Foreign capital	Perceived position of voters	4,2 (1,7)	7,1 (2,0)	2,7 (1,3)	5,0 (1,7)
	MP's position	2,6 (2,2)	5,9 (2,2)	1,1 (1,4)	3,7 (2,2)
	Voter position	4,5 (3,2)	5,1 (3,6)	4,0 (3,0)	4,7 (3,2)
	Perceived position of party by MP	3,4 (1,9)	7,1 (1,7)	1,9 (1,4)	4,7 (1,7)
	Perceived position of party by voter	3,9 (2,8)	6,0 (2,7)	3,3 (2,8)	5,4 (2,8)
Abortion	Perceived position of voters	1,7 (1,4)	5,6 (1,8)	4,2 (1,3)	8,1 (1,6)
	MP's position	1,2 (1,6)	5,8 (3,0)	4,3 (3,4)	8,5 (1,7)
	Voter position	1,6 (2,4)	3,2 (3,3)	2,6 (2,9)	5,1 (3,8)
	Perceived position of party by MP	1,3 (1,8)	6,3 (1,7)	4,2 (1,4)	8,7 (1,0)
	Perceived position of party by voter	–	–	–	–
Public administration	Perceived position of voters	4,9 (2,1)	7,9 (1,4)	2,2 (1,7)	3,6 (2,1)
	MP's position	4,2 (2,8)	7,3 (2,2)	0,5 (1,1)	1,6 (2,2)
	Voter position	–	–	–	–
	Perceived position of party by MP	3,8 (2,0)	8,4 (1,4)	0,6 (0,9)	1,6 (1,4)
	Perceived position of party by voter	–	–	–	–

A6.2. Hungary 1998 Political preferences on issues of parties and voters

Left-right		MDF	SZDSZ	FKgP	MSZP	FIDESZ	MIEP
	Perceived position of voters						
	MP's position						
	Voter position	6,7 (1,7)	4,1 (1,7)	6 (2)	3,6 (2)	5,5 (1,8)	7,3 (2,3)
	Perceived position of party by MP	8 (1)	4,7 (0,5)	7,3 (1,7)	2,3 (1,2)	6,2 (1,1)	8,2 (1,6)
	Perceived position of party by voter						
Privatization		MDF	SZDSZ	FKgP	MSZP	FIDESZ	MIEP
	Perceived position of voters	4,7 (1,7)	2,7 (1,8)	5 (2,8)	5,1 (1,8)	3,8 (1,8)	6,2 (1,8)
	MP's position	3,7 (0,9)	1,4 (1)	4,4 (2,1)	3,6 (1,9)	3,7 (1,9)	5,8 (1,6)
	Voter position	5,5 (2,7)	4,4 (2,6)	6,1 (3,1)	5,2 (3,2)	5,6 (3,2)	6,9 (2,7)
	Perceived position of party by MP	3,3 (0,7)	1,5 (2,3)	4,5 (3,1)	3,3 (1,8)	3,5 (1,9)	6,6 (1,8)
	Perceived position of party by voter						
Territorial Inequalities		MDF	SZDSZ	FKgP	MSZP	FIDESZ	MIEP
	Perceived position of voters	2,7 (2)	5 (1,8)	2 (2,4)	2 (2,1)	2,9 (2)	2,1 (1,5)
	MP's position	3,5 (2,8)	4,7 (2)	3,3 (3,1)	2,6 (2,1)	3,1 (2,1)	3 (3,2)
	Voter position	3,4 (2,7)	3,7 (2,7)	3,6 (3,1)	3,7 (3,2)	3,9 (3,1)	3,1 (2,8)
	Perceived position of party by MP	3,6 (2,9)	6,1 (2,4)	3,5 (3,1)	3,2 (2,1)	3 (1,9)	2,5 (2,4)
	Perceived position of party by voter						
	Perceived position of voters						
Church-state		MDF	SZDSZ	FKgP	MSZP	FIDESZ	MIEP
	Perceived position of voters	5,6 (3)	1 (0,8)	6,7 (2,8)	2,1 (2)	5,1 (2,2)	7,6 (2)
	MP's position	7 (1)	0,7 (1,3)	6,7 (2,8)	1,2 (2,1)	4,9 (2,7)	7,4 (2,1)
	Voter position	3,1 (3,5)	1,9 (2,6)	3,2 (3,5)	2,3 (2,9)	3,3 (3,2)	3,7 (3,4)
	Perceived position of party by MP	6,6 (1,5)	0,5 (0,7)	7,4 (2,8)	1,3 (1,4)	5,2 (2,5)	7,3 (1,5)
	Perceived position of party by voter						
Communists		MDF	SZDSZ	FKgP	MSZP	FIDESZ	MIEP
	Perceived position of voters	2,5 (1,9)	3,6 (1,6)	2,4 (2)	6 (2)	2,3 (2,3)	1,2 (0,9)
	MP's position	3,7 (0,9)	4,1 (1,1)	1,8 (1,6)	5,5 (1,8)	1,9 (1,7)	1,4 (1,5)
	Voter position	2,2 (2,6)	4,7 (2,6)	3,9 (3,3)	5,9 (2,8)	3,5 (2,9)	2,9 (3,1)
	Perceived position of party by MP	2,1 (1)	4,7 (1,3)	2,7 (2,6)	5,7 (1,8)	1,9 (1,7)	1,6 (1,3)
	Perceived position of party by voter						

		MDF	SZDSZ	FKgP	MSZP	FIDESZ	MIEP
Foreign Capital	Perceived position of voters	4 (2,5)	8,2 (0,8)	5,4 (2,7)	6,3 (2,1)	5,3 (2,2)	2,8 (2,9)
	MP's position	4,5 (2,3)	9,1 (1)	5,7 (2,7)	8,6 (1,3)	6,9 (1,8)	2,5 (3,1)
	Voter position	4,2 (3,2)	5,9 (3)	4,5 (3,7)	5,6 (3,4)	5 (3,4)	2,4 (3)
	Perceived position of party by MP	nr	9,1 (0,9)	5,2 (2,6)	8 (1,5)	6,1 (1,9)	2,8 (2,8)
	Perceived position of party by voter						
Tuition fees		MDF	SZDSZ	FKgP	MSZP	FIDESZ	MIEP
	Perceived position of voters	2,5 (1,7)	6,3 (2,3)	1,2 (1,3)	3,7 (1,9)	1,9 (1,9)	1,8 (2,2)
	MP's position	3 (4,3)	7,3 (1,8)	1,7 (2,4)	4,7 (2,1)	2,4 (1,9)	2,5 (2)
	Voter position	2 (2,7)	3,7 (3,1)	2 (2,8)	2,5 (3)	1,8 (2,4)	2,8 (3,2)
	Perceived position of party by MP	1,6 (2)	7,4 (1,8)	1,1 (1,3)	5,5 (1,9)	1,7 (1,9)	2,1 (1,4)
NATO and EU	Perceived position of party by voter						
		MDF	SZDSZ	FKgP	MSZP	FIDESZ	MIEP
	Perceived position of voters	3,2 (1,5)	0,9 (0,9)	2,6 (2,6)	2,4 (1,7)	2,5 (1,9)	7,3 (2,6)
	MP's position	2,7 (1,5)	1 (1,2)	3,2 (3,1)	1,2 (2)	2,1 (1,8)	6,6 (2,6)
	Voter position	3,5 (3,2)	2,3 (2,7)	4,7 (3,7)	2,7 (3,1)	3,5 (3,2)	6,2 (3,3)
Family policy	Perceived position of party by MP	2,8 (1,9)	0,5 (0,9)	3,8 (3,5)	1,1 (1,7)	1,9 (1,8)	7,7 (2,7)
	Perceived position of party by voter						
		MDF	SZDSZ	FKgP	MSZP	FIDESZ	MIEP
	Perceived position of voters	1,5 (1)	7 (2)	1,7 (2,5)	6 (2,9)	1,7 (1,8)	3,2 (3,1)
	MP's position	1,5 (1,9)	8,7 (2,3)	1,6 (2,5)	8,8 (2,1)	1,5 (1,7)	4,4 (3,8)
	Voter position	4,2 (4,2)	4,4 (3,7)	4,2 (4)	4,4 (4)	3,4 (3,6)	5,3 (4,1)
	Perceived position of party by MP	1,5 (1,9)	9,2 (1,2)	1,9 (2,6)	8,3 (1,6)	1,1 (1,8)	2,8 (3,2)
	Perceived position of party by voter						

A6.3. Poland 2002 Political preferences on issues of parties and voters

		SLD-UP	PSL	PO	SRP	PiS	LPR	UP
Left-right	Perceived position of voters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	MP's position	2,8 (1,6)	4,7 (0,9)	7,1 (1,3)	4 (2,4)	8,3 (1,1)	9,4 (0,9)	2,9 (1,4)
	Voter position	2,6 (2)	5,1 (2,1)	6,5 (2,1)	5 (2,5)	6,8 (2,1)	7,2 (2,3)	2,6 (2)
	All non-voters position	1,4 (2,3)	4,3 (2,2)	6 (2,4)	4,9 (2,4)	6,3 (2,3)	6,7 (2,8)	4,6 (2,3)
	Perceived position of party by MP	2,6 (1,5)	4,3 (1,1)	7,2 (0,9)	4,3 (2,3)	7,7 (1,1)	9,3 (0,9)	1,7 (2,1)
	Perceived position of party by voters	1,3 (2,1)	4,9 (2,8)	7,2 (1,9)	5,1 (2,5)	7,6 (2,1)	8,6 (1,8)	
Crime prevention		SLD	PSL	PO	SRP	PiS	LPR	UP
	Perceived position of voters	3,5 (2,5)	3 (2,7)	4,3 (2,4)	4,4 (3,4)	0,8 (1)	3,2 (3,2)	1,6 (1,5)
	MP's position	5,3 (2,7)	3,4 (2,5)	4,1 (3)	4,8 (3,4)	1,1 (1,2)	4,1 (4,1)	1,9 (3)
	Voter position	3,3 (3,8)	4,1 (4,1)	4,1 (3,7)	3,3 (3,8)	3,2 (3,6)	4,3 (4)	3,3 (3,8)
	Perceived position of party by MP	6,5 (2,2)	4,2 (2,3)	5,6 (2,2)	4,4 (3,4)	1,9 (2,4)	3,9 (3,2)	3,7 (1,9)
Privatization	Perceived position of party by voter	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		SLD	PSL	PO	SRP	PiS	LPR	UP
	Perceived position of voters	5,8 (2,1)	7,5 (1,3)	3,1 (2,7)	8,7 (1,2)	5,3 (1,6)	7,3 (2,8)	6,9 (2,1)
	MP's position	5 (2,2)	5,3 (1,4)	2,1 (2,4)	8,6 (1,3)	3,5 (2,4)	8,4 (1,5)	4,5 (2,7)
	Voter position	7,2 (2,7)	7,8 (2,4)	5,7 (3,2)	7,4 (3)	6 (3,3)	7,4 (2,4)	7,2 (2,7)
Role of church in politics	Perceived position of party by MP	5,7 (1,8)	6,7 (1,9)	2,3 (1,9)	8,4 (1,6)	1,0 (1,5)	8 (1,6)	6,2 (2,3)
	Perceived position of party by voter	5,2 (2,6)	6,4 (2,6)	3,3 (2,8)	6,9 (2,8)	5,2 (2,6)	6,3 (3,1)	-
		SLD	PSL	PO	SRP	PiS	LPR	UP
	Perceived position of voters	1,6 (1,2)	4,1 (1,6)	3,5 (1,8)	0,7 (0,8)	6,3 (1,4)	8,3 (2,1)	1,2 (1)
	MP's position	1,2 (1,3)	3,4 (2,3)	3 (2,4)	1 (1,1)	6,8 (1,7)	8 (2,1)	1,1 (2,2)
Role of nomenclatura	Voter position	1,1 (2)	1,8 (2,3)	2,3 (3,1)	2,5 (3,1)	2,2 (3)	5,2 (3,7)	1,1 (2)
	Perceived position of party by MP	1,8 (1,8)	4,3 (1,8)	2,7 (1,8)	0,9 (1,3)	6,7 (1,2)	8 (2,4)	1,5 (1,8)
	Perceived position of party by voter	1,5 (2,6)	4,7 (2,2)	4,2 (2,7)	4,4 (2,4)	4,5 (2,4)	8,1 (2,4)	-
		SLD	PSL	PO	SRP	PiS	LPR	UP
	Perceived position of voters	6,8 (2,8)	4,9 (1,3)	3,1 (1,9)	5,6 (3,5)	1,2 (1,1)	0,8 (1,5)	6 (2,9)
	MP's position	7,2 (2,9)	5,1 (1,1)	3,1 (2,3)	5,8 (3,5)	1,3 (1,7)	1,5 (2,5)	9,3 (1,6)
	Voter position	6,3 (3,3)	5 (3,3)	3,8 (3,2)	4,6 (3,6)	3,9 (3,3)	3,2 (3,1)	6,3 (3,3)
	Perceived position of party by MP	8,3 (2,0)	5,5 (1,2)	3,4 (1,5)	5,7 (2,7)	1 (1,2)	0,9 (1,5)	8,2 (2,2)
	Perceived position of party by voter	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

		SLD	PSL	PO	SRP	PiS	LPR	UP
Unemployment	Perceived position of voters	1,3 (1,3)	2,1 (1,8)	4 (2,2)	1,8 (2,6)	2,6 (1,7)	0,7 (0,6)	0,4 (0,8)
	MP's position	2 (1,7)	2 (1,4)	4,5 (1,8)	2,3 (2,6)	3,2 (2)	0,9 (0,8)	0,3 (0,6)
	Voter position	1,5 (2,5)	1,3 (2,2)	2,7 (3,1)	1,5 (2,5)	1,5 (2,2)	1,8 (3)	1,5 (2,5)
	Perceived position of party by MP	1,8 (1,3)	2,6 (1,6)	5 (2,2)	2,5 (3,3)	3,5 (1,7)	0,8 (0,7)	0,8 (1,1)
	Perceived position of party by voter	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
		SLD	PSL	PO	SRP	PiS	LPR	UP
Taxation	Perceived position of voters	2,4 (1,9)	1 (1,2)	7,8 (2,3)	2,3 (2,5)	4,1 (1,2)	1,7 (1,5)	1,6 (1,3)
	MP's position	3,1 (2,4)	1,7 (1,4)	9,3 (1,2)	2,3 (2,6)	5,5 (3,5)	3,4 (3)	1,3 (1,7)
	Voter position	2,9 (3,4)	2,9 (3,4)	4 (3,6)	2 (2,9)	3,4 (3,6)	2,6 (3,2)	2,9 (3,4)
	Perceived position of party by MP	3,3 (2,4)	1,8 (1,4)	8,9 (2,0)	4,4 (2,8)	4,6 (1,9)	2,5 (1,7)	1,1 (1,2)
	Perceived position of party by voter	3,6 (2,8)	3,3 (2,6)	6,7 (3,2)	3 (2,9)	4,6 (2,6)	3,4 (2,6)	–
		SLD	PSL	PO	SRP	PiS	LPR	UP
Joining the EU	Perceived position of voters	3,1 (1,7)	6,1 (2)	1,3 (1,8)	9 (2,2)	4,5 (1,9)	9,4 (1,2)	3,2 (1,8)
	MP's position	1,3 (1,4)	4,7 (1,4)	0,9 (1,9)	8,4 (2,3)	4,1 (2,6)	9,8 (0,6)	2,4 (2,7)
	Voter position	4,7 (3,3)	6 (3,6)	3,6 (3,3)	6,1 (3)	4,9 (3,7)	6,8 (3,2)	–
	Perceived position of party by MP	1,0 (1,2)	4,5	0,8 (1,0)	9,2 (0,9)	4,8 (2,3)	10 (0)	1,8 (1,9)
	Perceived position of party by voter	3 (2,9)	6,5 (2,6)	2,6 (3)	7,1 (2,6)	4 (2,9)	7 (3,1)	–
		SLD	PSL	PO	SRP	PiS	LPR	UP
Agricultural policy	Perceived position of voters	3,1 (1,8)	1,1 (0,8)	5 (2,6)	1,6 (3,4)	4,1 (1,4)	2,3 (2,7)	3,3 (1,4)
	MP's position	3,1 (2)	2,3 (1,6)	5,1 (2,5)	1,5 (2,5)	4,5 (2,7)	1,8 (1,8)	3,7 (2,4)
	Voter position	2,7 (2,7)	1,4 (2,1)	3,7 (3,1)	2,2 (2,8)	2,4 (2,7)	2,2 (2,7)	–
	Perceived position of party by MP	2,7 (1,9)	2,0 (1,5)	5,9 (2,1)	0,8 (1,3)	4,4 (1,6)	1,4 (1,6)	2,6 (1,6)
	Perceived position of party by voter	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
		SLD	PSL	PO	SRP	PiS	LPR	UP
Social responsibility of the state	Perceived position of voters	1,8 (1,6)	1,3 (1)	4,8 (2,5)	1,3 (2)	3,6 (1,2)	1,1 (0,8)	2,3 (1,3)
	MP's position	2,2 (1,5)	2,4 (1,5)	5 (2,4)	1,4 (2,1)	5 (2,4)	1,6 (1,5)	2,4 (1,3)
	Voter position	1,7 (2,3)	1,4 (1,8)	2,5 (2,7)	1,7 (2,5)	1,9 (2,5)	1,3 (2,1)	–
	Perceived position of party by MP	2,2 (1,8)	2,1 (1,2)	5,9 (1,7)	1,5 (3,1)	4,1 (1,4)	1,4	2,7 (2,2)
	Perceived position of party by voter	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

	SLD	PSL	PO	SRP	PiS	LPR	UP
Foreign capital	Perceived position of voters	4,3 (2,1)	6 (2,2)	1,9 (1,9)	7,2 (3,1)	5,1 (2)	9,2 (0,9)
	MP's position	2,8 (1,8)	4,4 (2,4)	1,5 (1,5)	6,6 (3,3)	4,3 (3)	8,4 (1,8)
	Voter position	5 (3,4)	6,7 (3,2)	3,7 (3,1)	5,6 (3,5)	5,6 (3,6)	5,2 (3,5)
	Perceived position of party by MP	2,9 (1,7)	5,3 (2,0)	1,2 (1,3)	6,6 (3,3)	5 (1,6)	9,3 (1)
	Perceived position of party by voter	–	–	–	–	–	–

Annex for chapter 8

Table A8.1. Correlation between issues and the left right scale (Placement party by members of parliament) in Hungary 1998

Correlations								
	lr	score of congruence or privatisation	score of congruence on territorial inequalities	score of congruence on church and state	score of congruence on nomenclatura	score of congruence on foreign capital	score of congruence on nato and eu	score of congruence on family policy
lr	Pearson Correlation	1	-.029	-.023	.294**	.222	-.217**	.121
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.690	.755	.000	.002	.098	.000
	N	193	192	192	190	192	192	192
score of congruence on privatisation	Pearson Correlation	-.029	1	.043	.009	.107	.228**	-.058
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.690	.545	.903	.132	.001	.421
	N	192	198	198	196	198	198	195
score of congruence on territorial inequalities	Pearson Correlation	-.023	.043	1	.163*	.095	.167*	.194**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.755	.545	.022	.181	.019	.008
	N	192	198	198	196	198	198	195
score of congruence on church and state	Pearson Correlation	.264**	.009	.163*	1	.289**	-.002	.232**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.903	.022	.000	.977	.001
	N	190	198	198	196	196	198	193
score of congruence on nomenclatura	Pearson Correlation	.222**	.107	.095	.219**	1	.000	.228**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.002	.132	.181	.000	.995	.001
	N	192	198	198	196	198	198	195
score of congruence on foreign capital	Pearson Correlation	-.217**	.228**	.167*	-.002	.000	1	.085
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.002	.001	.019	.377	.996	.232
	N	192	198	198	196	198	198	195
score of congruence on nato and eu	Pearson Correlation	.121	-.058	.194**	.212**	.228**	.095	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.096	.421	.006	.001	.232	.000
	N	192	198	198	196	198	198	195
score of congruence on family policy	Pearson Correlation	-.497**	.081	.260**	-.038	-.177*	.441**	-.010
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.205	.000	.596	.000	.090
	N	189	195	195	193	195	195	195

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table A8.2. Correlation between issues and the left right scale (self-placement of members of Sejm) in Poland 1997

Correlations									
	All Lemniscates	score of congruence on privatisation	score of congruence on territorial inequalities	score of congruence on church and state	score of congruence on nomenclatura	score of congruence on foreign capital	score of congruence on nato and eu	score of congruence on family policy	score of congruence on agricultural and social issues
All Lemniscates	Pearson Correlation	1	.134	.302	.314	.331	.335	.377	.385
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.078	.029	.078	.008	.023	.026	.026
	N	176	194	188	193	178	173	176	172
score of congruence on privatisation	Pearson Correlation	.134	1	.314	.365**	.367**	.369**	.362	.352
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.078	.056	.011	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	174	136	165	172	171	172	173	171
score of congruence on territorial inequalities	Pearson Correlation	.092	.014	1	.214	.296**	.265**	.237*	.214**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.079	.056	.149	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	166	165	166	163	164	164	165	163
score of congruence on church and state	Pearson Correlation	.134	.302**	.194	1	.364**	.369**	.369**	.359**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.078	.000	.149	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	173	172	163	173	171	172	171	169
score of congruence on nomenclatura	Pearson Correlation	.176	.307**	.311	.208**	1	.369**	.392**	.396**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.029	.000	.007	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	173	172	163	173	171	172	171	169
score of congruence on foreign capital	Pearson Correlation	.130	.000	.007	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.078	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	173	172	163	173	172	171	172	169
score of congruence on nato and eu	Pearson Correlation	.139	.307**	.305**	.204**	1	.393**	.399**	.399**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.068	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	174	172	164	171	172	171	172	170
score of congruence on family policy	Pearson Correlation	.177	.305**	.305**	.205**	.205**	1	.392**	.394**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.029	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	173	172	163	173	171	173	172	170
score of congruence on agricultural and social issues	Pearson Correlation	.188	.307**	.304	.206**	.206**	1	.394**	.397**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.029	.000	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	174	173	164	171	172	173	172	171
score of congruence on agricultural and social issues	Pearson Correlation	.171	.304	.287**	.268**	.267**	.266**	1	.395**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.024	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	175	173	165	172	172	173	172	171
score of congruence on social responsibility	Pearson Correlation	.179	.304**	.214**	.266**	.266**	.266**	1	.354**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.021	.000	.006	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	175	173	165	172	172	173	172	171
score of congruence on foreign capital	Pearson Correlation	.185	.307**	.211**	.266**	.266**	.266**	.266**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.029	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	174	172	164	171	171	172	171	171
score of congruence on education	Pearson Correlation	.176	.307	.304	.211**	.266**	.266**	.266**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.029	.000	.005	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	177	175	171	171	171	172	171	172
score of congruence on education	Pearson Correlation	.176	.307	.304	.211**	.266**	.266**	.266**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.029	.000	.005	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	177	175	171	171	171	172	171	172

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table A8.3. Correlation between issues and the left right scale (self-placement of members of Sejm) in Poland 2001

Correlations										
		score of congruence on crime prevention	score of congruence on privatization	score of congruence on church state	score of congruence on nomenclatura	score of congruence on taxation	score of congruence on EU	score of congruence on religion	score of congruence on state social responsibility	neoliberalism
1		-1.00	.267*	.543*	.446	.376*	.369*	-.673	.173	.167*
	Finance Comittee		.258	.079	.808	.583	.063	.038	.429	.063
	Big G-Milieu		.126	.129	.126	.125	.123	.128	.120	.120
	N		128	126	129	125	123	128	120	120
score of congruence on crime prevention	Finance Comittee		-1.03	.5	-.016	.583	.061	.007	.146	.092
	Big G-Milieu		.258	.079	.912	.261	.063	.342	.105	.315
	N		128	126	129	126	125	.128	.120	.120
score of congruence on privatization	Finance Comittee		.269*	-.026	1	.851	.655	.326**	.267*	.427*
	Big G-Milieu		.029	.879	.504	.551	.063	.034	.680	.081
	N		128	126	129	126	125	.128	.120	.120
score of congruence on church state	Finance Comittee		.543*	-.016	1	.061	.164	.199*	-.161	.184*
	Big G-Milieu		.008	.912	.584	.580	.073	.029	.679	.034
	N		128	126	129	126	125	.128	.120	.120
score of congruence on nomenclatura	Finance Comittee		-.049	.190	.056	.806	1	.063	.172	.261**
	Big G-Milieu		.503	.261	.581	.908	.077	.054	.081	.051
	N		128	126	129	126	125	.128	.120	.120
score of congruence on taxation	Finance Comittee		.339*	.041	.326**	.154	.683	1	.316*	.132
	Big G-Milieu		.008	.866	.083	.873	.577	.038	.161	.083
	N		128	126	129	126	125	.128	.120	.120
score of congruence on EU	Finance Comittee		.395*	.043	.290**	.119*	.577	.314**	1	.198
	Big G-Milieu		.008	.347	.084	.829	.654	.063	.134	.083
	N		128	126	129	126	125	.128	.120	.120
score of congruence on religion	Finance Comittee		-.073	.146	.427**	-.101	.291**	.332	.138	1
	Big G-Milieu		.429	.196	.083	.879	.681	.181	.134	.023
	N		128	126	129	126	125	.128	.120	.120
religion	Finance Comittee		.178	.092	.284**	.114*	.579	.334**	.363*	1
	Big G-Milieu		.003	.316	.081	.834	.651	.063	.038	.005
	N		128	126	129	126	125	.128	.120	.120
score of congruence on social responsibility of the state	Finance Comittee		.388*	-.193	.327*	.319*	.1666	.342**	.367*	.094
	Big G-Milieu		.008	.146	.083	.808	.549	.063	.038	.210
	N		128	126	129	126	125	.128	.120	.120
neoliberalism	Finance Comittee		.161*	.146	.287*	.105*	.514	-.013	.002	.254**
	Big G-Milieu		.048	.129	.081	.843	.214	.083	.033	.085
	N		128	126	129	126	125	.128	.120	.120

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 8.11. Correlation between issues and left right placement of elite in Poland and Hungary

Issue	Hungary 1998	Poland 1997	Poland 2002
Crime prevention	—	-.069	-.273**
Privatization	.072*	.001	-.164
Church state	.121**	.197**	.680**
Nomenclatura	-.270**	-.078**	-.651**
Unemployment	—	-.006	.363**
Taxation	—	-.021	.438**
European Union	.116**	-.054	.248**
Agricultural policy	—	.039	.210*
State social responsibility	—	.032	.391**
Foreign capital	-.180**	.124	.155
Abortion	—	-.011	—
Territorial inequalities	-.005	—	—
Tuition fees in universities	-.042	—	—
Family Policy	-.019	—	—

*<.05, **<.01

Table 8.12. Correlation between issues and left right placement of citizens in Poland and Hungary

Issue	Hungary 1998	Poland 1997	Poland 2002
Crime prevention	–	-.091**	-.077*
Privatization	.072*	.063*	.048
Church state	.121**	.138**	.076*
Nomenclatura	-.270**	-.110**	-.053
Unemployment	–	-.099**	-.034
Taxation	–	-.047	-.048
European Union	.116**	-.031	.097**
Agricultural policy	–	-.128**	-.092**
State social responsibility	–	-.091**	-.088**
Foreign capital	-.180**	.124**	-.011
Abortion	–	.107**	–
Territorial inequalities	-.005	–	–
Tuition fees in universities	-.042	–	–
Family Policy	-.019	–	–

*<.05, **<.01



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